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Abstract
Gender inequality remains a pressing social issue around the world. Due to recent social
movements, feminism has become a part of the cultural zeitgeist, and an increasing number
of people have begun identifying as feminists in recent years. However, many modern
feminists maintain a sense of ambivalence about the movement and their place within it. This
ambivalence is difficult to study because the tools designed to evaluate feminist attitudes and
identity do not capture this or other important and common aspects of modern feminist
identity, such as fear of stigma, solidarity with other feminists, and competence to engage in
feminist activism. Given that modern feminism is not well-understood by psychological
researchers, I conducted six studies to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the
subject. In Study 1, I provide a critical review of measures of feminist identity and attitudes
over the past fifty years. In Study 2, I conducted a grounded theory analysis of interviews
with 26 women and nonbinary feminist-identified people to develop a framework for
understanding the areas in which these individuals felt uncertain or ambivalent about their
beliefs and identities. In Studies 3-5, I developed and validated a new measure of feminist
social identity (the Feminist Social Identity Scale) that evaluates six distinct components of
modern feminist identity: four aligned identity subscales (Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity,
Centrality) and two ambivalent identity subscales (Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty). In Study 3, I
provide evidence of structural (exploratory factor analysis) and external validity (convergent
and discriminant validity) for the FSIS. In Study 4, I provide additional evidence of structural
(confirmatory factor analysis) and external validity (convergent validity) for the measure. In
Study 5, I provide further evidence of the tool’s external validity (convergent validity,
known-groups validity, incremental validity, criterion validity). In Study 6, I engaged in
reflexive thematic analysis to analyze interviews with 28 men about their experiences
adopting a feminist identity, and the ways their identities as feminists have shifted and grown
over time. Taken together, this dissertation reflects a series of studies geared at understanding
the ways that feminist identities are negotiated in the present cultural context.
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Summary for Lay Audience
Feminism refers to the movement to end sexist oppression. While most people support the
goals of the feminist movement, the stigma surrounding feminism has deterred many from
identifying themselves as feminists to other people. However, as feminism has become
mainstream, more people than ever are calling themselves feminists. This would seem like a
welcome step forward for the feminist movement; yet, many people who call themselves
feminists maintain ambivalent feelings about the feminist movement and their place within it,
which may reduce their willingness to engage in behaviours consistent with their feminist
identity. This dissertation examines feminist identity ambivalence and its consequences. In
Study 1, I analyzed existing measures of feminist identity and attitudes to determine the
appropriateness of these tools for studying modern feminism. In Study 2, I interviewed 26
women and nonbinary people who identify as feminists to develop a better understanding of
the domains of ambivalence within their feminist identities. This analysis led to the new
theoretical development of a framework for understanding ambivalent feminist identity, and
its downstream effects on mental body-related attitudes and feminist activism. In Studies 3
through 5, I developed and tested a new measure of feminist identity, which contains
subscales to evaluate both aligned (i.e., feminist beliefs, competence as a feminist, solidarity
with other feminists, and centrality of feminist identity) and ambivalent (i.e., fear of
experiencing stigma for being a feminist, uncertainty about feminist identity) aspects of
feminist identity. These studies revealed that the scale is reliable, valid, related to other
constructs related to feminist identity, and can help to predict behaviours of interest above
other commonly-used measures of gender attitudes. Finally, in Study 6, I interviewed 28 men
who identify as feminists to understand how their feminist identities develop and grow over
time. Overall, these six studies help to update the field’s understanding of modern feminism
as it is lived and experienced by people across the gender spectrum.
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Chapter 1

1

Literature Review

In recent years, feminism has become a cornerstone of popular culture. Once regarded as
a “derided and repudiated identity” (Gill, 2016, p. 611), the general public has
increasingly embraced the feminist label (Ballard, 2018; Gallagher, 2019; Siegel, 2020).
Inspired by feminist campaigns such as the 2017 Women’s March, the Everyday Sexism
Project, and #metoo, feminism has achieved new visibility in today’s cultural climate. In
fact, in a recent Pew Research study of over 1500 women, 61% of women and 40% of
men reported that the term “feminist” described them “very well” or “somewhat well”
(Barroso, 2020). However, once a unitary social movement with clear goals and specific
agendas, the feminist movement has diversified and expanded over the past few decades,
and it is unclear what is meant when people use the term “feminist” to describe
themselves. Indeed, even self-identified feminists provide vastly different definitions of
the term (Swirsky & Angelone, 2016). Existing measures of feminist identity are
inadequate for understanding the complexity and multidimensionality of feminist social
identity today (Siegel & Calogero, 2021), and the development of a new measure of
feminist identity, grounded in social psychological research, is warranted.
As evidenced by the multiplicity of scales used to assess feminist identity and attitudes
(Siegel & Calogero, 2021), psychologists have long been interested in the psychology of
feminism and feminists. These instruments, however, do not capture the nuances of
feminist social identity. In order to make more appropriate predictions about feminist
identity, it is important that instruments used to measure the construct reflect people’s
lived experiences of feminist identity. Similarly, most of these instruments are also
derived from feminist theory, rather than social psychological theory, thereby making it
difficult to test empirically-driven hypotheses derived from social psychological research.
In this dissertation, I present six mixed-method studies that explore how feminist social
identity is lived and experienced by individuals across the gender spectrum, and develop
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and validate the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS), a new multi-dimensional measure
of feminist social identity. In Study 1, I provide a critical review of extant measures of
feminist attitudes and identity, highlighting these tool’s utility for understanding modern
feminist identity. In Study 2, I present the results of a grounded theory analysis that
elucidate the domains in which feminist serves as an ambivalent identity, one that must be
reevaluated and negotiated in specific contexts, for women and nonbinary individuals. In
Study 3, I outline the initial development of the FSIS, conducting tests of structural
(exploratory factor analysis) and external (convergent, discriminant) validity in a large
sample of adult women. In Study 4, I confirm the factor structure (confirmatory factor
analysis) of the FSIS in a large sample of women and provide evidence of convergent
validity with relevant measures of attitudes toward gender relations, bodies, sexuality,
and romantic relationships. In Study 5, I provide further evidence of the tool’s convergent
validity, as well as incremental validity for predicting feminist and racial justice activism,
and criterion validity for predicting willingness to donate to a feminist charity. Finally, in
Study 6, I examine feminist identity growth in cisgender men, outlining the ways that
men come to adopt a feminist identity, and the process by which that identity shifts and
changes in response to new information and stigma.

1.1 Feminism: Past and Presence
The term “feminism” has a variety of different definitions; in fact, inability to come to
consensus about the definition of feminism has been regarded as a “central problem
within feminist discourse” (hooks, 1984, p. 17). For the purposes of this dissertation,
feminism will be defined as “a movement to end sexist oppression” (hooks, 1984, p. 28),
as per seminal feminist theorist and scholar bell hooks’ definition of the term. Feminism
has a long, rich history all over the world, but the last 150 years have seen the most rapid,
organized feminist progress in the Western world. Most scholars conceptualize feminism
as having three distinct phases, or “waves” (Kroløkke & Sørensen, 2006). The first
[recognized] wave1 of feminist activism occurred roughly between the 1860s and the
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Social activism tends to move through waves, or periods of rapid social change, followed by periods of
rest. While some scholars reject the wave metaphor to describe social movements, suggesting that it
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1920s. During this time, feminist activists primarily sought legal rights to vote, divorce,
and own property. Following the passage of the 19th amendment in the United States and
the right to vote for women in Canada, public feminist activism stalled until the second
wave emerged during the 1960s to the 1980s. Second-wave feminists in the United States
called attention to entrenched sexist customs and standards and procured important legal
rights for women such as the Equal Pay act, reproductive rights, and Title IX; and
feminists in Canada advocated for the Royal Commission on the Status of Women in
Canada, which aimed to reduce gender inequality in various domains, and offered safe,
legal access to reproductive control (Allford, 2019). It is important to note that, during
the second wave, Black women’s voices and lived experiences were largely ignored, and
many felt ostracized from mainstream feminism. Therefore, some chose to advocate for
minority women’s rights under the label of “womanism” (see Walker, 2012).
The third wave of feminism is somewhat ambiguous and undefined, though it largely
focused on addressing sexual harassment and gender-based oppression in their various
forms. Notably, participants in the third wave prioritized separating themselves from the
negative stereotypes often associated with feminists during the second wave (e.g., “braburners;” Swirsky & Angelone, 2014). Without common goals, and with the emergence
of various different streams and strains of feminism (see Henley et al., 1998), the third
wave never truly gained momentum and ultimately fractioned and fissured in the late
1990s and early 2000s (Allford, 2019). However, progress continues to be made through
feminist activist campaigns, which target specific problems, such as sexual harassment.
These smaller movements have produced critical changes in social status for women; the
third wave brought about ample feminist media, renewed attention and urgency to ending
sexual violence and accessible reproductive healthcare, and women populated big screens
and public offices.
Interest in feminism has surged over the past decade, yet consensus has not yet been
reached about whether this resurgence reflects a renewed interest in feminism’s third
wave (Thwaites, 2017), or marks the emergence of a fourth (Rivers, 2017) or even fifth
promotes intergenerational divisions (Reger, 2014), it is a useful analogy for understanding the timeline of
feminist activism.
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wave (Frances-White, 2018) of feminist activism. As I will articulate in greater detail
below, some have argued that the emphasis on individual agency, rather than collective
action, among many modern feminists reflects mainstream feminism’s collusion with
misogyny, and capitalism (Bean, 2007; Crispin, 2017 Levy, 2005; Zeisler, 2016).
Despite profound feminist progress over the past century, the work of feminism is not yet
done. Gender inequality persists in nearly all domains of life. Notably, in the financial
and economic realm, around the world, women’s income is only 63% of men’s, and
women comprise only 35% of global managers (Neate, 2018). Recent research from the
World Economic Forum suggests that the “gender pay gap,” or the discrepancy between
women’s and men’s earnings, will not close for another 200 years (World Economic
Forum, 2018). Safe, legal abortion is still not obtainable for many women (and others
who are able to carry children). Domestic and intimate partner violence
disproportionately affects women, and women of colour or who have low socioeconomic
status are particularly vulnerable (Doyle et al., 2020). Sexual harassment remains a
pervasive problem with detrimental consequences in workplaces (McLaughlin et al.,
2017), and as many as one in five women will experience sexual violence while at
college (Muehlenhard et al., 2017). The emergence of social media has created new
forms of violence against women, including online harassment and trolling (Branch,
2019) and various forms of image-based sexual abuse (e.g., nonconsensual pornography,
deepfakes; Eaton et al, 2020). Even subtle forms of sexism persist in the form of
microaggressions, such as sexist humour and stereotyping, which can have a lasting
detrimental impact on women’s overall well-being (Gartner, 2021). The COVID-19
pandemic has exacerbated existing gender-based social inequities; domestic violence
shelters have reported an uptick in calls (Mittal & Singh, 2020; Slakoff et al., 2020), and
women – particularly women of colour – have disproportionately become unemployed
during this time (Reichelt et al., 2020), leaving them vulnerable to abuse (Doyle et al.,
2020).
Clearly, we still need feminist activism, but as alluded to above, what it means to be a
feminist has shifted over time. In the next section, I describe the complexities of adopting
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a feminist identity that reflect the present state of feminism, and the challenges it presents
for the study of feminism and feminist identity.

1.2 Feminism Today
Today’s feminism has a number of different branches of thought (e.g., lesbian feminism,
radical feminism, Marxist feminism, socialist feminism, ecofeminism; Tong, 2009), but
the most common stream of feminist thought in the Western world is liberal feminism
(Henley et al., 1998). Liberal feminism is rooted in:
A faith in rationality or reason; a belief that by virtue of reasoning capacity, women and
men are equally and essentially the same, a belief in civil rights, education, and equality
of opportunity, assured by law, as the means to social change, and a belief in the
limitation of government to the public sphere, reserving the rights of the individual to a
private life not touched by the government (Henley et al., 1998, p. 320).
Liberal feminist activism does not generally call for the reorganization of society in the
way that radical feminism does, but rather liberal feminists desire for the present social
order to protect the women within it.
In addition, over the past thirty years, increased attention has also been paid to
intersectional feminism (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991). Intersectionality refers to the layered
nature of prejudice experienced by those who are members of multiple marginalized
social groups (Crenshaw, 1989, 1991). Specifically, intersectionality recognizes that
those whose social location situates them at the intersections of multiple axes of
oppression (e.g., Black, transgender women) are subjected to additive (or multiplicative;
Cole, 2009) forms of oppression, compared to those who are members of only one
minority group (e.g., White, cisgender women). While it has long been understood and
acknowledged in psychology that people are differentially influenced by their social
locations and demographic features (e.g., race, gender, (dis)ability, class, sexual
orientation, age, body size, etc.), psychological research has historically ignored
intersectional issues (Cole, 2009; McCormick-Huhn et al., 2019; Warner et al., 2018).
White women have historically excluded Black feminist perspectives from feminist
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initiatives, and some continue to do so today (Kendall, 2020). The phenomenon of White,
justice-oriented women failing to recognize the importance of intersectionality is so
prevalent that it has been termed “White feminism” (Daniels, 2015; Ortega, 2009).
Women, regardless of their race, who recognize the importance of an intersectional
perspective also demonstrate less social dominance orientation, system justification, and
right wing authoritarianism, and they engage in more social justice activism (Curtin et al.,
2015).
Further, feminist scholars have identified a regressive counterculture within the larger
push for women’s progress. Though this ideology goes by many names (choice feminism,
white feminism, soft feminism, equality feminism), it is most frequently referred to as
“postfeminism” (Budgeon, 2015; Gill, 2007; Hall & Rodriguez, 2003; Harris, 2004;
McRobbie, 2008 ; Pomerantz et al., 2013). Rooted in neoliberal ideology, in which
women are positioned as self-determined, independent, fully-agentic and willing subjects
(Gill & Scharff, 2011), postfeminism comprises a series of competing and contradictory
ideologies which converge on the themes of femininity, sexualization, and the denial of
continued, structural sexist oppression (Gill, 2007). Postfeminism in this context reflects
a “double entanglement,” or simultaneous acceptance and rejection, of feminist attitudes
(Gill, 2007, 2016; McRobbie, 2008). In this way, postfeminism represents "the
simultaneous incorporation, revision and depoliticization of many of the central goals of
second wave feminism" (Stacey, 1990, p. 339). Under postfeminism, women are
positioned as fully self-determined and agentic subjects for whom all decisions are freely
conferred and for whom life experiences are not constrained by sexist discrimination
(Budgeon, 2015; Rottenberg, 2014). Research and scholarship on postfeminism have
proliferated in recent years (see Gill, 2016); yet, it is unclear how accurately these (often
contradictory) characterizations of postfeminism coincide with women’s lived
experiences and attitudes (see Riley et al., 2017), and what this means for modern
feminist identity.
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1.3 Feminist Identification and the Complications of
Labelling
When studying feminist identity, it is important to distinguish between feminist
identification and feminist attitudes. Feminist identification refers to labeling oneself a
“feminist,” either publicly or privately (Szymanski, 2004), whereas feminist attitudes
refer merely to supporting the goals and objectives of feminism (i.e., “ending sexist
oppression”). Feminist identification is important because research consistently shows
that identifying as a feminist predicts engagement in feminist activism and behaviours
above and beyond merely holding positive views about feminists and supporting feminist
goals (Conlin & Heesacker, 2016; Redford et al., 2018; Weis et al., 2018; Yoder et al.,
2011; Zucker, 2004). Yet, feminist self-labelling can be influenced by a number of
situational and contextual factors, such as social desirability and exposure to positive
stereotypes about feminists (Crossley, 2010; Moore & Stathi, 2019; Quinn & Radtke,
2006; Roy et al., 2007).
Indeed, research suggests that many people who support feminism are reluctant to call
themselves feminists. The phenomenon by which people support feminist principles but
reject the feminist label has become known as the “feminist paradox” (also referred to as
the “I’m not a feminist, but…” phenomenon; Griffin, 1990; Rúdólfsdóttir & Jolliffe,
2008). This tension is pervasive: in a nationally representative sample of 1150 American
adults, although 69% of women reported that the women’s movement had enhanced the
quality of their lives, only 24% were willing to label themselves feminists outright, and
17% suggested that the term “feminist” was an insult (Alfono, 2009). Similarly, in a
study of 131 college-aged students, only 25% identified as feminists, but nearly twothirds of participants (63%) reported that they were “not feminists, but in support of
feminist goals” (Williams & Wittig, 1997). In virtually all published research on the
psychology of feminism, women score more highly on measures of feminist attitudes,
compared to measures of feminist identity (e.g., Burn et al., 2000; Eisele & Stake, 2008).
This discrepancy is even more pronounced among men, who are generally reluctant to
adopt a feminist label for themselves (Cai & Clement, 2016; Siegel, 2020). While
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postfeminist ideology is an important consideration for understanding the feminist
paradox, this concept is not sufficient for explaining the multiplicity of ambivalent
attitudes and beliefs endemic of modern feminism (Riley et al., 2017). Indeed, both
qualitative research and personal accounts reveal a variety of ways that people
simultaneously embrace and refute feminism (see Frances-White, 2018; Gay, 2014;
Scharff, 2012). However, as feminism has become popular in recent years, it is unclear
how relevant the feminist paradox is for understanding feminism today.
It is important to note that, while most research on feminist identity and attitudes has
been conducted with samples of women, some men also identify as feminists and hold
gender egalitarian attitudes. However, men often report resistance to adopting a feminist
label (Schmitz & Haltom, 2017), and many are averse to the term “feminist” (Conlin &
Heesacker, 2018; Ogletree et al., 2019). Although feminist identification is becoming
increasingly common among both genders, men consistently report lower levels of
feminist identification compared to women (Siegel, 2020). This resistance occurs despite
the fact that men’s gender-related attitudes have shifted toward more support of
egalitarian principles over the past 40 years (Scarborough et al., 2019), and men endorse
mixed attitudes toward feminists (see Edley & Wetherell, 2001; Twenge & Zucker,
1999). There are a variety of reasons why men may be reluctant to call themselves
feminists. Notably, some men hold sexist attitudes and disagree with the principles of
feminism. Past research suggests that these men may believe that feminist activist
campaigns, such as #MeToo, will unfairly harm their reputation (see Kunst et al., 2019)
or perceive feminists to be “man haters” (see Anderson et al., 2009; Ogletree et al., 2019;
Twenge & Zucker, 1999). Further, although the contemporary feminist movement is
generally inclusive of people across the gender spectrum (Baily, 2015), some men believe
that feminism is a “women’s movement” and that the term “feminist” is reserved for
women (Kretschmer & Barber, 2018). However, more research is needed to understand
how, when, and why men do choose to engage with feminism.
Research suggests that stereotypes about feminists influence men’s and women’s
willingness to identify with the feminist label. Various studies have corroborated the
colloquial knowledge that there are negative tropes associated with feminism and
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feminist women, including, but not limited to: angry, ugly, aggressive, egotistical, manhaters, lesbians, feminazis, and bra-burners (see Anderson, 2015; Rúdólfsdóttir &
Jolliffe, 2008; Swirsky & Angelone, 2014). Yet, consistent with the stereotype content
model (Fiske et al., 2002), people also tend to hold positive stereotypes about feminists,
such as ambitious, independent, and motivated (Berryman-Fink & Verderber, 1985;
Twenge & Zucker, 1999). Women who hold negative stereotyped implicit or explicit
attitudes about feminists are less likely to self-identify as feminists and engage in
feminist behaviours (Liss et al., 2001; Redford et al., 2018; Weis et al., 2018). Yet, when
exposed to positive stereotypes about feminists, people are more likely to adopt the label
and report higher levels of solidarity with feminists, a finding which has been supported
in samples of both women and men (Moore & Stathi, 2019; Roy et al., 2007; Wiley et al.,
2013).
Other research suggests feminist self-labelling is influenced by perceived discrepancies
between oneself and feminists, regardless of the valence of those discrepancies. For
example, in a study by Liss et al. (2001), feminist identification differed based on the
magnitude of the discrepancy between participants’ own support for various branches of
feminist thought and their perception of “typical feminists’” support for the various
feminist perspectives. Put another way, participants were more likely to label themselves
as feminists when they believed that the feminist views they held were consistent with the
views they felt others held. Another study (Moradi et al., 2012) explored how feminist
identification can be influenced by the extent to which perceptions of feminists differ
from perceptions of one’s self. In this study, participants rated a series of bipolar
dimensions on constructs of interest (e.g., stubborn/submissive, shy/outgoing, warm/cold,
etc.) three times: first based on which they saw as representative of themselves (actual),
second as who they wish they were (ideal), and third as if they were a “feminist”
(feminist-self). Perception of “feminist threat” was calculated by subtracting the feministself score from the number of times the actual self and ideal self matched with it. This
score was proposed to measure the magnitude of the threat introduced by the potential
incorporation of “feminist” into their self-concept. In this study, feminist threat was
significantly negatively associated with positive evaluation of feminists, positive attitudes
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toward feminism, affirmative feelings toward feminist acquaintances, and feminist selfidentification (Moradi et al., 2012).
A recent series of studies (Meijs et al., 2017) further examined how discrepancies
between the self and stereotypes about feminists can influence women’s feminist selfidentification, specifically the dimensions of warmth and competence. Participants
generally saw feminists as less warm and more competent than themselves, and the
magnitude and direction of the discrepancy between their ratings of themselves and
feminists negatively predicted feminist identification. Specifically, when the women in
the study perceived that feminists were less warm, or more or less competent than
themselves, they were less inclined to label themselves as feminists. Finally, a study
(Conlin et al., 2019) of women who held strong feminist attitudes explored the effects of
perceived knowledge deficits, and belief and behaviour inconsistencies (e.g., “My life
choices do not always match a belief in gender equality,” “The way I view my body is
inconsistent with a belief in gender equality”) on feminist activist behaviours. Through a
structural equation model, the researchers found that support for feminist attitudes was
positively predictive of feminist self-identification, which was positively predictive of
feminist activism. However, they also discovered that “bad feminism” (deficits and
inconsistencies) negatively predicted gender equality self-esteem, feminist selfidentification, and feminist activism. This study suggests that not just stereotype
discrepancies, but also other identity conflicts, may similarly challenge and complicate
willingness to align oneself with feminism and engage in behaviour that supports gender
equality.
Taken together, these studies suggest that stereotypes and discrepancies influence
people’s willingness to identify as feminists, regardless of their feminist attitudes. It is
important, therefore, that studies of feminist identity include questions that directly assess
attitudes toward stereotypes and perceived solidarity with feminists. Yet, the most
widely-studied model of feminist identity (the Feminist Identity Development [FID]
model) does not incorporate these components. In the next section, I outline the FID
model (Downing & Roush, 1985) and its various limitations.
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1.4 Existing Models of Feminist Identity
One of the most common models of feminist identity is Downing and Roush’s (1985)
Feminist Identity Development Model (FID). Modeled on Cross’s (1971) model of
Nigresence, the FID consists of five stages (or dimensions; Hyde, 2002) through which
women pass on their way to becoming feminist activists. It is important to note that the
FID model was designed only to evaluate women’s experiences and is not appropriate for
use with men or nonbinary individuals (Siegel & Calogero, 2021). During the first phase,
passive acceptance, women are unaware of the impact of gender inequality, and tend to
see continued feminist progress as unnecessary or unwanted. However, during revelation,
the second phase of the FID model, women begin to recognize gender inequality in their
lives, and their own participation in it, and many feel angry or distressed due to this new
perspective (Fischer & Good, 2004). In order to learn more and deepen their feminist
consciousness, many women then enter the third stage, embeddedness-emanation. During
embeddedness-emanation, women wish to embed themselves in a community of other,
like-minded women and develop an appreciation for women’s talents and
accomplishments. Stage four is Synthesis, the point at which women stop seeing all men
as oppressors and begin to evaluate men individually, recognizing that they, too, are
oppressed by sexism. It is during this phase that women would theoretically adopt a
feminist label and develop a more integrated self-concept. During the final stage, active
commitment, women engage in collective action to translate their feminist attitudes into
action.
Despite its widespread adoption, this model has been criticized on several grounds (see
Hansen, 2002; Hyde, 2002; Moradi & Subich, 2002; Siegel & Calogero, 2021). Perhaps
the clearest limitation of the FID model is that it cannot be readily applied to individuals
who do not identify as women. Given the gendered nature of the dimensions proposed in
this model, it is unlikely that this model is appropriate for men or nonbinary individuals.
Similarly, the model has been criticized for failing to accurately reflect how Black
women and Women of Colour may experience feminism. In fact, a parallel, four-stage
model was developed by Helms (1984) to more accurately capture the female politicized
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identity development process among Black women (i.e., the Womanist Identity
Development Model).
What is most concerning about the FID model, however, is that it does not seem to
accurately capture the experience of even the very population it is intended to reflect:
cisgender, White women. For example, the hypothesis that women adopt a feminist
identity in the Synthesis stage was not supported in a large sample of undergraduate
women (Erchull et al., 2009). In fact, the Synthesis stage consistently fails to predict
involvement with feminism, and has even been associated with support for the present
gender system (Liss & Erchull, 2010). Indeed, the individualism associated with
synthesis would seem to be inconsistent with the collectivism necessary for socialidentity based social change (van Zomeren et al., 2008). Further, the model does not seem
to be linear, and many women who endorse beliefs consistent with more advanced stages
of feminist identity development report no prior experiences with the earlier stages (Liss
& Erchull, 2010), suggesting that either the FID model does not appropriately capture the
linear trajectory of women’s feminist identity development processes or the model is not
relevant for understanding the experiences of young women today (Erchull et al., 2009;
Liss & Erchull, 2010; Marecek, 2019). Models of feminism that do not deliberately
disentangle feminism and postfeminism may not produce true insight into understanding
feminist identity and attitudes (Marecek, 2019). Put simply, although the FID model
defined an era of research on feminist identity and attitudes, more research and theorizing
is needed to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the developmental process
underlying contemporary feminist identity.

1.5 “Feminist” as a Social (Collective) Identity
In general, given that feminist identification “is too ambiguous, too torn between ‘hard’
and ‘soft’ meanings, essentialist connotations and constructivist qualifiers, to serve well
the demands of social analysis” (Brubaker & Copper, 2000, p. 2), attempting to
understand feminist identity, or any identity for that matter, simply through the labels
people do or do not adopt is a generally fruitless endeavour. This is particularly true of
feminist identity today due to the diversity of feminist thought and the emergence of

13

postfeminism. Many people who hold feminist attitudes avoid the label of feminist, and
even people who do label themselves as feminists define the term differently and only do
so under specific social contexts. Further, as described above, theoretical models of
feminist identity are outdated and fail to capture the ways that feminist identity is
experienced by individuals across the gender spectrum. By taking a social identity
approach to understanding identity (Hornsey, 2008), however, people’s understandings of
themselves as individuals belonging to particular social groups and teams can be
understood more comprehensively.
The social identity approach (Hornsey, 2008) comprises Self-Categorization Theory
(Turner et al., 1987) and Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which are
conceptually-related theories that aim to clarify the role of the social selves in people’s
individual identities. A social identity approach is a natural next step for research on
feminism: identifying broad and social, rather than unique and individual, factors that
motivate behaviour was the inspiration for the development of the social identity tradition
(Hornsey, 2008), and in recent years, a social identity framework has been applied to
various groups not typically studied through a social psychological lens (e.g., gay and
lesbian identity, disability identity; Cox & Gallois, 1996; Dirth & Branscombe, 2018).
Broadly, social identity can be defined as the knowledge that one belongs to a broader
social category, and that group has emotional significance to that person (Tajfel, 1974).
For the purposes of SIT, a social group is any combination of two or more people who
evaluate themselves as comprising an ingroup, or an “us.” Self-categorization is a process
of depersonalization or seeing oneself as representative of a category of people. If one
perceives themselves as prototypical of, or having similar attributes to, the group, they
may begin to see themselves as a group member. Self-identification with a group is more
likely when groups themselves are cohesive (i.e., when the group has strong comparative
fit) and when the individual’s personal identity is consistent with their prototype of the
group (i.e., when the individual has normative fit). While, of course, there are individual
differences between group members, social group identification adheres to the
metacontrast principle, or the idea that intergroup differences are accentuated, and
intragroup differences are devalued through our social identities (Hornsey, 2008).
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Therefore, while people may see themselves as more or less similar to group members,
once they see themselves as a group member, they may begin to blend their personal
attributes with those prototypical of the group and engage in behaviours that are
consistent with group behaviour prototypes. However, many factors complicate people’s
relation to social groups and the extent to which they engage in behaviours that are
prototypical of group members. As Hogg (2008) notes, “if they have no sense of
belonging, do not identify, and do not define and evaluate self in terms of the properties
of the group, then they are unlikely to think, feel, and behave as group members” (p.
117).
Not all social identities are equally socially valued, of course. There are some identities
that are perceived favourably in society and others that are stigmatized. Of those that are
stigmatized, there are some that are visible to others (e.g., skin colour) and others that are
not visible to others (e.g., mental health status). For those whose personal identity is
entwined with a stigmatized one, the social identity process is somewhat more
complicated, as the person managing the stigmatized identity may wish to eschew
identifying with the stigmatized group so as to evade the stigmas associated with that
category. The development of a stigmatized social identity “is an issue of group identity
as much as individual identity” (Cox & Gallois, 1996, p. 9). Given the myriad negative
stereotypes attributed to feminists, it is clear that “feminist” represents a stigmatized
identity. In fact, women often report a “complex negotiation” (Crossley, 2010, p.125) of
their support for feminism and identify themselves as feminists only under certain
circumstances (Calder-Dawe & Gavey, 2016, 2017; Crossley, 2010; Rúdólfsdóttir &
Jolliffe, 2008). For example, in Calder-Dawe and Gavey’s (2016) New Zealand-based
study of 20 students’ attitudes toward feminism, nearly all endorsed feminist beliefs and
desired to address gender inequality, yet few identified as feminists, and those who did
identify did so conditionally.
Social or collective identities may also be understood as political identities when the
social group is evaluated as being unjustly lower in social status, compared to another
social group (Simon & Klandermans, 2001). Assuming system-legitimizing ideologies
are not absorbed by the low-status group (i.e., they do not believe that the unequal
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distribution of power is somehow warranted), they should feel motivated to enhance their
social status. Politicized collective identities “can be understood as a form of
collective identity that underlies group members' explicit motivations to engage in ... a
power struggle” (Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 323). In the context of feminist social
identity, whereas woman represents a social identity, feminist represents a politicized
identity (see Frederick & Stewart, 2018). Aligning oneself with the movement for gender
equality necessitates a recognition that women’s and men’s social status is presently
unequal and a desire to rectify this injustice.
Ashmore and colleagues (2004) have outlined core components of multidimensional
collective (social) identities. Although there is no singular definition of a collective
identity, Ashmore et al. (2004) have defined a collective identity as “one that is shared
with a group of others who have (or are believed to have) some characteristic in
common” (p. 81). Social identities may be formed by any number of commonalities,
including (but not limited to): visible characteristics (e.g., race or age), preferences and
hobbies (e.g., Leafs fans, gamers), believed shared goals (e.g., sports teams,
organizations), values (e.g., vegans, environmentalists), or beliefs (e.g., Democrats or
Jewish people). While there are some aspects of collective identities that are common
across identity categories (i.e., self-categorization, evaluation, importance, attachment
and sense of interdependence, social embeddedness, behavioural involvement, and
content and meaning; Ashmore et al., 2004, p.83), each social identity comprises aspects
unique to that particular social group. Measures designed to evaluate the
multidimensionality of social identities must be uniquely tailored to the groups they are
designed to evaluate. For example, the Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Identity Inventory
(Mohr & Kendra, 2011), contains an “internalized homonegativity” subscale, given that
this is an attitude that is often reported for members of this population (Szymanski,
2002).
Feminism is a complicated subject for social identity analysis (see Skevington & Baker,
1989), given that it is an ideological (Devine, 2015), stigmatized (Anderson, 2015),
politicized (Simon & Klandermans, 2001), and often (though not always) gender-bound
identity. However, a multidimensional social identity approach to understanding and
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analyzing feminist identity may help shed light on the variety of ways that feminism is
lived and experienced. Indeed, understanding people’s alignment with feminism across
myriad theoretically-relevant dimensions provides a more comprehensive evaluation of
feminist social identity than merely evaluating feminist attitudes, perceptions of
feminists, or willingness to label oneself as feminist. As will be described in greater detail
in Chapter 2, the extant measures of feminist identity and attitudes are limited in a variety
of ways, one of which is that they capture only one dimension of what is more likely a
complex and multidimensional construct.

1.6 Feminist Social Identity and Mental Heath
Social Identity Theory was not conceptualized as a theoretical framework for
understanding mental health; however, decades of research have supported the links
between maintaining a positive social identity and maintaining positive mental health.
Specifically, a social identity approach posits that our social identities provide us with a
sense of purpose and meaning in the word, and a strong sense of identification with an
ingroup may be protective against adverse mental health outcomes (see Cruwys et al.,
2014). Indeed, research suggests that identification with an ingroup that is positive and
distinct has positive implications for people’s sense of self-esteem. Feminism is no
exception: several studies have supported the link between holding an advanced feminist
identity and self-esteem, self-efficacy, and self-acceptance (Carpenter & Johnson, 2003;
Conlin et al., 2021b; Eisele & Stake, 2008; Leavy & Adams, 1986; Yoder et al., 2011),
often times above and beyond merely holding feminist attitudes.
However, the benefits of holding a feminist identity extend beyond self-esteem. While
findings are mixed, feminist attitudes have been associated with a variety of positive
mental health outcomes for women, which can largely be categorized into four broad
topics: better coping with sexist treatment (e.g., Ayres et al., 2009; Carretta &
Szymanski, 2020; Kucharska, 2018; Leaper & Arias, 2011; Moradi & Subich, 2002;
Watson & Grotwiel, 2016), better body and eating attitudes (e.g., Borowsky et al., 2016;
Feltman & Szymanski, 2018; Hurt et al., 2007; Murnen & Smolak, 2009), healthier
sexual attitudes and sexual agency (e.g., Fitz & Zucker, 2013; Schick et al., 2008;
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Tolman et al., 2006; Yoder et al., 2012), and more general happiness and well-being (e.g.,
Conlin et al., 2021b; Rudman & Phelan, 2007; Saunders & Kashubeck-West, 2006;
Yakushko, 2007).
One psychological construct that is relevant to feminist identity is self-objectification.
Objectification theory (Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997) proposes that women’s routine
experiences of sexual objectification may become internalized into a state of selfobjectification, in which the societal “male gaze” (i.e., the omnipresent awareness that
women’s appearance is being evaluated and judged) is turned inward (Calogero, 2004).
This objectified self-perspective is theorized to link to several subjective experiences
(e.g., body shame, personal safety anxiety; Calogero et al., 2020), which are proposed to
link to adverse mental health outcomes in women (e.g., eating disorders, sexual
dysfunction, depressed mood; Fredrickson & Roberts, 1997). Two decades of research on
objectification theory has supported and extended most of its links (Calogero et al., 2020;
Roberts et al., 2018). Given that feminist women should, theoretically, recognize and
reject sexist treatment, maintaining a feminist identity could help prevent women from
internalizing sexually objectifying treatment.
Yet, the links between feminism and self-objectification are not straightforward. Two
studies that examined the links between feminist identification and self-objectification
(Hurt et al., 2007; Siegel & Calogero, 2019) demonstrated that while feminist
identification does not directly link to self-objectification, (less) conformity to some
feminine norms may help to link the two. Specifically, feminist identity may be
negatively associated with thinness, less dedication to romantic relationships, and less
investment in appearance (Hurt et al., 2007), and less conformity to these norms may be
associated with less self-objectification (Siegel & Calogero, 2019). It is possible that
having a more fully developed and central feminist identity may be linked to selfobjectification in a way that lower levels of feminist identity are not.
Further, the female body has long been a site of domination and oppression (Bartky,
1990; Calogero et al., 2007; Wolf, 1991). Beauty standards and ideals are virtually
unattainable for most women (Calogero et al., 2007), and cisgender women’s natural
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bodily attributes and functions (e.g., body hair, menstruation) are regarded by many as
dirty and animalistic (Fahs, 2012; Haymond, 2020; Roberts, 2004). As such, women’s
bodies are constantly under construction, and many women may feel that their bodies
must be altered, changed, and enhanced in order to conform to dominant beauty ideals of
women. While the ideal woman’s body has changed from thin and waif-like to
“curvaceously thin,” scholars have posited that women may actually do “double damage”
(Harrison, 2003) to their bodies in trying to attain this figure: they may engage in
disordered eating to be thin, and they may pursue cosmetic surgery to enhance their
curves (Calogero et al., 2007; Harrison, 2003).
However, feminist scholars have recognized that beauty norms and ideals keep women
occupied with their bodies, rather than on their social treatment, and have encouraged
women to embrace their natural bodies (see Tovar, 2018; Wolf, 1991). Consistent with
feminist principles, in a meta-analysis of 27 studies examining feminism and body image
(Murnen & Smolak, 2009), women who endorsed higher levels of feminist ideology also
scored more highly on measures of body satisfaction and lower on measures of
disordered eating attitudes (see also Peterson et al., 2008). Similarly, women enrolled in a
course in which they grew out their body hair for extra credit reported increased
sociopolitical awareness at the end of the course, due to their participation in the
assignment (Fahs, 2012).
Feminist women may also be less inclined to engage in strategies to alter their bodily
appearance, such as disordered eating and cosmetic surgery. However, the links between
feminist attitudes and body-related behaviours are small and inconsistent (see Mazzeo et
al., 2007; Murnen & Smolak, 2009), and research suggests that feminist women’s
heightened awareness of patriarchal bodily pressures does not necessarily translate into
less internalization of these pressures or less disordered eating (Borowsky, et al., 2016;
Myers et al., 2012; Ojerholm & Rothblum, 1999). Given these mixed findings, the links
between feminism and body related attitudes and behaviours must be subjected to further
empirical scrutiny.
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Moreover, despite evidence to the contrary, some of the most common stereotypes
attributed to feminists is that they are man-haters, lesbians, and incapable of being in
romantic relationships (Anderson et al., 2009; Rudman & Fairchild, 2007; Rudman &
Phelan, 2007). However, research suggests that feminist women may actually have more
equally satisfying romantic relationships and healthier sexual attitudes and behaviours,
compared to non-feminist women. A study by Schick et al. (2008) revealed that liberal
feminist ideology was linked to higher sexual subjectivity, condom use self-efficacy,
more sexual motivation, and higher sexual satisfaction. In fact, women with strong
feminist attitudes may be better able to discuss condom use even in the face of hostile
sexist treatment (Fitz & Zucker, 2013). Similarly, feminist women maintain more
egalitarian expectations for relationships (Yoder et al., 2007), and feminist attitudes are
unrelated to relationship quality, equality, and stability (Rudman & Phelan, 2007).
Yet, as with most research on correlates of feminist attitudes and identity, these findings
are mixed. While Schick et al. (2008) identified a significant correlation between feminist
ideology and sexual satisfaction, this link was not detected by Rudman and Phelan
(2007), and other research has failed to detect a significant link between advanced stages
of feminist identity development and sexual assertiveness (Yoder et al., 2007). Further,
some feminist women enjoy the experience of sexualization (Erchull & Liss, 2013).
Taken together, the research on feminism’s links to sexual and relationship outcomes is
mixed. By examining these outcomes of interest as they related to distinct components of
feminist social identity, we may be able to clarify how, and why, and for whom some of
these links hold.

1.7 Conclusion
In sum, due to continued gender inequity around the world, feminism is a topic of interest
for many social psychologists. However, theoretical models that presently exist in the
psychological cannon do not accurately reflect or capture women’s experiences and are
not grounded in social psychological theory. Given the complexities of modern feminism,
in order to develop a more comprehensive understanding of feminist identity as it is
experienced in today’s cultural context, bottom-up, inductive research is necessary.
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Further, this research should form the foundation for novel tools to evaluate feminist
identity.
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Chapter 2

2

Study 1: Critical Review of Existing Measures of
Feminist Attitudes and Identity2
2.1

Introduction

Although the core goal of feminist activism, to end sexist oppression, has remained
consistent over time (hooks, 1984), the beliefs and principles that constitute a feminist
identity and attitudes vary across cultural, sociopolitical, and historical contexts. Early
popular feminist thought has been criticized for centering the experiences of middle-class
White women (Kruks, 2005). Arguably, one of the most significant (and often
misunderstood) challenges to the study of modern feminism is the deliberate assessment
of intersectional feminist identities and attitudes (Davis, 2008; Grzanka, 2020). The
integration of intersectionality into the feminist movement has highlighted the unique
relationship women and nonbinary individuals may have with feminism when their life
experiences are also shaped by factors such as racism, ageism, ableism, hetero- and
mono-sexism, transphobia, and prejudice against women involved in sex work (see
Robnett & Anderson, 2017; White, 2006). In order to study modern feminism, measures
of feminist identity and attitudes should be applicable to the experiences of diverse
groups of women. To date, no known review has examined the extent to which measures
of feminist identity and attitudes were developed and/or validated for use with diverse
samples.
Another challenge to the study of modern feminism is the relevance of assessment tools
for men and nonbinary individuals. Although social psychological research highlights the
importance of feminist allyship across gender categories (hooks, 2000; Wiley et al.,
2013), some argue that cisgender men’s privileged status creates a structural and
psychological barrier to their involvement in feminist activism (Burrell & Flood, 2019).
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Some research suggests that men can and do identify as feminists and engage in feminist
activism, although they may express discomfort adopting the label around others (Conlin
& Heesacker, 2018). This discomfort is not unfounded: both men and women report
mixed reactions to men who identify as feminists (Anderson, 2009; Breen & Karpinski,
2008; Rudman et al., 2013). In addition, some people reject the binary classification of
gender entirely and do not identify as male or female, but may identify as feminist and/or
endorse feminist attitudes. In order to operationalize modern feminism, measures of
feminist identity and attitudes should be applicable to the experiences of cisgender men
and nonbinary individuals. To date, no known review has examined the extent to which
measures of feminist identity and attitudes were developed and/or validated for use with
cisgender men or persons across the gender spectrum.
An additional challenge to the study of modern feminism is the rise of postfeminism
(Girerd & Bonnot, 2020; Rottenberg, 2014). Specifically, some critical feminist scholars
have questioned and problematized the newfound cultural interest in feminist identity,
suggesting that the mainstreaming of feminism has diluted its potency and purpose (see
Gill, 2016; Zeisler, 2016), resulting in a widespread cultural “postfeminist sensibility”
(Gill, 2007). Therefore, people may choose to adopt a feminist identity without
supporting or understanding the fundamental principles of the modern feminist
movement (e.g., reproductive justice, anti-racism; Banet-Weiser, 2018; Banet-Weiser &
Portwood-Stacer, 2017; Gill, 2016; Moon & Holling, 2020; Zeisler, 2016). A feminist
identity that is bolstered by endorsement of postfeminist ideology represents a “double
entanglement” of feminist and antifeminist beliefs fueled by neoliberal principles of selfdetermination, meritocracy, and individualism (McRobbie, 2008, p. 12). Under
postfeminism, the adoption of a public-facing, collective feminist identity may reflect
support for neoliberal attitudes (Gill, 2007), and women who label themselves as
“feminist” may do so from a perception that any and all choices they make, even those
that arguably defy principles of gender equality, can be considered “feminist” choices
(Gill, 2007, 2016). In order to study feminism as it is experienced and understood in the
present cultural moment, measures of feminist identity and attitudes should include items
that distinguish between collective (feminist) and individualized (postfeminist) identities
and attitudes, and they should consider how to assess and interpret paradoxical and/or
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hybrid orientations toward feminism. To date, no known review has specifically
examined whether measures of feminist identity and attitudes are able to distinguish
between these more nuanced and paradoxical forms of feminist identity and attitudes.

2.2

Method

To identify measures of feminist identity and attitudes, we searched three databases (i.e.,
PsycINFO, PsycTESTS, GenderWatch) for the terms feminist and feminism in
combination with the terms attitudes, identity, ideology, beliefs, scale, instrument,
inventory, and measure within the title, abstract, and/or keywords. The search was
conducted in August 2019. After removing duplicate results, this search yielded 722
articles. All measures of feminist identity and attitudes described in these articles were
included in this review if they (a) were published between January 1, 1969, and August 1,
2019, in peer-reviewed academic journals; (b) were written in English (or an English
version was available) and constructed for U.S. samples; (c) assessed a broad
conceptualization of feminist identity and/or feminist-based attitudes, as opposed to
gender-based issues (e.g., Acceptance of Myths about Intimate Partner Violence Against
Women Scale; Megías et al., 2018) or parenting or therapeutic style (e.g., The Child
Gender Socialization Scale; Blakemore & Hill, 2008); (d) assessed profeminist, rather
than non-sexist, attitudes and perspectives; (e) reported information on the scale’s
psychometric properties and validity; and (f) were specific to feminist identity and
attitudes and did not assess broader, related constructs (e.g., Intersectional Awareness
Scale; Curtin et al., 2015)
After screening on the noted inclusion criteria 10 scales were identified, some of which
had extended and short forms, resulting in 13 measures that were included in our review:
The Attitudes Toward Feminist Issues Scale (Brodsky et al., 1976), the Womanist
Identity Attitudes Scale (Ossana, 1986), the Feminist Identity Scale (Rickard, 1987,
1989), the Feminist Identity Development Scale (Bargad & Hyde, 1991), the Attitudes
Toward Feminism and the Woman’s Movement Scale (Fassinger, 1994), the Liberal
Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale and its short form (Morgan, 1996), the Feminist
Perspectives Scale (Henley et al., 1998) including the Lesbian subscale (Simoni et al.,
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1999) and a short form of the measure (Henley et al., 2000), the Feminist Identity
Composite (Fischer et al., 2000), the Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale (Szymanski,
2004), and the Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale (Zucker, 2004).
The scales were grouped separately into measures of feminist identity and measures of
feminist attitudes based on what the scale was intended to assess and how it was
described. Specifically, scales that were designed to examine attitudes toward issues,
topics, and goals that represent broad feminist principles and ideologies were classified as
measures of “feminist attitudes” and scales that assessed individual variations in
internalization of feminist principles, personal alignment with feminist goals, and the use
of the feminist label were categorized as measures of “feminist identity.” However,
because many scales fail to distinguish between the two categories (Eisele & Stake, 2008;
Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010), there is substantial overlap between them. A chronological
list of each of the scales included in the present review, along with key psychometric
information about each (e.g., subscales, alphas, descriptions, readability values, validity)
can be found in Tables 1 (identity measures) and Table 2 (attitude measures). All of the
studies presented in this review were conducted with U.S. samples unless otherwise
noted. In the present paper we assess a variety of measures of feminist identity and
attitudes across four primary domains: (a) evidence of scale validity, (b) sample diversity,
(c) inclusion of the term “feminist” in items, and (d) ability to distinguish between
feminism and postfeminism (for an overview of our findings, see Tables 3 and 4).

1

Table 1. Measures of Feminist Identity in Chronological Order

Subscales
Preencounter
Encounter

Aims
Four dimensions of
Helms’ (1990)
Womanist Identity
Attitudes Model

Number of
items
8
8

Reliability (α)
Evidence of Validity
(a) Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale (Ossana, 1986)
.51
Convergent
Factor analysis (EFA
(Ossana,
and CFA), convergent,
1986)
(Moradi et al., 2004)
.39

Immersion–Emersion

16

.77

Internalization

11

.65

Embeddedness–
Emanation
Synthesis

(b) Feminist Identity Scale (Rickard, 1987, 1989)a
5
.54
Convergent,
Factor analysis (EFA,
discriminant,
CFA), convergent,
14
.78
known groups discriminant, content
6
.74
(cited by
(Moradi & Subich,
Rickard,
2002)
12
.70
1989)
(c) Feminist Identity Development Scale (Bargad & Hyde, 1991)
12
.85
Convergent,
Factor analysis (EFA,
7
.75
known–
CFA), convergent,
7
.82
groups
discriminant, content
(Moradi & Subich,
5
.65
2002)
5
.80
(d) Feminist Identity Composite (Fischer et al., 2000)
7
.74–.75
Factor
Factor analysis (EFA,
analysis
CFA), convergent,
(EFA, CFA)
discriminant, content
8
.75–.80
convergent,
(Moradi & Subich,
discriminant
2002)
4
.84–.86
(Fischer et al.,
2000)
4
.68–71

Active Commitment

9

Passive Acceptance
Revelation
Embeddedness–
Emanation
Synthesis

Four dimensions
of Downing and
Roush’s (1985)
FID model

Passive Acceptance
Revelation
Embeddedness–
Emanation
Synthesis
Active Commitment

Five dimensions
of Downing and
Roush’s (1985)
FID model

Passive Acceptance

Five dimensions
of Downing and
Roush’s (1985)
FID model

Revelation

.77–81

M (SD)
15.98 (3.99)–
16.93 (3.63)
23.49 (3.53)–
24.64 (3.76)
38.05 (6.43)–
40.06 (8.08)
44.26 (4.32)–
45.06 (4.12)
Not available

Min–Max
8–40

Reading
Easeb
6.5
(68.3)

8–40
16–80
11–55

5–25
14–70
6–30

8.2
(61.8)

12–60
1.73–2.29a
3.12–4.02a
2.82–3.13a

12–60
7–35
7–35

3.84–4.08a
3.35–3.75a

5–25
5–25

2.64 (0.71)–
2.69 (0.72)
2.49 (0.71)–
2.55 (.67)
3.00(.87)–
2.98 (.91)
4.39 (.50)–
4.23 (.56)
3.42 (.54)–
.27 (.59)

7–35
8–40
4–20
4–20
9–45

8.2
(67.3)

8.8
(61.4)

2

N/A

Feminist self–
labeling

N/A

Support for core
feminist beliefs,
labeling

(e) Self–Identification as a Feminist Scale (Szymanski, 2004)
Factor analysis (EFA), convergent,
4
.93
discriminant
(f) Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale (Zucker, 2004)
3, 1 for
Known-groups validity, criterion
feminist/no
N/A
feminist

4.05 (.97)

1–20

9
(44.1)

N/A

N/A

4.8
(81.4)

Note. N/A = not applicable.
a

Standard deviation not reported. bFlesch-Kincaid Reading Grade = Measure of readability based on word length and sentence length. A Flesch-

Kincaid Reading grade level of 8 or below suggests that the items can be easily understood by a person with an 8th grade education.
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Table 2. Measures of Feminist Attitudes in Chronological Order
Reading
Subscales
Human Reproduction
Childcare
Policies/Legislation
Employment
Marriage/Family
Overcoming Self–Denigration
Consciousness–Raising/Media
Religion
Education

N/A

Gender Roles
Global Goals
Specific Political Agendas
Discrimination/Subordination
Collective Action
The Sisterhood

N/A

Femscore
Conservative

Number of
Aims
items
Reliability (α)
Evidence of Validity
(a) Attitudes Toward Feminist Issues Scale (Brodsky et al., 1976)
Attitudes about
6
.71–.76
Image analysis, known–groups
specific feminist
5
.83–.85
goals of the
16
.87–.90
1970 National
15
.81–82
Organization of
17
.85–.87
Women platform
8
.84–.91
12
.89–.93
11
.88–.90
30
.95–.95

M (SD)

Min–Max

8.18–13.82
8.35–12.73
21.30–40.00
22.60–40.09
11.05–23.69
28.45–50.09
19.85–36.91
16.79–30.70
32.85–62.27

6–30
5–25
16–80
15–75
17–85
8–40
12–60
11–55
30–150

(b) Attitudes Toward Feminism and the Women’s Movement Scale (Fassinger, 1994)
Attitudes about
10
.87–.90
Factor analysis (CFA;
35.17(6.61)
feminist
Ormerod, 1991), convergent,
activism and
discriminant
feminist
activists
(c) Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale (Morgan, 1996)
Attitudes about
10
.77
Convergent, discriminant,
NR
liberal feminist
concurrent, known–groups
10
.80
social change
20
86
10
.85
10
.80
10b
45(W),
.15 (M)
(d) Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale – Short (Morgan, 1996)
Attitudes about
10–11
.81–.84
Factor analysis (ESEM, EFA;
NR
liberal feminist
Woodbrown, 2015)
social change

Support for
different

(e) Feminist Perspectives Scale (Henley et al., 1998)
50
.88–.92
10
.65–.77

203.00 (37.07)
29.38 (9.98)

Easea

10.6
(47.7)

10–50
8.6
(54.0)

10–60
10–60
20–120
10–60
10–60
10–60 (W),
5–30 (M)
11–66
(11-item)
OR
10–60
(10-item)
50–350
10–70

7.5
(61.9)

7.5
(61.9)

4

Liberal
Radical
Socialist
Cultural
Womanist
Fembehave

branches of
(anti)feminist
ideology

Femscore
Conservative
Liberal
Radical
Socialist
Cultural
Lesbian
Womanist
Fembehave

Support for
different
branches of
(anti)feminist
ideology

Femscore
Conservative
Liberal
Radical
Socialist
Cultural
Womanist
Fembehave

Support for
different
branches of
(anti)feminist
ideology

10
.46–.62
Factor analysis (EFA),
convergent, discriminant,
10
.78–.86
known–groups validity
10
.76–.79
10
.58–.73
10
.68–.75
18
.41–.52
(f) Feminist Perspectives Scale + Lesbian (Simoni et al., 1999)
60
.95
Convergent, known–groups
10
.81
10
.64
10
.85
10
.78
10
.81
10
.81
10
.91
21
.68
(g) Feminist Perspectives Scale – Short (Henley et al., 2000)
25
.85
Convergent, discriminant,
concurrent, known–groups
5
.71
5
.53
5
.73
5
.59
5
.57
5
73
6
NR

51.68 (8.00)
36.57 (11.71)
34.65 (10.20)
35.02 (8.93)
45.72 (9.03)
61.57 (9.62)

10–70
10–70
10–70
10–70
10–70
18–126

260.1 (53.7)
26.2 (11.3)
53.7 (8.2)
41.2 (12.5)
39.2 (9.8)
40.0 (10.4)
48.4 (10.1)
37.8 (14.1)
73.6 (13.4)

60–420
10–70
10–70
10–70
10–70
10–70
10–70
10–70
21–147

103.68 (18.77)
12.98 (5.84)
26.67 (4.58)
16.53 (5.78)
16.66 (5.28)
19.40(4.69)
24.22(5.15)
21.83(4.38)

25–175
5–35
5–35
5–35
5–35
5–35
5–35
6–42

Note. N/A = not applicable. NR = Not reported.
a

Flesch-Kincaid Reading Grade. bWhen administered to individuals who do not identify as women, only five items, rather than 10, are used.

10.9
(45.2)

10.8
(44.1)

10.6
(47.7)
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Table 3. Overview of Critical Analysis of Feminist Identity Scales

Validity Evidence

Sample Diversity

Contains
“feminist”
in items

Distinguishes
feminist/postfeminist

Yes

Yes

Convergent/
Scales

Structural

Discriminant

Womanist Identity
Attitudes Scale

✓a

✓

Feminist Identity
Scale

✓a

✓

Feminist Identity
Development
Scale

✓a

✓

Feminist Identity
Composite

✓a

✓

Self-Identification as
a
Feminist Scale

✓

✓

N/A

N/A

Cardinal Beliefs of
Feminists Scale

Known-groups

Other

Racial

Age

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Gender

✓

✓

✓

✓

Note. Structural validity = Exploratory and/or confirmatory factor analysis; Sample diversity—Racial = Sample was < 80% White; Sample
diversity—Age = Validated with samples other than undergraduates. N/A = not applicable for this particular measure.
a

Although tests of structural validity were conducted, the hypothesized factor structure was not always supported.
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Table 4. Overview of Critical Analysis of Feminist Attitudes Scales

Validity Evidence
Scales

Structural

Attitudes toward
Feminist
Issues Scale

✓a

Attitudes toward
Feminism and
the Women’s
Movement
Scale

✓

Liberal Feminist
Attitude and
Ideologies
Scale

Convergent/Discriminant

Sample Diversity
Known-groups

Other

✓

✓

✓

Contains
“feminist”
in items

✓

✓

Racial

Gender

Yes

NR

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Age

Distinguishes
feminist/postfeminist

✓

✓

Yes

✓

Liberal Feminist
Attitude and
Ideologies
Scale - Short
form

✓a

✓b

Feminist
Perspectives
Scale

✓a

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Feminist
Perspectives
Scale +

✓

✓

✓

7

Lesbian
Subscale
Feminist
Perspectives
Scale - Short

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

✓

Note. Structural validity = Exploratory and/or confirmatory factor analysis; Sample diversity—Racial = Sample was < 80% White; Sample
diversity—Age = Validated with samples other than undergraduates. NR = Not reported.
a

Although tests of structural validity were conducted, the hypothesized factor structure was not always supported. bAlthough explicit tests of

convergent validity were not conducted, the measure has shown positive associations with related constructs.

1

2.3 Measures of Feminist Identity
2.3.1 Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale
The Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale (WIAS; Ossana, 1986) measures the various
attitudes associated with the developmental stages of a womanist identity. The scale was
initially created as part of a larger project assessing women’s perception of the campus
environment and self-esteem in relation to womanist identity development (Ossana,
1986). Due to its conceptual similarity with instruments designed to measure feminist
identity development, we have chosen to include it in the present review. The scale
contains 43 items that are scored on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5
(strongly agree). The WIAS assesses four stages of Womanist Identity Development:
Preencounter (8 items), Encounter (8 items), Immersion-Emersion (16 items), and
Internalization (11 items). Internal consistency for the subscales has been reported in the
poor-to-fair range in samples of 649 and 659 U.S. undergraduate female participants
(Ossana, 1986; Ossana et al., 1992, respectively), with the exception of the
Immersion/Emersion subscale (α = .82; Ossana et al., 1992).

2.3.1.1

Psychometric properties

In further examination of the scale’s psychometric properties, the measure demonstrated
poor internal reliability in a sample of 201 women, balanced between 101 Black and 100
White participants (Moradi et al., 2004), with many of the items loading negatively on
their respective subscale. Convergent validity was assessed through links with relevant
constructs: Preencounter scores were significantly linked to more negative attitudes
toward women and significantly positively linked to hostile and benevolent sexism.
Encounter and Immersion-Emersion followed the same general pattern, although these
links did not achieve statistical significance (except for benevolent sexism, which was
positively correlated with both Encounter and Immersion-Emersion). Internalization was
significantly positively correlated with positive attitudes toward women, but not with
modern, hostile, or benevolent sexism (Moradi et al., 2004). Ossana, et al. (1992) also
reported a positive association between Internalization and self-esteem and an inverse
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association with perceived gender bias on campus. Although the scale was designed to
capture the four stages of the Womanist Identity Development model, exploratory and
confirmatory factor analyses revealed a poor fit of the data to the theoretical model
(Moradi et al., 2004). Moradi et al. (2004) also conducted a multivariate test of equality
of covariance matrices between Black and White women and found that the tool assessed
womanist identity similarly in both groups. To our knowledge, there have been no
updates to this scale in recent years.

2.3.1.2

Critique

The Womanist Identity Attitudes Scale (Ossana, 1986) explores a developmental model
of feminist attitudes that is distinct from Downing and Roush’s (1985) FID model, yet
Moradi et al. (2004, p. 264) concluded that the WIAS is better conceptualized as a
measure of “traditional gender-role ideology, pro-woman attitudes, and anti-man
attitudes” than a measure of identity development. The scale itself does not ask
participants to label themselves as either a feminist or a womanist, suggesting that this
scale assesses unique dimensions of womanist attitudes rather than identity. Also,
intercorrelations among subscales have been identified that would seem inconsistent with
the theoretical framework underlying the measure. For example, a significant, positive
correlation between the Preencounter and Immersion/Emersion subscales has been
detected in at least two samples (Moradi et al., 2004; Ossana, 1986). The items on the
WIAS pertain exclusively to female-identified people (e.g., “I would have accomplished
more in this life had I been born a man”), and the measure does not disentangle feminist
from postfeminist attitudes. The “internalization” stage assesses exclusively
individualized feminist attitudes (e.g., “I believe that being a woman has caused me to
have many strengths”; “I find that I function better when I am able to view men as
individuals”) without assessing solidarity with feminists. In fact, the words “feminism” or
“feminist” are not included anywhere in the scale items.

2.3.2 Feminist Identity Scale
The revised Feminist Identity Scale (FIS-R) was designed to measure the cognitive,

3

affective, and behavioural components of the first four stages of the FID model (Rickard,
1989). The revised version of the scale contains 37 items with four subscales, which are
rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree),
including Passive Acceptance (5 items), Revelation (14 items), EmbeddednessEmanation (6 items), and Synthesis (12 items). Notably, this scale does not assess Active
Commitment specifically because Rickard (1989) conceptualized this stage as a
behavioural manifestation of Synthesis and not as a distinct developmental stage;
however other scholars have disagreed with this interpretation and measurement of
Active Commitment as part of Synthesis (Fischer et al., 2000; Moradi & Subich, 2002).
The original development and validation of the Feminist Identity Scale (Rickard, 1987)
was presented at a conference and is not available for evaluation, but because the
Feminist Identity Development Scale and the Feminist Identity Composite are derivatives
of the Feminist Identity Scale (Rickard, 1989), we chose to also include the revised form
of this instrument.

2.3.2.1

Psychometric properties

The FIS-R has yielded inconsistent estimates for internal reliability. In a sample of 63
female students at a large university in the southwest United States, internal reliability
exceeded .85 for each subscale and 3-week test-retest reliability (.83–.93) was strong for
each subscale (Rickard, 1989). In a larger sample of 191 female students (Fischer et al.,
2000), internal reliability was poor-to-fair (see Table 1). In another large independent
sample of 240 undergraduate women and female staff members at a midwestern U.S.
university (79% White; Moradi & Subich, 2002), internal reliability ranged from poor-togood for each of the subscales, with significant intercorrelations found among the scales.
Rickard (1989) cited findings from the original version of the scale to support knowngroups and convergent validity for each of the four subscales based on positive
correlations with self-esteem and traditional gender role adherence. Additional
convergent validity has been reported based on ascending correlations between the four
stages of the FIS with positive attitudes toward working mothers (Tetenbaum et al.,
1983), quality of life (Rickard, 1987), and dating behaviours that were “atypical” of
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women at the time (e.g., asking men on a date, leaving a tip, holding the door; Rickard,
1989). Three of the subscales (i.e., Revelation, Embeddedness-Emanation, and Synthesis)
were positively correlated with lifetime exposure to and appraisal of sexist events, and
Synthesis was positively correlated with self-esteem (Moradi & Subich, 2002). Although
Rickard (1987, 1989) proposed a four-factor structure for this measure, a subsequent
confirmatory factor analysis did not support this model (Moradi & Subich, 2002).

2.3.2.2

Critique

As summarized in Table 3, there are a number of concerns with the conceptual meaning
and distinctiveness of the items included in the FIS-R. Given the scale was limited to the
first four stages, Synthesis represents the end stage of feminist development in this
measure. Yet, the operationalization of Synthesis does not appear consistent with such an
advanced stage of identity development. For example, the Synthesis item, “I have
incorporated what is female and feminine into my own unique personality,” does not
reflect any active commitment to or involvement with feminism on the part of
respondents, and it may be more consistent with a postfeminist identity. In addition, the
items composing Passive Acceptance and Synthesis do not allow for a clear interpretation
of responses. For example, the Passive Acceptance item, “I like being a traditional
female,” is not readily distinguishable from the Synthesis item, “I enjoy the pride and
self-assurance that comes from being a strong female.” Most women, even traditional
women, would identify with the label of “strong” or “competent” (Liss & Erchull, 2010),
particularly in a postfeminist context in which the promotion of confidence has become
ubiquitous (Gill & Orgad, 2016). Similar to the WIAS, the scale items are written for
woman-identified people, and none of the items includes the term “feminist,” limiting its
wider utility for assessing feminist-mindedness and identification. The tool also does not
inquire into intersectional feminist issues or topics, rendering it both psychometrically
lacking and outdated for the study of modern feminism.

2.3.3 Feminist Identity Development Scale
The Feminist Identity Development Scale (FIDS; Bargad & Hyde, 1991) was designed to
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measure all five stages of the FID model, which contains 39 items, which are rated on a
5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), including
Passive Acceptance (12 items), Revelation (7 items), Embeddedness-Emanation (7
items), Synthesis (5 items), and Active Commitment (8 items). An additional nine items
were included with the development of the measure, but they did not map onto any stage
of feminist identity development and were not used in future research using the FIDS
(e.g., “I can finally feel very comfortable identifying myself as a feminist”; “I feel angry
about the way women have been left out of history books”).

2.3.3.1

Psychometric properties

Bargad and Hyde’s (1991) exploratory factor analysis of the FIDS based on a sample of
156 predominantly White (82.7%) women from an introductory psychology course
yielded a five-factor solution for the measure. A second factor analysis based on a sample
of 328 predominantly White (96.2%) female students enrolled in a women’s studies
course supported this solution (Bargad & Hyde, 1991), and in a confirmatory factor
analysis of 240 racially diverse university and community women, most fit indices
supported this five-factor model (except RMSEA; Moradi & Subich, 2002). Within the
second sample of the original study (Bargad & Hyde, 1991), alphas for each of the
subscales ranged from .65 to .85 (see Table 1), and subscale scores were not significantly
correlated with social desirability scores. Yet, this factor solution has not been upheld in
other exploratory factor analyses in studies of primarily White female undergraduate
students (Fischer et al., 2000) or in a Mexican American adolescent sample (Flores et al.,
2006). In other studies of exclusively female students (Fischer et al., 2000; Gerstmann &
Kramer, 1997), internal consistency was also more variable, ranging from .48 to .81, with
the Synthesis subscale consistently demonstrating the lowest reliability.

2.3.3.2

Critique

The FIDS assesses the five stages of feminist identity development in women, but its
items cannot be applied to men or nonbinary individuals in their present state, and many
contain heteronormative language (e.g., “If I were married and my husband was offered a
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job in another state, it would be my obligation as his spouse to move in support of his
career”). In addition to having limited generalizability beyond woman-identified people,
scholars have suggested the FIDS does not provide an adequate assessment of the
underlying developmental model of feminist identity (Fischer et al., 2000; Moradi &
Subich, 2002). Indeed, contrary to the theoretical assumptions underpinning the FID
model, the Synthesis subscale does not reliably differentiate between feminist and
nonfeminist women (Erchull et al., 2009), which is suggestive of postfeminist identity
(Downing & Roush, 1985). This failure may be partly due to the fact that all of the items
refer to attitudes toward men (e.g., “I feel that some men are very sensitive to women’s
issues”; “I evaluate men as individuals, not as members of a group of oppressors”) rather
than to attitudes toward women, feminists, and feminism. Although one scale item
assessing feminist identification was proposed for the scale (“I can finally feel very
comfortable identifying myself as a feminist”), it is not included in the final measure
because it did not load with the other items in any stage in the exploratory factor analysis.
Additionally, one item relates specifically to the Equal Rights Amendment), which would
not be relevant for those outside the United States. Although the term “feminist” is never
used directly, the Active Commitment subscale does probe participants’ involvement in
the women’s movement.

2.3.4 Feminist Identity Composite
The Feminist Identity Composite (FIC) was also designed to assess women’s degree of
feminist identity development (Fischer et al., 2000), as per Downing and Roush’s (1985)
FID model, while addressing the psychometric limitations of the scales described
previously. The FIC comprises 33 items derived from the FIS and the FIDS. Specifically,
Fischer et al. (2000) administered both the FIS (Rickard, 1987) and the FIDS (Bargad &
Hyde, 1991) to a sample of 191 female undergraduate students (90% White) at a large
public midwestern university in the United States. After discovering that neither scale
reliably contributed to the measurement of feminist identity development, the authors
restructured the instruments. Individual items were reviewed by five independent judges
and were retained for a new instrument if they loaded highly onto one (and only one)
factor. The resultant 33 items (Passive Acceptance [7 items], Revelation [8 items],
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Embeddedness-Emanation [4 items], Synthesis [5 items], and Active Commitment [9
items]) represented a more coherent set of items for assessing feminist identity
development. Items on the FIC are rated on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).

2.3.4.1

Psychometric properties

Using the same dataset from the original study, a joint factor analysis was conducted,
demonstrating that a five-factor solution was most interpretable, and the internal
reliability ranged from .68 (Synthesis) to .84 (Embeddedness-Emanation). Similar
internal reliability estimates were demonstrated in an independent sample of 295 female
non-university community residents and college students, ranging from .71 (Synthesis) to
.86 (Embeddedness-Emanation). Convergent validity for the subscales of the FIC were
established in a second sample through positive correlations between Passive Acceptance
and the Foreclosure subscale of the Objective Measure of Ego Identity Status (Adams et
al., 1989) and Active Commitment with identity achievement. Also, Revelation was
associated with both recent and lifetime sexist events (Klonoff & Landrine, 1995), and
increasing involvement with feminist activism was observed as respondents moved from
Revelation to Active Commitment, but not in relation to Synthesis. None of the subscales
was significantly associated with socially desirable responding. The five-factor structure
was upheld in this sample, as well as another sample of predominantly White
undergraduate women (Moradi & Subich, 2002), but not in a study of exclusively sexual
minority women (DeBlaere et al., 2017) or a large sample of Chinese women (Liu &
Zheng, 2019).

2.3.4.2

Critique

The FIC is regarded by some as more reliable and valid than the FIS or the FIDS (Moradi
& Subich, 2002), but its psychometric properties are not substantially stronger than the
other two instruments (Hansen, 2002). The items composing the Synthesis subscale are
still limited in the ways we noted, and the Embeddedness-Emanation subscale contains
only four items, all of which are related to respondents’ interest in learning more about
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women and women’s work (e.g., “I am very interested in women’s studies”; “I am very
interested in women musicians”). These items would appear to be more distally related to
holding a feminist identity rather than essential to a desire to surround oneself with
women with similar attitudes.
Given that the set of FIC items was derived from existing scales, the FIC contains the
same weaknesses (e.g., applicable only to women, no mention of intersectional ideas or
attitudes, no use of the term “feminist”; see Table 3). Like the FID, the FIC allows for
researchers to choose which phase of feminist identity development they wish to use to
represent advanced feminist identity, but the Synthesis subscale is especially problematic,
not only because it does not reliably distinguish between feminist labelers and nonlabelers (Erchull et al., 2009), but also because it explicitly assesses an individualistic,
rather than a collective, feminist identity (e.g., “As I have grown in my beliefs I have
realized that it is more important to value women as individuals than as members of a
larger group of women”), making it reflective of postfeminism. We encourage
researchers to use the final subscale, Active Commitment, when assessing advanced
feminist identity.
Overall, measures used to assess the FID model do not appear to be relevant for
understanding the development of a modern feminist identity (Marecek, 2019). Although
some subscales may represent a meaningful personality dimension and be linked to
clinically relevant outcomes, researchers should use caution when using and interpreting
measures derived from the FID model (FIS, FIDS, FIC).

2.3.5 Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale
To eschew some of the complexities associated with measures of feminist identity
development, Szymanski (2004) developed the Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale
(SIF), which is a four-item measure that assesses four components of feminist selfidentification (i.e., beliefs, public identification, private identification, and support for the
feminist movement). The items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1
(strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree), including “I consider myself a feminist,” “I
identify myself as a feminist to other people,” “Feminist values and principles are
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important to me,” and “I support the goals of the feminist movement.”

2.3.5.1

Psychometric properties

In a sample of 227 primarily White (87%), sexual minority (82% lesbian, 15% bisexual,
3% unsure) women, the scale was determined to be unidimensional and internally
consistent. Convergent validity was established through significant positive correlations
with a measure of involvement in feminist activities (Szymanski, 2004), attitudes toward
feminism and the women’s movement (Fassinger, 1994, see below), the FIC subscales
except for Synthesis (and negatively for Passive Acceptance; Fischer et al., 2000), and all
of the subscales of the Feminist Perspectives Scale (negative for Conservative; Henley et
al., 1998), including the Lesbian Feminist subscale (Simoni et al., 1999). SIF scores were
not significantly correlated with social desirability.

2.3.5.2

Critique

The SIF is a psychometrically sound measure that was not derived from the FID model
and would appear to offer a more precise assessment of what it means to claim a feminist
social identity. The scale includes the word “feminist” in each of its items and is nongender-specific. In particular, the four items were designed in a way to allow respondents
to differentiate between public and private feminist self-identification, providing a way to
quantify aspects of the “feminist paradox” around self-labeling and potentially
differentiate between individuals with feminist and postfeminist identities (Abowitz,
2008; Rúdólfsdóttir & Jolliffe, 2008). Its simplicity makes it usable for people across the
gender spectrum and societal contexts. Of the feminist identity scales reviewed thus far,
the SIF most reliably assesses identity. That being said, the SIF does not assess the
content underlying said feminist identity. Higher scores on the SIF suggest greater
personal alignment with the “feminist” label but may or may not offer insight into the
ways that respondents identify as feminists. Overall, when the aim is to assess feminist
identity independent of underlying attitudes, the SIF is a well-suited and valid measure
for this purpose.
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2.3.6 Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale
The Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists scale (CBF; Zucker, 2004) was designed to assess core
beliefs that are observed across branches of feminist thought, as well as feminist
identification, in order to categorize respondents as feminists, egalitarians, and nonfeminists. The beliefs portion of the scale consists of three items: “Girls and women have
not been treated as well as boys and men in our society,” “Women and men should be
paid equally for the same work,” and “Women’s unpaid work should be more socially
valued.” Participants indicate whether they “agree” or “disagree.” The scale also includes
a behavioural paradigm in which participants are asked to respond to one page of the
questionnaire if they consider themselves “feminists” or a different page if they consider
themselves to be “non-feminists” (directing all to the same next page). Zucker (2004)
found that 272 of the original 333 predominantly White, heterosexual female participants
could be classified into three categories: “feminists” (45%; those who agree with all three
cardinal beliefs and answer questions for feminists), “egalitarians” (31%; those who
agree with all three cardinal beliefs and do not answer questions for feminists; later called
“non-labelers”), and “non-feminists” (24%; those do not agree with all three cardinal
beliefs and do not answer questions for feminists). The remaining participants, those who
identified as feminists but did not support all three principles, were not categorized.

2.3.6.1

Psychometric properties

Psychometric properties. Convergent validity was established through the differential
association between the feminist categories and outcomes relevant to gender relations and
equality. Participants categorized as feminists endorsed more positive perceptions of
feminists, held more positive attitudes toward feminism, and were more discontent with
power relations than participants categorized as egalitarians and non-feminists. Compared
to participants categorized as egalitarians and non-feminists, those categorized as
feminists also scored more highly on the Revelation, Embeddedness-Emanation, and
Active Commitment scales of the FIDS (but not Synthesis), as well as four dimensions of
feminist group conscious. Those categorized as egalitarians scored between non-feminists
and feminists on all measures. Criterion validity has also been demonstrated, with those
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categorized as feminists reporting higher levels of engagement in six types of political
feminist behaviours (e.g., signing petitions) compared to those categorized as egalitarians
or non-feminists (Zucker, 2004).

2.3.6.2

Critique

Overall, the CBF is a brief and useful tool for assessing a person’s general feminist
orientation, but not the strength of that orientation, due to its yes/no response format.
Strengths of this measure include that it requires participants to indicate whether or not
they use the feminist label to describe themselves, and it can be used with individuals
across the gender spectrum. However, although the feminist identification paradigm is a
novel approach to assessing feminist self-labeling, the typical format of a single forcedchoice question is not sufficient for assessing feminist identity, especially if it is unclear
precisely what selecting a “feminist” option will entail for the participant (e.g., Will they
be asked trivia about their knowledge of feminism? Will they be asked to donate to a
feminist cause?). Given the broad scope of the items, this measure is not able to
disentangle feminist from postfeminist ideology (indeed, Zucker transformed her
language from “egalitarians” to “non-labelers” in future research) and has not been
shown to represent diverse samples of respondents. However, the CBF may be a useful
measure for some research designs, particularly in studies that aim to assess group-level
differences between individuals who do and do not identify as feminists.

2.4 Measures of Feminist Attitudes
2.4.1 Attitudes Toward Feminist Issues Scale
The Attitudes Toward Feminist Issues Scale (ATFIS; Brodsky et al., 1976; Elmore et al.,
1975) assesses attitudes toward particular feminist goals based on the National
Organization for Women’s 1970 national platform. The scale contains nine subscales
consisting of 120 items associated with women’s liberation: Human Reproduction (6
items), Child Care (5 items), Policies and Legislation (16 items), Employment (15 items),
Marriage and Family (17 items), Overcoming Self-Denigration (8 items), ConsciousnessRaising in Media (12 items), Religion (11 items), and Education (30 items). Respondents
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answer each item on a 5-point Likert style scale ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5
(strongly disagree).

2.4.1.1

Psychometric properties

The scale was initially validated in a sample of mixed-gender women’s studies and
psychology students (race unspecified; Brodsky et al., 1976; Elmore et al., 1975). Image
analysis revealed that one factor accounted for 80% of the common variance between
scale items, suggesting that despite its various subscales, a global feminist attitudes factor
exists (Elmore et al., 1975). Fully 105 students (61 women’s studies, 44 psychology)
completed the ATFIS on the first day of each course, and 31 women’s studies and 36
psychology students completed the measure again on the last day. Participants in the
women’s studies course scored significantly lower (more liberal) than those in the
psychology course at pre-test and post-test. Male participants scored significantly higher
(more conservative) than female participants on all subscale scores, except for childcare.
At post-test, those in the women’s studies course, but not the psychology course,
endorsed significantly lower (more liberal) attitudes compared to their pre-test attitudes.
For the entire sample, the full scale (Cronbach’s ⍺ = .93) and the subscales (Cronbach’s
⍺s = .77–.96) demonstrated good-to-high internal consistency. Test-rest reliability was
adequate for all of the subscales except childcare and education (< .70; Brodsky et al.,
1976; Elmore et al., 1975). To our knowledge, no other validity tests have been
performed with this measure.

2.4.1.2

Critique

The ATFIS (Brodsky et al., 1976; Elmore et al., 1975) provides a comprehensive
assessment tool for covering a wide range of feminist topics. Given that these items were
derived explicitly from the National Organization of Women’s platform, they arguably
represent key feminist, rather than postfeminist, political issues. Indeed, the word
feminist appears twice on the scale. Further, its items can be supported by individuals
across the gender spectrum, although many items are heteronormative and do not
acknowledge nontraditional family structures (e.g., “The wife should be able to keep her
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own name or the husband should be able to take his wife's name, and/or there should be
the option of both partners choosing a neutral second name to be used also by the
children, or the children should use both the wife's and husband's name”). That the scale
has not undergone a more rigorous validation process, including convergent,
discriminant, incremental, or predictive validity, nor a confirmatory factor analysis,
makes it unclear whether this instrument is appropriate for psychological research. On the
whole, a more rigorous assessment of the validity of the scale across diverse samples of
respondents is necessary before recommendations can be made regarding the use of the
ATFIS.

2.4.2 Attitudes Toward Feminism and the Women’s Movement Scale
The Attitudes toward Feminism and the Women’s Movement (FWM) scale was designed
to assess a person’s subjective attitudes toward feminism and the women’s movement
(Fassinger, 1994). Participants rate their level of agreement with the items on a 5-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The scale does not
define “feminism” or “women’s movement” for respondents, and thus intentionally
leaves these items open to broad interpretation.

2.4.2.1

Psychometric Properties

Psychometric properties. The original instrument was validated in a sample of 117
undergraduate psychology students (76 women) at a large public university in the
northeastern United States (57% Caucasian/White, 16% African American/Black, 4%
Hispanic/Latinx, 17% Asian-American/Pacific Islander). Internal reliability was good
across the full sample (Cronbach’s ⍺ = .89) as well as for women (Cronbach’s ⍺ = .87)
and men (Cronbach’s ⍺ = .90). Other studies have suggested comparable reliability
estimates in demographically similar samples (Szymanski, 2004; Twenge & Zucker,
1999).
Convergent and discriminant validity were also established through significant positive
correlations with attitudes toward women and gender roles, as well as feminist selfidentification. The scale was unrelated to dogmatism and social desirability,
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demonstrating the tool’s discriminant validity. Researchers demonstrated that endorsing
more positive attitudes toward feminism and the women’s movement was related to
unconventional career choices for undergraduate women (O’Brien & Fassinger, 1993),
less concern with weight in women between the ages of 30 and 49 (Tiggemann &
Stevens, 1999), more involvement with feminist activities and identification with
feminism (Enns, 1987; Zucker, 2004), and greater egalitarianism, sexual assertiveness,
and a sense of common fate with women (Yoder et al., 2012). The FWM has been
subjected to a CFA, although the results have not been published or otherwise reported
(Ormerod, 1991, as cited in Fassinger, 1994).

2.4.2.2

Critique

The scale is short, non-gender-specific, and purportedly psychometrically sound, which
makes it a useful tool for researchers who wish to assess subjective attitudes toward the
feminist movement broadly. An important caveat is that higher scores on this scale would
only reveal general support for feminism and would not be able to distinguish between
more specific types of attitudes and movements, including intersectional feminist
attitudes or meritocratic beliefs (i.e., postfeminism). For example, the scale’s generic
form refers to “leaders of the feminist movement” and the application of “feminist
principles”; however, it is unclear which leaders and principles “come to mind” for the
respondents when completing these items. Because this tool is a measure of feminist
people and practices, and not necessarily an assessment of support for feminist principles,
a high score on the FWM does not necessarily mean respondents endorse all aspects of
feminist ideology or support the goals of every feminist-based movement.

2.4.3 Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale
The Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideology Scale (LFAIS; Morgan, 1996) was designed
as an explicit sociopolitical measure of feminist attitudes that reflects the degree of
support for feminist goals, gender roles, and feminist ideology. The LFAIS is composed
of 70 items across six subscales: Gender Roles (10 items), Goals of Feminism (10 items),
Specific Political Agendas (20 items), Discrimination and Subordination (10 items),
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Collective Action (10 items), and The Sisterhood (10 items if administered to women; 5
items if administered to men). Although the full Sisterhood subscale contains 10 items,
all of which are relevant to the lives of women, when the instrument is administered to
men, only half of the items are to be presented. The items are rated on a 6-point Likert
scale anchored at 1 (strongly disagree) and 6 (strongly agree). Using the same data from
the validation of the full LFAIS, Morgan (1996) also published a theoretically
unidimensional short form of the instrument, consisting of 11 items positively related to
feminist self-identification, support for the feminist movement, and positive attitudes
toward feminism. Each of these items was derived from the feminist ideology or feminist
goals domains rather than the gender roles items. Morgan has suggested that one item on
the short form of the LFAIS should be removed in some samples.

2.4.3.1

Psychometric properties

In a sample of 209 mixed-gender and mixed-race (43% Asian American, 37% Caucasian
12% Hispanic, 4% African American 2% Native American) undergraduate students (136
women), the full scale and each of the subscales demonstrated adequate-to-strong internal
consistency in women and men, with the exception of the Sisterhood subscale (⍺ = .45 in
women; ⍺ = .15 in men; see Table 1). The scale demonstrated strong concurrent validity
with personal identification as a feminist, support for the women’s movement, and
positive attitudes toward the feminist movement. Across two samples, the 4-week testretest reliability was .83 in both a group of 22 avowed feminists and a mixed-gender
group of 32 undergraduates at a medium-sized midwestern U.S. university. Knowngroups validity was also determined for the full scale and each of the subscales by
establishing that undergraduate men scored lower than undergraduate women, both of
whom scored significantly lower than avowed feminists (Morgan, 1996).
For the brief measure, the initial validation was completed in the aforementioned two
samples and demonstrated good internal reliability (Sample 1: ⍺ = .81; n = 69
undergraduate women and Sample 2: ⍺ = .84; n = 234 mixed-gender undergraduate
students; Morgan, 1996). More recent studies have demonstrated similar reliability scores
(⍺s = .87–.95; Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Conlin et al., 2019). Using an exploratory
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structural equation modeling strategy in a sample of 890 mixed-gender participants,
Woodbrown (2015) demonstrated that when several items were removed, a two-factor
solution could be obtained for women, but no discernable factor structure was obtained
for men. Although the tool has never been explicitly subjected to tests of convergent
validity, it has been employed widely and shown positive correlations with related
constructs such as feminist identification, gender self-esteem (Burn et al., 2000), and
positive implicit attitudes toward feminists (Breen & Karpinski, 2008).

2.4.3.2

Critique

The LFAIS (Morgan, 1996) is a comprehensive measure of feminist attitudes that can be
used in women and men (although no scoring instructions exist for nonbinary
individuals). However, the scale is not without its limitations. Notably, the full scale has
not been subjected to tests of structural validity, and it lacks an intersectional focus. For
example, nearly all items included in the Gender Roles subscale refer to heterosexual
partnerships and childrearing, thus failing to capture attitudes toward diverse expressions
of gender and sexuality. What is potentially the most unique contribution of the LFAIS is
unfortunately also one of its weaknesses: the Sisterhood subscale. This subscale moves
away from postfeminism and reflects women’s political solidarity with others within the
movement. However, its low internal consistency reliability (⍺ = .45 in women; .15 in
men) suggests the scale is unreliable and the items should be reexamined. Further, neither
the long nor short forms of the tool contain the word “feminist,” suggesting that these
attitudes may reflect “a more covert type of feminism” (Burn et al., 2000, p. 1084). The
short form of the scale has been widely used to assess liberal feminist attitudes, but it
does not adequately capture the multidimensionality of liberal feminist thought, and some
research suggests that the 10-item form lacks structural validity (Woodbrown, 2015). Yet,
for those researchers merely hoping to include a brief measure of support for some
aspects of liberal feminist attitudes, particularly in U.S. samples, the short form of the
LFAIS may be a reliable tool for doing so.
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2.4.4 Feminist Perspectives Scale
The Feminist Perspectives Scale (FPS) has three variations: the original scale (FPS-2),
the abbreviated form (FPS-3), and the expanded form, including a Lesbian feminist
subscale (FPS-4). In the following, we provide psychometric information for each of the
measures, followed by a general discussion of the scales’ strengths and weaknesses. The
original item pool was labeled the FPS, which was condensed into the 78-item FPS2.

2.4.4.1

Feminist Perspectives Scale-2

The Feminist Perspectives Scale (FPS-2) was designed to measure the degree of
endorsement of an array of feminist attitudes and behaviours across multiple feminist
ideological perspectives (Henley et al., 1998, 2000; Simoni et al., 1999). The scale
contains 78 items, with 60 assessing feminist ideology and 18 assessing feminist
behaviours across six different feminist perspectives. The ideology items comprise
Liberal Feminism (10 items), Radical Feminism (10 items), Socialist Feminism (10
items), Cultural Feminism (10 items), Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism (10 items),
and Conservatism (10 items). Three behaviour items relevant to each feminist perspective
compose the remaining items (18 total). Separate scores are calculated for the attitudes
(not including Conservativism; Femscore2) and behaviours items. Conservative
behaviours, including “My wedding was, or will be, celebrated with a full traditional
ceremony,” are not counted in the total behaviour score. Items are rated on a 7-point
Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) for the
attitudes items and from 1 (very untrue of me) to 7 (very true of me) for the behaviour
items.
The scale was initially developed in a sample of 92 mixed-gender, ethnically diverse
undergraduates and validated on an ethnically-diverse (40% European American, 25%
Latin American, 18% Asian American) sample of 344 undergraduate and community
women and men. In the validation study, the measure demonstrated high internal
consistency and stable two- and 4-week test-retest reliability in both the full scale and its
subscales, with the exception of the Fembehave subscale at two-week retest (r = .49;
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Henley et al., 1998). The individual subscales also demonstrated high internal
consistency (see Table 1), except for the Liberal Feminism subscale (⍺s = .46–.62), and
these reliability estimates have been upheld in later research (Szymanski, 2004).
Convergent validity was established with positive correlations between the five feminist
subscale scores and attitudes toward women, involvement in women’s studies courses,
and feminist self-identification (Henley et al., 1998). Scores on the five feminist
subscales were also linked to less religiosity and less conservative political orientation.
Exploratory factor analyses of the ideology items revealed a four-factor structure of
Radical Feminism and Socialist Feminism items (Factor 1), Conservativism (Factor 2),
Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism (Factor 3), and Cultural Feminism (Factor 4).
The Liberal Feminism subscale items did not load onto any factor (Henley et al., 1998).

2.4.4.2

Feminist Perspectives Scale-3

A 36-item short form of the scale (FPS-3) was also developed (Henley et al., 2000). Each
of the six primary subscales are included in this abbreviated tool, each with five
attitudinal items and six behavioural items that best capture the various perspectives. In a
sample of 209 mixed-gender and ethnically diverse undergraduate students, the
Cronbach’s alpha for the combination of the feminist subscales (Femscore3) was .85, and
the internal consistency estimates for the subscales ranged from .53 (Liberal Feminism)
to .73 (Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism). Femscore3 and subscale scores correlate
highly with items on the original measure, ranging from .54 (Liberal Feminism) to .87
(Femscore3), and the instrument has demonstrated strong 2-week test-retest reliability
(scores ranging from .87 for the Conservativism and Femscore3 subscales to .54 for
Liberal Feminism items). Convergent validity for the abbreviated instrument was
established through correlations with self-rated degree of feminism and liberal political
orientation (all in the positive direction except conservative, which was also negatively
linked to having taken a women’s studies course and positively linked to religiosity). In
their sample, women scored higher than men on all scales except Conservativism, and
Participants of Color had higher Femscore3s and scored higher on Radical Feminism,
Socialist Feminism, Cultural Feminism, and Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism
subscales than White participants. In a sample of 95 undergraduate students, only a few
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of the subscales (Conservative, Liberal Feminism, and Fembehave) linked with the
Attitudes toward Women Scale (Spence & Helmreich, 1972) or femininity items on the
Bem Sex Role Inventory (Bem, 1984). Notably, Respondents of Color scored
significantly higher on the full scale, as well as the Radical Feminism, Socialist
Feminism, Cultural Feminism, and Womanism/Woman of Color Feminism subscales,
compared to White participants. To our knowledge, no studies have reported a factor
analysis for this version of the scale.

2.4.4.3

Feminist Perspectives Scale-4

Feminist Perspectives Scale-4. Shortly after the publication of the FPS-2, an additional
subscale was added to the instrument to assess Lesbian Feminism (FPS-4; Simoni et al.,
1999, p. 835) to address the FPS-2’s “blatantly heterosexist” nature. The subscale
positions compulsory heterosexuality as a primary source of oppression for women,
encouraging women to define their goals and perspectives outside those of men. The final
10 items for the attitudinal and behavioural Lesbian Feminism subscale were selected
based on the highest corrected item-total correlations and relations with one another from
previous studies with lesbian-identified women.
When the full FPS-4 (FPS-2 plus the Lesbian Feminism subscale) was presented to a
mostly European American (76%) mixed-gender student sample (n = 76) and a sample of
women attending a LGBTQ cultural gathering (n = 41), the internal consistency was high
for the Lesbian Feminism subscale (Cronbach’s ⍺ = .91) and the remaining subscales
(Cronbach’s ⍺s > .70), except for the Liberal Feminism subscale (Cronbach’s ⍺ = .64).
The Lesbian Feminism subscale was significantly positively correlated with feminist
identification and attitudinal items (Femscore4) and each of the subscales, all in the
expected directions. A more liberal political orientation and past experience in a women's
studies course were also linked to Femscore4 and subscales in the expected directions.
Known-groups validity was supported with women consistently scoring higher than men
on the FPS-4, and those who self-identified as less heterosexual (“more” or “exclusively
homosexual”) scored higher than those who identified as more heterosexual (“equally
heterosexual and homosexual,” “more” or “exclusively homosexual”; Simoni et al.,
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1999). To our knowledge, no studies have reported a factor analysis for this full version
of the scale.

2.4.4.4

Critique

The Feminist Perspectives Scale (and its multiple iterations; Henley et al., 1998; Henley
et al., 2000; Simoni et al., 1999) is a unique instrument because it allows researchers to
explore diverse feminist perspectives simultaneously. Yet, the scale has been critiqued
and scrutinized by various feminist social psychologists (Frieze & McHugh, 1998; Russo,
1998; Spence, 1998). In particular, the Liberal Feminism subscale has been criticized for
its inability to capture the diversity within liberal feminist thought (Frieze & McHugh,
1998; Henley & McCarthy, 1998; Spence, 1998). Given that items representing liberal
feminism would be most applicable to U.S. women today (Frieze & McHugh, 1998;
Morgan, 1996), this subscale’s poor reliability and lack of coherence further limits its
utility for assessing endorsement of feminist ideology.
As others have noted, the FPS is not comprehensive and does not cover many branches of
feminist thought (e.g., ecofeminism, Marxist feminism; Frieze & McHugh, 1998), and
the Cultural Feminism subscale does not appear to be widely endorsed by feminists or
non-feminists (Liss et al., 2000). For example, participants who identified with the
“radical right” in Henley et al.’s (1998) original study had the highest scores on this
subscale (although, notably, the number of participants in this category was small).
Spence (1998) has also critiqued the theoretical underpinnings of these scales, noting that
they generally fail to capture the core assumptions of each perspective. Although the
scale allows for the assessment of feminist attitudes and behaviours in tandem through
the inclusion of the behaviour subscale, the psychometric properties of the behavioural
subscale are weak, and many of these items are quite specific and seemingly outdated
(e.g., “I have read non-exploitative erotica written from a woman’s point of view”) and
may not represent the behaviours of modern feminists (Kelly, 2015). Additionally,
considering that the major strength of the FPS is that it allows for the assessment of
nuanced aspects of feminist attitudes, the brief form of this measure loses this nuance and
ability.
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Further, despite the length of these measures, the terms “feminist” or “women’s
movement” are not included in any version of the scale. The tool can be used across
gender categories, although items pertaining specifically to men (e.g., “It is a man's right
and duty to maintain order in his family by whatever means necessary”) are not included
in the total FemScore. The radical, socialist, liberal, and lesbian (in FPS-4) feminism
subscales clearly align with a feminist orientation, although the Cultural Feminism
subscale could potentially reflect postfeminist ideology (“Beauty is feeling one's
womanhood through peace, caring, and nonviolence”). Notably, the scale does have an
intersectional component to it, particularly in the Womanism/Woman of Color and
Lesbian Feminism subscales. By assessing attitudes toward the interlocking prejudice
experienced by women who are also members of sexual or racial minority groups, the
FPS stands out among other measures of feminist attitudes. Overall, the FPS represents a
unique measure of feminist attitudes that assesses endorsement of a variety of diverse
feminisms, but the various dimensions have not shown consistent reliability and validity
across samples.

2.5 Discussion
Our review provides a critical evaluation of 13 scales of feminist identity and attitudes
(10 of which were unique measures) that were published in the last 50 years and used in
psychological studies of feminism. We critically assessed each scale along four distinct
dimensions: (a) type of validity evidence; (b) diversity of the validation samples across
race, age, and gender; (c) inclusion of the term “feminist” within scale items, and (d) the
ability to disentangle collective (“feminist”) and individualistic (“postfeminist”) attitudes
(see Tables 3 and 4). Across the scales, there was substantial variation in the reliability
and validity evidence available for determining their utility. Concerns have been reported
about the psychometric properties, content validity, and relevance for all scales we
included in our review. Some scales appeared to be used infrequently, whereas others had
been used across a wide variety of samples. Of the 13 scales examined, nine had been
subjected to factor analytic tests, offering some evidence for their structural validity;
however, the factor structures observed for these scales did not emerge consistently
across samples.
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It is important to note, however, that inconsistent factor structure among measures of
feminist identity and attitudes may not necessarily point to psychometric weakness of
these measures; rather, these discrepancies may be reflective of the diverse ways
feminism is understood and experienced by individuals from different backgrounds and
at different points in time. We also observed that no measure is known to have been
subjected to tests of measurement invariance across groups. Given the qualitatively
different experiences faced by people across demographic categories, as well as the
different ways that feminist identity is understood and conceptualized across racial
groups (Robnett & Anderson, 2017), assessing group-level differences and the factor
structure of scales across populations seems to be a logical next step for those who aim to
study feminism quantitatively.
Another limitation of the measures reviewed in this paper is that they cannot reliably be
used with samples outside of the United States, given that each measure was validated in
American samples. Indeed, in non-American samples, several of these tools have not
maintained their factor structure, and several instruments contain items that ask about
“American” women and society (LFAIS, FPS-2, FPS-4, WAIS) or assess attitudes toward
U.S.-specific legislation, such as the Equal Rights Amendment (LFAIS, FIDS). For those
conducting research outside of the United States, it will be critical to consider whether
these tools contain language or items that are relevant and appropriate to the sample and
to examine the factor structure of the instrument prior to conducting quantitative
analyses.
The reading ease of the items also varied across the scales. Based on Flesch-Kincaid
Grade Level values, the measures of feminist identity included items that are easy to read
and understand by students ranging from Grade 5 (or an average 11-year-old) to Grade
8/9 (or an average 13- to 15-year-old). The measures of feminist attitudes were less
consistent, with some scales including items that are easily read and understood by
students in Grade 8 and other scales with items at the Grade 11 level and fairly difficult
to read.
Whereas most measures of feminist attitudes employed diverse samples in the initial
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validation studies, measures of feminist identity had overwhelmingly White samples or
did not report on race/ethnicity, with the exception of the WIAS. Several tools,
particularly measures of feminist identity, were validated with—and therefore can be
reliably used only with—individuals who identify as women, leaving the feminist identity
process in men and nonbinary individuals underexamined. Notably, only a handful of the
scales that assess feminist attitudes or identity actually use the term “feminist” anywhere
in the scale, which may affect the way participants responds to these items (Conlin &
Heesacker, 2016, 2018). Most of the scales were theoretically murky on dimensions of
identity and attitudes, and few identity scales appeared to differentiate between feminist
and postfeminist identities. In the remainder of the present paper, we offer a number of
recommendations for future use of these measures in psychological studies of modern
feminist identity and attitudes, as well as considerations for new scale development.

2.5.1 Recommendations for Using Existing Measures
For researchers interested in the study of individual differences in feminist selfidentification, we would recommend the Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale
(Szymanski, 2004) as a brief, reliable, and valid scale for this purpose. Researchers may
also examine the four items contained in this scale individually, rather than average them,
to categorize and compare participants as public feminists, private feminists, feminist
movement supporters, and feminist attitudes supporters. The Cardinal Beliefs of
Feminists Scale (Zucker, 2004) may be used to assess attitudes toward three core
components of feminism in relation to feminist self-labeling. Specifically, the measure
has utility for assessing between-group differences among individuals who support
feminist principles but who do not identify as feminists and those who support feminist
principles and use the feminist label. Given the recent uptick in feminist self-labeling, we
encourage future researchers to consider exploring the category of responses that is often
omitted from analyses: participants who identify as feminists but do not support all three
cardinal beliefs. What function does a feminist identity serve when it is not bolstered by
support for feminism’s basic principles? More research is needed to better-understand the
motivations and attitudes of those who fall into this category.
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Any study utilizing scales derived from the FID model or the Womanist Identity
Development Model (WIAS) should consider the nonlinearity of the proposed stages of
identity development and must carefully consider which stage(s) best correspond to the
research questions (Hansen, 2002; Hyde, 2002). The FIS (Rickard, 1987, 1989) omits the
Active Commitment stage, meaning that Synthesis (e.g., “I find myself much more
willing to trust my perception of events than I have been in the past”) represents the
ultimate stage of feminist identity development on this scale, and researchers who choose
to use it should be clear about the scale’s operationalization of feminist identity when
interpreting the findings. Although Moradi and Subich (2002) have recommended the use
of the FIC, rather than the FIS or the FIDS, to assess the stages of the FID model, other
feminist psychologists disagree (Hyde, 2002).
Additionally, the WIAS is not a conceptually or psychometrically valid tool for assessing
feminist (or womanist) attitudes, and we agree with other scholars that the interpretation
and generalizability of findings from this scale are problematic (see Moradi, 2005). Those
wishing to assess Womanist attitudes may choose to utilize the Womanism/Woman of
Color subscale of the Feminist Perspectives Scale (Henley et al., 1998; Simoni et al.,
1999). Although it did not meet criteria for inclusion in the present review, and it is not a
measure of feminism per se, researchers may wish to employ the Intersectional
Awareness Scale (Curtin et al., 2015) or Intersectional Political Consciousness Scale
(Greenwood, 2008) to assess a more general understanding of structural inequality at
multiple intersection and the ability to critique it.
For the assessment of feminist attitudes, the LFAIS offers the most comprehensive
analysis of multiple components of liberal feminist thought and political orientation, as
well as attitudes toward feminists and the women’s movement, particularly among
cisgender women in the United States and, therefore, it would appear to subsume the
purpose of the FWM scale. Yet, until a factor analysis is conducted on the full LFAIS
scale, its structural validity cannot be determined. In addition, the FWM scale assesses
subjectively positive or negative attitudes about the feminist movement, rather than
support for feminist principles, and therefore it is not a proxy for feminist attitudes or
individual support for feminism on its own. Although the ATFIS (Brodsky et al., 1976)
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assesses agreement with various topics and goals of the feminist political movement, it
does not assess engagement with feminist thought to the same degree as the LFAIS
(Morgan, 1996) or FPS (Henley et al., 1998). Those researchers wishing to employ the
ATFIS in their research may wish to consider updating the items to reflect the issues
facing women and nonbinary individuals today.
Researchers considering the FPS should think clearly about their research question in
relation to specific branches of feminist thought and be wary of its psychometric and
theoretical limitations. It is possible that the FPS can be utilized creatively because some
researchers have found alternative ways to use the scale, such as combining the Radical
Feminism and Socialist Feminism subscales to constitute a general measure of strong
feminist attitudes (Erchull & Liss, 2013; Liss & Erchull, 2010). The combined measure
has demonstrated strong internal consistency across samples (⍺ = .87–.91) and links to
relevant constructs (less enjoyment of sexualization, gender system justification, and
beliefs in a just world; more gender collectivity, positive attitudes toward women, and
collective action). Yet, without additional tests of validity, we suggest caution in the
widespread use of the FPS and its multiple iterations.

2.5.2 Recommendations for the Next Generation of Measures
When developing tools to assess ever-changing sociopolitical attitudes, identities, and
ideologies, “repeated iterations and refinements are often needed” (Spence, 1998, p. 353).
Therefore, we offer some suggestions to researchers to improve upon the existing
instruments used to measure feminist identity and attitudes, as well as those researchers
aiming to develop novel tools to study modern feminism. All scales must be updated and
validated to account for the shifting sociopolitical climate and sociodemographic
landscape in which the scale is being used. In particular, given feminism’s emergence in
mainstream culture, new measures should examine not merely use of the feminist label
but also participants’ understandings of this term. Notably, qualitative and mixedmethods studies have shown that definitions of feminism vary widely, and these diverse
perceptions of what constitutes feminism have been linked to feminist self-identification
(Hoskin et al., 2017; Swirsky & Angelone, 2016). Further, given that scale language can
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influence participants’ response patterns, those creating new measures should weigh the
costs and benefits of including the term “feminist” within scale items (Conlin &
Heesacker, 2016, 2018; White, 2006). During the age of postfeminism, examining
potential overlap or discrepancy between feminist identification and feminist attitudes
may be more useful for predicting feminist behaviours than assessing either attitudes or
identity in isolation.
Language of scale items should be easily understood, both in regard to reading ease and
use of complex or outdated terms. With all scales, where words or phrases are used that
may be unknown to respondents (e.g., the Equal Rights Amendment), we recommend
including brief definitions in order to clarify these terms for research participants. The
cross-cultural utility of many scales was limited by their context-specific nature. Indeed,
various scales referred to specific feminist issues that do not apply outside a U.S. context
(i.e., WIAS, LFAIS, and ATFIS, each of which reference “American women” or
American political jargon), so researchers studying participants outside the United States
must be cautious when selecting measures to be certain that each item is relevant to the
population being studied. We encourage the development of novel instruments to assess
feminist political attitudes in countries outside the United States. For example, scales
used to assess support for feminist politics in Canada may include attitudes toward the
Inquiry on Missing and Murdered Indigenous Women and Girls.
Future research on feminist identity development would also benefit from integrating the
lived experiences of self-identified feminists discerned through qualitative, and
particularly feminist qualitative (Beckman, 2014), research methods to inform item
generation to increase content validity. In addition, most of the scales in our review
focused on holding a positive, coherent identity around feminism, and they were not
designed to assess more ambivalent feminist identities reflected in the current cultural
wave of feminism (Banet-Weiser, 2018; Gill, 2016). Future research on feminist identity
would benefit from the assessment of postfeminist identities, which are not represented in
earlier generations of feminist identity scales. We encourage the continued use of the
term “feminist” either within survey questions or somewhere within study designs given
the importance of feminist labeling for predicting behaviours of interest (i.e., collective
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action; Radke et al., 2016; Yoder et al., 2011). Given that people more readily identify
with feminism when a definition of the term is provided (see Siegel, 2020), future
measures may wish to include a definition of the term “feminist” in the instructions. We
suggest a broad definition, such as “a person who supports and advocates for gender
equality.” Alternatively, researchers may allow participants to provide their own
definitions of what a feminist is and thematically analyze the responses (Hoskin et al.,
2017; Swirsky & Angelone, 2014, 2016). In addition, the importance of allies for
achieving gender equality means theoretical frameworks and instruments should be
developed to examine men’s and non-binary people’s experience of feminist identity
development.
Researchers must consider whether scale items are formulated for hetero/cis-normative
individuals and thus exclude individuals outside these categories, such as gender fluid
and nonbinary respondents. For example, if pronouns are used in scale language, we
suggest the use of singular “they/them” as per the recommendations of the seventh
edition of the APA Publication Manual (American Psychological Association, 2020). In
regard to language, the items should be written in an accessible way to widen their utility
across samples and populations. In scales with items that refer to men as a social group,
we recommend distinguishing between cisgender and transgender men, given that these
different classifications of men likely have different relations with women as a social
group, as well as experiences of power and oppression (Watson, 2019). We also support
the development of instruments that can reliably be used by male-identified and gender
nonconforming people (see Sudkämper et al., 2020). Although it is unlikely that any
instrument can capture the full breadth of feminist identity and attitudes, measures should
be updated to assess the unique concerns of feminists today (e.g., intersectional
awareness; Curtin et al., 2015; Greenwood, 2008) and be inclusive of respondents across
the gender spectrum
We would also recommend more attention to scale validation in the measurement of
feminist identity and attitudes. Validity evidence was minimal across the scales, and a
priori hypotheses for the scale’s associations with relevant outcomes were lacking.
Notably, despite research and theory suggesting that feminism holds different meanings
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for individuals from different racial/ethnic backgrounds, samples included in scale
validation efforts—specifically in measures of feminist identity—were overwhelmingly
non-Hispanic White. Future researchers should deliberately seek out diverse samples as
well as assess measurement invariance between racial/ethnic groups. Age likely also
contributes to feminist identity and attitudes, although nearly all scales were developed
and validated in undergraduate samples. We encourage careful attention to diversity
across demographic categories in future scale development efforts, perhaps by setting
quotas of different groups or targeting specific groups in recruitment advertisements.
Moreover, very few of the scales demonstrated systematic tests of ecological validity.
The validity and utility of these scales would be strengthened by testing whether they
predict key constructs of interest such as involvement in feminist collective action,
willingness to intervene in sexist situations, or allocation of compensatory funds to a
feminist organization. Overall, future research should address the gaps in the construct
validation of feminist identity and feminist attitudes scales.
Overcoming the challenges of operationalizing feminist identity and attitudes is critical
for the study of modern feminism because people’s feminist attitudinal orientation and
alignment with the feminist movement have far-reaching consequences for individual and
collective well-being, including body image and subjective well-being (Murnen &
Smolak, 2009; Saunders & Kashubeck-West, 2006; Yakushko, 2007), how individuals
cope after experiencing sexism and sexual violence (Carretta & Szymanski, 2020; Moradi
& Subich, 2002; Sabik & Tylka, 2006), use of safe sex practices (Schick et al., 2008),
resistance to stereotype threat (Leicht et al., 2017), and gender-based collective action
motivation (Liss et al., 2004; Nelson et al., 2008; Yoder et al., 2011). As we move
forward, it will be critical to understand if, how, and why modern feminist identity and
attitudes map onto other social identities and attitudes, such as environmentalism, fat
acceptance, and anti-racism to examine whether cultivating feminist identity can motivate
support for and engagement with other social justice movements. Some measures, such as
the Intersectional Awareness Scale (Curtin et al., 2015) and Intersectional Political
Consciousness Scale (Greenwood, 2008), have begun to examine these intersections.
Quantitative research on feminist identity and attitudes is also relevant to other domains
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of psychology beyond the social and personality area. Specifically, industrial/
organizational psychologists may explore how feminist identity and attitudes among
managers influence employees’ career satisfaction and trajectory, and clinical
psychologists should continue to explore how feminist identity may buffer against mental
health concerns (e.g., Sabik & Tylka, 2006) and how developing feminist attitudes may
influence recovery from clinical psychological conditions (e.g., Holmes et al., 2017).
In conclusion, feminist identity and feminist attitudes are important areas of study. The
validity and utility of measures designed to assess these constructs in quantitative
research should be considered carefully. Ultimately, the selection of measures should
derive from the specific research question. Given the challenges and complexity of
studying modern feminism, researchers may need to use multiple instruments in tandem
to assess those aspects and forms of feminist identity and attitudes most relevant to their
study (see Yoder et al., 2012). On the basis of this review, we identified a need to update
measures of feminist identity and attitudes that would improve on the psychometric
properties of measures assessing feminist identity and attitudes, to provide more
systematic validation of feminist identity and attitudes scales in diverse samples, to
incorporate gender-inclusive language and content to widen the utility of the scales across
social groups. and to allow researchers to assess context-specific content relevant to
modern feminists, including intersectionality and disentangling individualized from
collective feminist identities. To continue to study modern feminism in relevant and
meaningful ways, it is imperative that researchers develop and validate new measures
that capture the multidimensional nature of feminism as a collective, social identity
(Ashmore et al., 2004) and situate the meaning of feminist identity and attitudes in the
context of other relevant identity characteristics, such as race/ethnicity, (dis)ability, age,
and gender identity.
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Chapter 3

3

Study 2: A Grounded Theory Analysis of Young Women

and Nonbinary Individuals Navigating Ambivalent Feminist
Identities
In this study, I aimed to develop a more comprehensive understanding of the ways that
young people navigate and negotiate their feminist identities in daily life. I was
specifically interested in the areas that present challenges to feminist identity, and the
identity management strategies employed by people who call themselves feminists in the
face of these challenges. As scholars continue to debate the legitimacy of today’s
feminism(s) across fields and disciplines, the experiences and perspectives of modern
self-identified feminists in the United States and Canada have been generally absent from
the conversation. Scholars have noted that “now, more than ever, is the time to develop a
nuanced approach to understanding contemporary versions of feminism” (Lewis &
Marine, 2015, p. 119) and this information must be gleaned from the voices and
experiences of young people themselves (Keller et al., 2018). Given the complexity of
modern feminist identity, rather than imposing past theory onto feminists’ experiences, I
used a grounded theory approach, which allowed me to take a bottom-up approach to
developing a theoretical framework for understanding feminist ambivalence.

3.1 Introduction
As reflected by recent, popular feminist social movements and the rise in feminist
identification among young people around the world (for a review, see Siegel, 2020),
feminism has become mainstream in recent years (Gill, 2016). However, scholars have
argued that this mainstreaming of feminism has resulted in the watering down of feminist
principles in order to make feminism more palatable to the masses (see Gill, 2007;
Zeisler, 2016). When feminist identification is a part of popular culture, and the stigma
attributed to feminists no longer serves as a deterrent to feminist identification, people
may choose to use the label “feminist” to describe themselves without necessarily
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knowing enough about feminism to be certain of their commitment to the movement.
Similarly, people may use the label conditionally, or only in situations where they feel
that it is acceptable and normative to do so (Crossley, 2010). Qualitative research
suggests that young people distance themselves from feminism that they feel others will
think is “unreasonable” and instead strive for palatable politics and “fair feminism” that
supports equity without disrupting the status quo (Calder-Dawe & Gavey, 2016).
In addition, the past decade has seen a proliferation of various “feminist memoirs” and
“feminist media” in which self-identified feminist women grapple with the contradictions
and limitations that surround their support for feminism. Most famously, in her popular
essay collection Bad Feminist, author Roxane Gay explains that she feels she is “failing
as a feminist” (2014, p. 18). While she holds strong pro-woman attitudes regarding
important feminist issues such as sexual violence and depictions of women in the media,
she allows herself to indulge in various sexist practices such as listening to music that
blatantly degrades and objectifies women. Similarly, on Deborah Frances-White’s Guilty
Feminist podcast, she explains that she is “a feminist, but…” followed by a statement that
arguably is inconsistent with feminist principles (e.g., “I am a feminist, but when a
fashion designer recently told me I had lost so much weight I could be a plus-size model,
I was secretly pleased”). Her book on the subject encourages women to embrace “guilty
feminism” and adopt a feminist label, regardless of their continued support for sexist
practices (Frances-White, 2018). Given the popularity of these books and podcasts, and
the changing face of feminism, feminist self-labelling may no longer reliably be
considered reflective of strong pro-feminist attitudes and behaviours.
While these quasi-feminist positions are framed as entryways into feminist politics,
maintaining ambivalent feminist attitudes may have negative downstream consequences
for the women’s movement more broadly. Recent research with women and men with
strong feminist beliefs has revealed that “bad feminism” (i.e., perceived knowledge and
behavioural inconsistencies) can disrupt the link between feminist beliefs, identification,
and behaviour (Conlin et al., 2019). It is also possible that ambivalence nullifies the
protective effect of feminist attitudes on women’s mental health. Though some research
suggests that feminism is linked to better mental health outcomes in women, the research
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on these links is mixed, and the benefits associated with endorsing feminist attitudes may
be overreported due to publishing bias (Yoder et al., 2012). It is possible that core
feminist principles may have a beneficial effect on women’s mental health, but
ambivalence about feminism may prevent women from reaping the full benefits that an
established feminist identity may afford (Yoder et al., 2012).
This study sought to develop a more comprehensive understanding of modern feminist
identification from the perspective of self-identified feminist women and nonbinary
people. To date, theoretical frameworks for understanding feminist social identity have
been derived from the literature on stigmatized identity development. However, I
deliberately sought to make “women the subjects of the sociological act of knowing”
(Smith, 1987, p. 69), and allowed women and nonbinary people to give life to the theory,
rather than deducing or inferring their tensions from past research or models. Importantly,
while cisgender men may also choose to identify as feminists, this study focused on the
experiences of those who are the principal beneficiaries of feminism. However, men’s
feminist identity development is examined in Chapter 7 of this dissertation. This study
builds on the various qualitative endeavors that have attempted to clarify the role of
ambivalence in the lives of modern feminists, but, to my knowledge, it is the first to
utilize a constructivist grounded theory approach in doing so (Mills et al., 2006).
Through semi-structured interviews with self-identified feminist women and nonbinary
people, I aimed to address the following research questions: 1) What are sites of
ambivalence for modern feminists? 2) What does feminism mean to modern feminists? 3)
What aspects of feminism are accepted and refuted by modern feminists? 4) How do
modern feminists advance women’s rights (or not)? 5) What are the psychological and
behavioural consequences of endorsing ambivalent feminist attitudes?

3.2

Method

3.2.1 Participants
Twenty-eight self-identified feminists and nonbinary people were interviewed for the
study, though two interviews were omitted due to issues that arose during the interview
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process. The final sample consisted of 26 participants, who ranged in age from 19 to 37
(Mage = 25.92, SD = 4.82). They identified as predominantly cisgender (n = 21;
80.77%), non-binary (n = 2; 7.69%), transgender (n = 2; 7.69%), and gender fluid (n = 1;
3.85%). They were mostly heterosexual or straight (n = 15; 57.69%), bisexual (n = 5;
19.23%), queer (n = 3; 11.54%), pansexual (n = 2; 7.69%), or lesbian (n = 1; 3.85%).
Participants varied in age, ethnicity, and (dis)ability status. See Table 5 for demographic
information about each participant interviewed, including chosen pseudonym and
pronouns3, reported age, gender, sexual orientation, race/ethnicity, highest level of
education attained, and (dis)ability status.

3.2.2 Procedure
Given its amenability to feminist scholarship (Keddy et al., 1996; Plummer & Young,
2009; Wuest, 1995), I utilized a constructivist grounded theory approach for data analysis
(Corbin & Strauss, 2008; Creswell, 2013; Mills et al., 2006). The literature review
leading up to this study depicted feminism as in a state of flux, with some decrying
postfeminist apathy and others applauding renewed feminist activism. Considering the
inappropriateness of existing models of feminist identity and the inadequacy of published
instruments for capturing core components of feminism (Siegel & Calogero, 2021), a
grounded theory approach was suitable for understanding feminist-identified women and
gender diverse people’s experiences in the present cultural context. I acknowledge that
grounded theory typically does not include a comprehensive literature review prior to
data collection (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), but given that this study was undertaken as part
of a program of dissertation research, it was necessary to familiarize myself with the
extant literature ahead of time.
To be eligible to participate, participants had to identify as women or nonbinary, speak
English fluently, and be 18 or older. The grounded theory approach allows for
researchers to begin with broad questions and narrow in on more specific inquiries as

3

I use the language of “chosen pronouns” because it is possible that participants preferred to use pronouns
that were not consistent with their own personal pronouns for the sake of this study.
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interviews progress (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Therefore, while feminist selfidentification was not initially a requirement for inclusion, early in the research process
(after interview 7, the first participant who did not identify as a feminist when asked
directly), I chose to interview only those who self-identified as feminists. Following
interview 11, I chose to include only those who were under the age of 40 because the
experiences of those who were active during feminism’s second wave appeared to be
different than those expressed by younger feminists. A recruitment advert was posted to
Twitter and was able to be reposted by other researchers and those interested in the topic
(“re-tweeted”). Eligible participants were encouraged to contact me via email to express
interest in participating in an interview about feminist identity. After initial contact was
made by the participant, they were sent an electronic version of the Letter of Information,
which they signed and emailed back to me, along with a pseudonym to maintain
anonymity within study records and reports.
Interviews were conducted via Skype and recorded to later be transcribed verbatim. I
chose to keep my camera off during interviews, though some participants chose to keep
their videos on during the interview. I chose to keep my video off during these interviews
because I did not want participants to make assumptions about my position on feminism
on the basis of my age or appearance. Participants were compensated $10 USD or $13
CAD (depending on geographic location) in the form of an Amazon gift card4. I stopped
collecting data once I felt that theoretical saturation was reached (the point at which I did
not derive new codes from the interviews; but see Braun & Clarke, 2019 for a critique of
saturation). After 10 interviews, I prioritized those with diverse gender identities, given
that the perspectives of transgender women and gender expansive people have
historically been omitted from studies of feminist identity. After the 24th interview, I
specifically sought out participants with racially diverse backgrounds. Interviews ranged
from 52-76 minutes and were transcribed into 328 single-spaced pages of useable text for
data analysis.

4

It was observed by those online that compensation through Amazon may have deterred some potential
participants, given that some feminists also hold anti-corporate attitudes.
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3.2.3 Addressing Social Positions
At the time of the interviews, I was a 24-year-old white American cisgender woman
completing her second year of PhD at a Canadian university who identified as
heterosexual and able-bodied. Though this information was not revealed to participants,
she also identified as a liberal, intersectional feminist and supported feminist goals,
including, but not limited to, reproductive justice, pay equality, Black Lives Matter, and
Health at Every Size, through both advocacy and public activism. The first author
conducted, transcribed, and coded all of the interviews. The second author and coder was
a 42-year-old white, able-bodied, cisgender woman and tenured professor of social
psychology who also identified as feminist and has published widely on topics related to
the psychology of gender, sexist ideologies, women’s self-concept, and body image.

3.2.3.1

Analytic procedure

I began with a broad set of questions derived from an extensive literature review on the
subjects of feminist theory, postfeminism, feminist identity development, feminist
ideology, and feminist stigma. Because I did not want my own assumptions to guide the
interviews, the questions were initially broad to allow participants to explain their
experiences and concerns for themselves. Throughout the interview process, the
questions were revised in order to shed light on the emergent coding scheme (Agee,
2008) and to explore new, conceptually-related ideas. Interview questions covered a wide
range of topics, including identity development (i.e., “Have you always identified as a
feminist? How did your feminist identity develop?”), definitions of feminism (i.e., “What
is a feminist? Define it in your own words based on what it means to you”), and feminist
stigma (“Have you ever experienced discrimination or backlash for being a feminist?”).
Reflexivity was paramount throughout the interview process (England, 1994). To this
end, I was conscious of the power dynamic established between myself as a researcher
and participants and sought to humanize and empower the participants (Pillow, 2003).
Specifically, I allowed participants to steer the discussion, avoided intrusive
interruptions, and responded appropriately to disclosures of potentially-sensitive subject
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matter. Participants were able to contact me after the interview to discuss their
experience, and a few thanked me for encouraging them to think more about their
identities as feminists. Participant creativity was encouraged in choosing a unique
pseudonym, and the participants sometimes selected single names (e.g., Mrinalini,
Zipporah), full names (e.g., Nicky J. Kent), or numbers (e.g., 150) to represent
themselves. Participants also chose the pronouns they would prefer to be used for the
purposes of this study (See Table 5). Reflexivity notes were maintained and regarded as
critical to the analyses (Ackerly & True, 2008; England, 1994). The quotes that I have
chosen to present in this manuscript not only reflect the participants’ lived experiences,
but also their unique personalities.
Table 5. Demographic Information for Study 2 Participants
Chosen
pseudonym

Age

Gender

Pronouns

Sexual
orientation

Race

Alexandra

25

Woman (C)

She/her

Bisexual

White

Ruth

30

Woman (C)

She/her

Straight

White

M

25

Woman (C)

She/her

Bisexual

White

Adriana

26

Woman (C)

She/her

Queer

White

Nicky J.
Kent

26

Woman (C)

They/them

Pansexual

White

Christina

22

Woman (C)

She/her

Straight

White

Melody

27

Woman (C)

She/her

Straight

Eastern
European

150

20

Woman (C)

She/her

Straight

White

Marie

24

Woman (C)

She/her

Straight

Black

Alicia

36

Woman (C)

She/her

Straight

White

Mrinalini

21

Woman (C)

She/her

Straight

Eastern
European

Phoebe

27

Woman (C)

She/her

Straight

White

X

25

Non-binary

They/them

Straight

White

Ginger

37

Non-binary

They/their

Straight

White

Alice

21

Woman (C)

She/her

Straight

White

Patty

28

Woman (C)

She/her

Queer

White

Education
Graduate
degree
Graduate
degree
Some
college
Bachelor’s
degree
Graduate
degree
High
school
Graduate
degree
Some
college
Bachelor’s
degree
Graduate
degree
Some
college
Graduate
degree
Some
college
High
school
High
school
Bachelor’s
degree

(Dis)ability
status
None
None
Psychological
Physical and
psychological
Psychological
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
None
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Bachelor’s Physical and
degree
psychological
Bachelor’s
Laura
22
Woman (C)
She/her
Straight
White
Psychological
degree
Graduate
Zipporah
28
Woman (C)
She/her
Bisexual
White
None
degree
White/
Graduate
Veronica
27
Woman (C)
She/her
Straight
None
Latina
degree
Some
Kim
19
Woman (C)
She/her
Straight
White
Psychological
college
White/
Some
Kayla
20
Woman (T)
She/her
Lesbian
Psychological
Latina
college
West
Bachelor’s
Jennifer
29
Woman (C)
She/her
Bisexual
None
Indian
degree
MultiBachelor’s
Brenda
24
Woman (C)
She/her
Bisexual
None
racial
degree
Lisa
Some
20
Woman (C)
She/her
Straight
Asian
None
Simpson
college
Woman (T),
Some
Rose
35
She/her
Queer
White
Cognitive
genderqueer
college
Note: Chosen name reflects participant chosen pseudonym. Woman (C) represents cisgender women.
Olivia
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Gender
fluid

She/her

Pansexual

White

Woman (T) reflects transgender women.

Each interview was conducted and transcribed verbatim. After the initial transcription
was completed, the transcript and audio recording of the interview were sent to one of
four female research assistants to review for any potential paraphrasing or omissions.
Edited transcripts were sent back to the primary coders who completed line-by-line
coding of the interviews, first independently and then together. Throughout the analytic
process, the data were coded inductively (Morrow, 2007), using an interactive, constant
comparison technique (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) whereby emergent themes from past
interviews were routinely compared against the new data to ensure their appropriateness
and completeness (Kolb, 2012). As interviews progressed, the earlier interviews and
original themes that had been identified were revisited so as not to prioritize the
experiences of later interview subjects (Charmaz, 2014). Often, this meant revisiting
major categories and revising core themes in the model to better suit the broader patterns
as described by the participants.
I followed the general principles of grounded theory analysis, beginning with open
coding (Fassinger, 2005). Specifically, I divided the data from each transcript into lineby-line segments, which were related to our overall research questions. Throughout this
stage, I engaged in memoing (see Birks et al., 2008), or making notes about ideas for
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potential higher-order themes as they emerged. Both coders individually coded the first
ten interviews before meeting to discuss potential themes. After this initial meeting, we
met more frequently to discuss the new interviews as they occurred to assess for novel
findings within the coding scheme. In the second phase (axial coding), I condensed the
most frequent and robust codes into higher-order themes, which served as our initial
framework for the development of a more formal coding scheme. Major themes were
derived on the basis of perceived higher order theoretical constructs that subsumed the
meanings of the codes based on commonalities among them (Gioia et al., 2013). On the
basis of this initial coding, I revised the original interview schedule and devised
subsequent questions (Agee, 2008). After the generation of the initial codes and themes,
we utilized an iterative technique as a means of engaging in a constructivist form of
selective coding (Creswell, 2013).
Given the complexity of the topic, the unique influences of gender and racial group, and
the inconsistencies present within participants’ discussions of the subject, developing a
cogent model of ambivalent feminism was a challenging task. I created numerous visual
and narrative representations of the data, and we both commented and explored the
themes until we felt they best represented associations among constructs as they were
described by the participants (Creswell, 2013). To increase the credibility of the analysis
and to ensure that the proposed model resonated with participants’ own lived
experiences, I used a member checking technique (Lincoln & Guba, 1985), whereby the
final model was sent back to a subsample of the original participants for validation. Of
the 10 participants contacted, eight responded with feedback, all of whom approved of
the final model. Upon receiving insightful feedback from additional experts in the field, I
revised the model once again to take a more compassionate approach to understanding
participants’ experiences, given the unique challenges faced by young feminists in the
current cultural climate (Lewis & Marine, 2015) and engaged in theoretical sampling to
fill the potential gaps our initial sample may have left. Additional, minor revisions were
made to the model and grouping of themes. This final model is presented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Theoretical Model of Ambivalent Feminism

3.3 Results
While each of the participants self-identified as a feminist when asked directly, they
expressed various tensions that complicated their relationship to feminism more broadly,
which I refer to as domains of ambivalence. In particular, the tensions were concentrated
around six domains: representation and inclusion, feminist self-concept, entrenchment of
feminine norms, identity incongruence, fear of backlash, and evasion of stereotypes.
Further, these tensions appeared to co-occur with particular experiences within the
personal and political spheres. In the personal sphere, the tensions were connected to
body image disturbances, gendered appearance management strategies, and negotiated
sexual agency. In the political sphere, the tensions were connected to conditional feminist
self-labelling, feminist bystanding, political (in)action, and lifestyle feminism. Our
analytic process moved from repeating ideas to consistent themes to theoretical
constructs (see Table 6).
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Table 6. Coding Scheme for Study 2
Repeating idea
Exclusionary/intersectional
Compulsory feminism

Common theme

Dimension

Representation and
inclusion

Experiences with other feminists
Perceived knowledge deficit
Skills deficit

Feminist selfconcept

Impossibility of change
Feminine power
Personal importance of femininity

Entrenchment of
feminine norms

Preference for traditional gender role
Cultural conflicts
Religious conflicts
Personality conflicts

Identity
incongruence

Domains of
ambivalence

“Angry feminist”
“Radical feminist”
“Man-hater”

Evasion of
stereotypes

Physical harm
Social ostracism
Familial disapproval

Fear of backlash

Romantic rejection
Occupational/educational stigma
Body image disturbances
Gendered appearance management

Personal outcomes

Negotiated sexual agency
Personal and
political outcomes

Conditional feminist labeling
Feminist bystanding
Political (in)action
Lifestyle feminism

Political outcomes
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3.3.1 Domains of Ambivalence
Throughout the interviews, participants expressed frustrations and complications in their
relationships to feminism. These tensions were varied and differed between the
participants, but several appeared fairly consistently. The primary domains of
ambivalence were representation and inclusion (i.e., perception of what and whom
feminism is for), feminist self-concept (i.e., feminist self-esteem and self-evaluation),
identity incongruence (i.e., incompatibility between feminism and other important aspects
of one’s life), entrenchment of femininity (i.e., desire to present and live as both feminine
and feminist), evasion of stereotypes (i.e., wish to avoid the negative stereotypes
attributed to feminism and feminists), and fear of backlash (i.e., anxiety regarding real or
perceived negative repercussions of feminist identification and activism).

3.3.1.1

Representation and Inclusion

Participants engaged with feminism somewhat differently, depending on their perceptions
of who is represented (or not) within feminism. First, a few participants felt that feminism
was exclusionary to people who do not identify as women. Due to this perceived
exclusivity, some participants wished to distance themselves from the “feminist”
movement. For example, Melody had mixed feelings about feminism’s recognition of
people outside of the gender binary. She explained:
I hear the word feminist, and I think automatically female, but I think it’s, like, it’s an
exclusionary term almost… you know, the issues that are facing women – and that should
be trans women, you know, all type of women, needs to be heard… I care about the
issues on a broader level. [Melody]
It is worth noting that the four non-cisgender participants in the sample did not express
ambivalence regarding feminism’s inclusion of marginalized gender identities. Each
recognized various sects of feminism that were reductionistic but did not see these groups
as a barrier to their own involvement in the movement. Kayla explained, “There’s trans
exclusionary radical feminism. There’s a different - there’s all different kinds of subsets
of it… When it comes to the current feminist movement, I don’t have many criticisms of
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it right now.” Similarly, Ginger noted, “SWERFS and TERFS - these are people who are
sex worker exclusionary feminists and trans-exclusionary feminists… I’m not in
agreement with the SWERFS and TERFS because I think that sex workers and trans
women need to have rights.” While some cisgender feminists perceived all of feminism
as trans-exclusionary, at least in this particular sample, those who did not identify as
feminists were able to distance themselves from the pockets of the movement that did not
support them.
Some participants saw feminism as a movement rooted in intersectionality (see
Crenshaw, 1991) and thereby encapsulated other social justice initiatives, such as “Health
at Every Size” [Alexandra, Adriana, Ginger] and “Black Lives Matter”5 [Nicky J. Kent,
X]. For example, when asked what feminism meant to her, Alexandra responded, “what’s
really important to me about feminism and my definition of feminism is that it’s
intersectional always.” She continued to expand on this point throughout the interview,
drawing attention to the various ways that her attitudes about equality expanded into
various other social justice issues, such as transgender, racial, and (dis)ability rights. This
strong desire for intersectional liberation was not well-understood or incorporated by
other participants, such as M, for whom feminism was perceived as narrowly catering to
the needs of (White) cisgender women. Toward the end of the interview, she expressed
that she wanted to talk about “all lives matter,” but noted:
If we’re talking about equality across genders, then feminism is the word. If you’re just
talking about equality, then you’re talking about racial injustice and you’re talking about
you know socio-economic issues… is there a word for that? [M]
For Alice, not only was feminism not inclusive of fat acceptance, but she felt that this
social justice initiative was “damaging” to society and desired to distance herself from it:

5

Health at Every Size refers to the social movement to end the oppression of fat bodies (see Bacon, 2010),
and Black Lives Matter is a social initiative that demands justice for black people wrongfully subjugated to
police brutality due to their race (Khan-Cullors & Bandele, 2018).

43

Have I been a [fat] activist? I wouldn’t say so because I don’t necessarily agree with the
movement. Like I think body positivity is very damaging these days… I just think [body
positivity] comes with a lot of stories and activists who are damaging, like, the minds of
growing individuals who are not maintaining healthy lifestyles because they see role
models in the field who are unhealthy but love themselves still. [Alice]
Despite the fact that women (and nonbinary individuals) are located at various axes of
privilege and oppression, some participants saw the “women’s movement” as solely
advocacy for women like themselves. When participants did not incorporate
intersectional perspectives into their feminist attitudes, they often felt that feminism was
not a cause worth fighting for.
A few participants felt that feminism was compulsory, explaining that they felt that most
people were already feminists and so they did not need to be active in the feminist
movement. For example, Laura noted that endorsing a feminist attitude was “just the way
to be,” and Ruth explained that in the city where she grew up, “it was weird if you
weren’t a feminist.” Some participants even felt that structural change was no longer
necessary, such as Alice:
The first wave and second wave of feminism, I think women were concretely fighting for
something tangible and for rights. [Modern feminism] doesn’t look to solve anything but
really just looks to identify more problems that don’t necessarily exist or exacerbate them
to the level where you feel bad. [Alice]
Despite the tensions these women felt regarding feminism, they felt that some degree of
commitment to feminism was socially compulsory. Yet, those who held more ambivalent
attitudes toward the feminist movement were less inclined to engage deeply with it. Some
of the participants noted that they practiced a form of apolitical feminism that centered
on “personal autonomy” [Adriana] and authenticity, rather than supporting and
advocating for women as a collective. Mrinalini was among those for whom feminism
was a very personal stance, noting that she did not want to be labelled as an “activist.”
She went on to explain, “I’m less concerned with changing the world or the way a large

44

group of people sees, and that’s an incredible thing to be able to do, but it’s not
necessarily how I operate.”
It also appeared that the participants’ feminist attitudes were shaped by their experiences
with other feminists, including their attitudes towards feminist activists they had seen and
their sense of inclusion within the feminist movement. Penny explained that some other
feminists she knew engaged in “clout grabbing,” or constantly trying to one-up others,
rather than supporting and encouraging their growth:
Instead of being like, “Oh, wow, it looks like you and I both read that Audre Lorde book”
[or] “It seems that we both seem to enjoy that bell hooks article a lot,” it’s like “Actually,
you’re misquoting that” or “What other books have you read by that author?” You know,
this like weird gatekeeping … that shouldn’t be the emphasis. [Penny]
For Olivia, her engagement with activism was hindered by “infighting” within the
movement. She recalled a recent “disheartening” experience:
No one’s perfect, but when you throw a lot of people together that aren’t perfect, you
bring a lot of imperfection into one place, and then everybody gets mad because there’s
so much imperfection in the room… there’s less acceptance of the imperfection and
there’s more finger pointing… In this last year, I was on this accountability pod for
someone and the response in the community was disheartening with the amount of
infighting and the amount … just the sheer lack of wanting there to be change and the
sheer lack of desire for anyone to even try to change. [Olivia]
Participants seemed to use their negative experiences with feminists to justify their lack
of engagement in the movement. When they believed that their opinions or contributions
would not be welcomed, they disengaged. Overall, representation and inclusion,
composed of exclusion and intersectionality, socially compulsory feminism, and
experiences with other feminists, was a primary domain of ambivalence for the
participants in this sample.
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3.3.1.2

Feminist Self-Concept

Participants sometimes noted that they perceived themselves to be poor representatives of
feminism (i.e., a “bad feminist;” Conlin et al., 2019; Gay, 2016) or that their activism
would be ineffectual, a conglomeration of attitudes I have labelled feminist self-concept.
For some, feminist self-concept was hindered by perceived knowledge deficits. For
example, Mrinalini had never taken a gender or women’s studies course, and she felt
uneasy advocating for feminism without adequate knowledge about it:
I want to know what I’m talking about before I talk about it, and as much as I’d like to
engage in rights rallies, I’m not entirely confident on – for myself, just to be a political
activist. I would like to be much more well-versed in the activism before I step into it…
I’m focused on developing my ideology, less than, like, espousing it. I really want to be
firm and understand and learn as the world learns. That’s where I’m at. [Mrinalini]
Others felt as though they had a skills deficit and would not be able to actively advocate
for feminism. For example, Veronica felt very knowledgeable about feminist issues, but
she stated, “I don’t feel like I’m the expert debater, and while I feel comfortable in the
knowledge that has led to my own decision making, I – and I have that knowledge, I feel
concern about my ability to express it persuasively.” Because she was uncertain about
how effective she would be as an advocate for feminism, she often chose to silence her
feminist beliefs and values, rather than try (and potentially fail) to engage in debate with
others about them.
A few participants said that they did not put their feminist attitudes into action because
they did not feel that they (or anyone else) would be effective in changing the minds of
others (impossibility of change). M, for example, rationalized her lack of feminist
activism by acknowledging:
People have different experiences, right? So, you can’t make somebody have a different
experience than what they have… sometimes people just have different abilities and
understandings than you and, like, what are you gonna do? You gotta live with it. You
can’t change it. [M]
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Because M and others felt like their attempts to engage with people would be ineffectual
or uninformed, they chose not to challenge sexism when the opportunity arose. Christina
spoke about this directly when referring to a past relationship in which she held
“differing” views from her partner’s family:
I thought like maybe these are just things that I’m thinking, that I’m observing, but I’m
being, like, too critical or I’m overreacting, or there’s nothing I could do about it
anyways, so it wouldn’t be worth the fight to me. [Christina]
In general, when participants in the sample had poor feminist self-concept, whether from
a perceived knowledge or skills deficit, or if they felt that change was impossible, they
were disinclined from actively engaging with feminism in their own lives.

3.3.1.3

Entrenchment of Femininity

Participants also expressed a tension between being feminine and being feminist. Some
participants felt that femininity had a unique power or felt an allegiance to the feminine
gender role and had difficulty incorporating their feminist beliefs into a feminine gender
expression. Others preferred traditional gender roles within their relationships. A sense
of “feminine power” was particularly strong for Kim, who also queried whether her
adherence to feminine norms was truly reflective of her own choices:
I genuinely enjoy dressing and presenting in a more stereotypically feminine way. That is
something that I really do enjoy, but I never know how much of that has been
internalized pressure to enjoy that or to seek that… I never know how much of it is just
me being a person who enjoys how I present myself and then how much of it is just me
expecting – what is expected of me. [Kim]
For Alicia, the relationship between femininity and feminism was similarly complicated,
though this tension arose from her perceptions of other feminists’ attitudes about
femininity, which were different from her own:
I do wear makeup or dress up or I do like to wear fancy dresses when I go out sometimes.
I don’t like to think that that’s weakness, and I get this from other women who are
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feminists… the parts of feminism that I don’t like are the parts that are critical of …
women for being the traditional, societal ideal of feminine, and I think that is probably
because I, I am that way. That’s how I present. [Alicia]
Those pursuing romantic (especially heterosexual) relationships expressed tension
regarding their preference for traditional gender roles in these relationships. Some of
these tensions took the form of changing one’s surname [Phoebe], gendered domestic
work [Melody, M], or adopting conventionally gendered romantic roles [Laura]. For
Laura, it was difficult to embody her feminist stances when she was dating men:
I really give into gender norms [in relationships]… I’m constantly like, “No, no, no, it’s
okay for me to go in and say that, like, I like them or for me to cover the bill,” and I’ve
tried to do that before, but it’s just so innate for me to be like, “if they like me, they will
say it first,” and “if they want to progress the relationship, they will do it first.” [Laura]
Laura’s “innate” proclivity for stereotypical demonstrations of femininity in romantic
relationships underscores the entrenchment of her adherence to traditional gender roles
within romantic contexts, and this conformity made her feel like she was not living up to
her feminist values.
Put simply, when participants felt tension regarding their feminine and feminist
subjectivities, their commitment to feminism was complicated. Yet, for those in the
sample who did not strongly value femininity, this tension appeared to be alleviated.
Penny, for example, saw her role as a woman as “defiant,” explaining, “For me, I guess,
like, femininity or being a woman, specifically being a woman, is sort of a way of – of
destabilizing – destabilizing alpha male identity.” Contrary to others whose desire to
appear feminine was in conflict with their feminism, the participants who sought to
redefine and restructure their gender identity in the absence of a feminine gender
expression found feminism to be a more natural fit.
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3.3.1.4

Identity Incongruence

Participants also noted various instances of identity incongruence, or conflicting aspects
of their identity that complicated their relationship with feminism, such as cultural,
religious, and personal identities. For example, Marie noted that she, as a Black woman,
felt uncomfortable about feminism because she felt as though Black women were not
adequately considered within feminism’s newest wave:
How can I rally behind this movement that’s not even considering, like, another
important part of my identity? … People are gonna discriminate against me or treat me
differently because I am - not just because I am a woman, but because I am a Black
woman, you know? So, it’s hard to, like, fully be behind a movement that, like, doesn’t
really acknowledge another part of my identity. [Marie]
Similarly, Rose noted:
I find [conventional feminism] can be less welcoming, and also less fruitful. And I find
that generally, I find that my efforts are usually more valuable in creating and fostering
communities where everyone feels included, like the queer people and people of color
who feel excluded by those larger communities and sort of trying to work with those
larger communities. [Rose]
For some, religious conflicts made it challenging to subscribe completely to feminism.
Adriana was raised in a devoutly Catholic community, and the backlash she experienced
from friends and family regarding her progressive stances complicated her relationship
with feminism:
If I talk to my Catholic, Christian friends, family members, acquaintances, then I get told
that I drank the Kool-Aid… in my church setting, I definitely cannot be as feminist as I
otherwise would be in a normal, non-religious setting. [Adriana]
This tension ran deep, and Adriana (as well as Alicia and Alice) refused to support
reproductive justice initiatives due to her religious upbringing. The same was true of
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Alice, who chose not to participate in political activism because she did not agree with
feminism’s “liberal” platform on reproductive healthcare:
I grew up in a very conservative home … I don’t agree with the liberal platform,
especially like a couple hot topics. So reproductive rights. I don’t agree with abortion,
and I am pro-life... I know there’s controversy about like, “Oh, they’re just, like, a clump
of cells” but, like, as a Christian, I believe that it’s life-forming. [Alice]
Others, such as Mrinalini, noted that their personalities were incongruent with those of
feminists. Mrinalini’s perception of a “feminist” personality was not consistent with her
own, so participating in feminist events or behaviours felt inauthentic to her. She
explained:
I would be acting if I tried to [be active with the feminist movement]… and I’m also not
as, like, loud and aggressive. That’s kind of just the way – like my personality is like that.
So, the way that I am a feminist is just a little bit more [reserved] and that’s why I like to
have conversations one on one. If I can’t control the way someone else believes
something, then I can only control myself. [Mrinalini]
Mrinalini and others’ suggestion that their individual personalities and characteristics
make feminism incompatible with other important parts of their identities is consistent
with feminist theorizing on postfeminist identities. Specifically, Mrinalini draws on
negative feminist stereotypes (i.e., loud, aggressive) to distance herself from the
movement, and to suggest that she is dissimilar from other feminists. Rather than
allowing feminism to shift her personality – as is consistent with past models of feminist
identity (Downing & Roush, 1985) – Mrinalini’s individualized perspective on feminism
allowed her to maintain her “authentic feminist” identity (Calder-Dawe & Gavey, 2017;
Pruchniewska, 2018).
When the participants felt as though other aspects of their identity competed with their
feminist identities, or when they experienced identity incongruence, they equivocated on
their feminist positions and were often less involved with feminism more broadly.
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3.3.1.5

Evasion of Stereotypes

Consistent with past research (Ramsey et al., 2007), each of the feminist-identified
participants held fairly positive views of feminists, but they largely felt that some people
still endorsed negative stereotypes about feminist women. For example, a few noted that
they feared coming across as “angry.” Christina, when asked why she was not involved
in feminist social activism, explained, “I’m still like a little bit self-conscious because I’m
like, ‘Are people gonna see me as this angry feminist?’” Veronica echoed this refrain
when she noted, “[I’m] afraid of being fully engaged because I'm afraid I'll be dismissed
by people who do have those stereotypes… angry and irrational.” Derived from both a
desire to eschew negative judgment and to be taken seriously, the possibility of being
seen as “angry” dampened women’s interest in feminist activism.
Others worried about coming across as “radical,” “militant,” or “extreme.” Alice
explained, “I think there is this like very loud, radical group of feminists – third wave
feminists – that I definitely would not identify myself with.” Mrinalini similarly noted,
“I’m so concerned with how someone – and it’s usually men or people who are maleidentifying – who become uncomfortable and some women also – with me saying I’m a
feminist because I think the association is really radical or really negative.” Consistent
with feminism’s mainstreaming, while the participants generally sought to procure and
protect rights for women and nonbinary people, they wanted to do so in a way that did
not appear to disrupt the status quo or make them seem unappealing to other people.
A few participants reported that they were fearful about coming across as “man-haters.”
Kim clearly and humorously articulated her perception of others’ views of feminists
when she explained:
There’s an assumption that you hate men and that you are, you know, just staunch liberal
and that you’re gonna burn bras and you’re going to fight [men]… and that you’re about,
like, cutting off their dicks and burning them in a bonfire and dancing around while the
bras burn, as well. [Kim]
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Similarly, Nicki J. Kent explained their feelings regarding others’ attitudes toward
feminists:
They think that we hate men. I mean, I can’t tell if that’s like a thing people genuinely
believe or just a thing they each other so that they’re not as threatened by our - our voice
or something… I think that men think it’s emasculating for women to be feminists.
[Nicky J. Kent]
As will be explained in the next section, this fear followed Nicky, and she later recalled
an experience in which she was blatantly objectified, but did not voice her outrage
because “you don’t want to make men angry… they might do violence to you, and it’ll be
your fault.”
Many of the participants in this study who were self-identified feminists sought to
distance themselves from negative feminist stereotypes (angry, radical, and man-hating).
These findings are also consistent with past research on young people’s desire to put
distance between themselves and “extreme, man-hating, and unfeminine” feminists
(Sharff, 2013), which some have suggested is grounded in performance of femininity
which appeals to heterosexual men (Scharff, 2010). Mrinalini’s concern about disclosing
her feminist identity to men, as well as Christina’s fear of her boyfriend’s family’s
backlash, potentially supports this idea. However, Nicky J. Kent’s comments on this
subject suggest that her fear of being stereotyped as man-hating was grounded in a
legitimate fear of violence.

3.3.1.6

Fear of Backlash

Many participants described a fear of being penalized or punished for being openly
feminist, and therefore deliberately avoided espousing feminist attitudes and beliefs in
certain situations. The most striking of these fears was fear of physical harm. Even
among those who reported generally low levels of ambivalence around feminism in the
other domains, the fear of physical harm for expressing feminist ideals was sufficient to
keep some participants from speaking up. For example, Ginger explained that she did not
generally hide her feminist stances, but when she did, “it’s mostly a safety issue… there

52

are times when I’ve definitely just kept my head down because I’m terrified of what
might happen if I don’t keep my head down.” Ginger’s fear of safety is consistent with
the personal safety anxiety many women feel (Calogero et al., 2020); however, she noted
her experience of fear may have been compounded by her physical disability (see
Milberger et al., 2003).
Others feared negative consequences from their families. While some of the participants
were raised in progressive households, others grappled with the tension between their
family’s beliefs and their own. For example, Veronica explained:
I have to be very careful with the way that I talk to my parents … I minimize my
potential for backlash – I don’t engage – I purposely don’t engage in ways that I think
it’ll cause backlash or confrontation to. I’m currently in the process of figuring out how
to be my full self with these people who raised me. [Veronica]
Regardless of the fact that Veronica felt close to her family, she was uncertain how to be
a feminist and a member of her family at the same time. Laura similarly hid her feminist
identity from her family, explaining that her choice not to engage with family members
about their traditional beliefs was “mostly as a form of preservation, and knowing that –
like, having politics get in the middle of my family ties isn’t appropriate.” Laura worried
that her family would not accept her because of her nontraditional attitudes toward issues
such as marriage and (not) having children, so she kept quiet about her feelings on these
topics around them.
Others feared social ostracism if they were seen defending their feminist beliefs or
engaging with feminism as thoroughly as they would like. Although most felt that peers
would support their stances, the fear of encountering someone who opposed their
feminist attitudes and threat of losing friends was palpable. 150, for example, explained:
You have to watch what you say… they kind of see you as – just, like, a negative, like,
sensitive person who just, like, can’t take a joke… especially with a lot of my guy
friends. I’ll feel uncomfortable when they say things about women, but I’m not always –
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like, I don’t always feel justified in saying, “No, that’s not okay. Like, stop.” Because
then I seem really… not fun. [150]
Though she felt “uncomfortable” by her friends’ comments, 150 did not intervene in
instances of sexism because she was afraid of the potential backlash she may experience
for doing so. On the other hand, Adriana had grown up with a close-knit circle of
religious friends, and she was well aware of their attitudes toward feminism. She
explained that fear that her friends with conservative attitudes would not accept her for
speaking up:
I also have not completely separated from my Catholic friend circle yet, not that I will
ever not be Catholic, but I also haven’t separated from that circle and made it my own
journey, so I’m still very much afraid of backlash from them. [Adriana]
Among those sampled, it was important to feel socially accepted by their families,
friends, and peers. When they felt that expressing their feminist stances around those
close to them could potentially jeopardize their close social relationships, they behaved in
ways that were inconsistent with their feminist attitudes.
For many (heterosexual) participants, fear of romantic rejection presented a barrier to
openly embracing feminism. Kim explained, “If I’m at a party and someone says
something sexist, I’m not about to like pull up the Prezi about why they’re wrong because
I’m like, ‘I’d still like you to think I’m cute.’” Kim’s (and Zipporah’s) concern about
coming across as “sexually undesirable” [Zipporah] influenced the times and places they
chose to act on their feminist attitudes. Olivia was similarly influenced by this fear:
Dating, of course, is when it gets to be the trickiest because… most folks seem to have
sort of a bizarre, inaccurate view of feminism. So, to then turn around and say, “Hey I’m
a feminist, how does that make you feel?” tends to turnoff a lot of people. [Olivia]
For Olivia, feminism became “tricky” when there was a potential for backlash from
potential romantic partners. Many of the participants chose not to speak their mind if they
perceived that their feminist attitudes would make them undesirable or “unfuckable”
(Zipporah) to potential partners.
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Finally, a few participants felt as though feminism would not be welcomed in their place
of employment, fearing negative occupational or educational ramifications. Adriana was
surrounded by politics yet explained that she chose not to join the feminist circles around
her: “I am too afraid of it impacting my job prospects… I – at this point – need to appear
as bipartisan as I possibly can in terms of the job market.” For Phoebe, it was much the
same:
I’m thinking about the workplace … if I didn’t know [my boss’s] opinions, I certainly
would never – I wouldn’t tread into those waters. I would try to stay very neutral… If I
were in that type of situation, I’m honestly not sure how I would respond. [Phoebe]
Adriana and Phoebe worried that inserting their feminist opinions in the workplace would
have negative consequences at work and chose to limit their feminist expression and
behaviour to seem “impartial.” This tension was also felt by students [Kim, Alexandra],
who often encountered sexism in their universities, but felt that their academic trajectory
may be thwarted by taking a feminist stance against it:
I find it very difficult to be completely honest and open about my feminist ideology in
classrooms run by guys, by male profs, because there is such a profound power
imbalance there. Your marks, and your scholarship, and your reputation is very much in
the hands of this person … you’re not gonna super step up to your white, straight –
assumedly-straight - prof and be like, “Well actually here’s all of the bullshit about what
you just said” because then, you know, you’re gonna tank their course, and then there
goes your GPA. [Kim]
In general, the threat of social, relational, or occupational backlash seemed to influence
open expressions of feminism, with many participants avoiding or actively hiding their
feminist attitudes to protect their relationships and careers.

3.3.2 Body-Related Attitudes and Involvement in Feminist Activism
The participants in this sample often noted discrepancies between their feminist identity,
their attitudes about their bodies, and their involvement in feminist behaviours. These
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discrepancies appeared to be underscored by their ambivalence about feminism more
broadly. In particular, ambivalent attitudes regarding feminism seemed to be linked to
personal consequences (body image disturbances, gendered appearance management
strategies, and negotiated sexual agency) and political outcomes (conditional selflabelling, feminist bystanding, political (in)action, and everyday feminism).

3.3.2.1

Ambivalent Feminism and the Body

Across the interviews, participants described a tension between their feminist attitudes
and their attitudes toward their own bodies (see also Rubin et al., 2004). These
consequences included body image disturbances, gendered appearance management, and
negotiated sexuality. Disturbed body image was relatively common among participants.
For example, when asked about her relationship with her own body, Kim explained:
It’s really weird to like to hate [my body] so much but then also be super sexualized at
the same time, and so it’s very much like my body is not really ever truly mine… it’s just
impossible to navigate because, like, no matter how much weight I gain or I lose or, like,
anything, like, I’m always gonna feel shit about my body… I’m never going to feel okay
in my body. [Kim]
Kim’s ambivalent feminist attitudes, underscored by her desire to appear feminine and
sexually desirable, complicated her relationship with her body. She knew she was
“supposed to feel empowered,” but although she was aware of these external forces, she
was unable to embody feminism in the ways that she desired.
Yet, as participants’ relationship with feminism clarified, so too did their relationships
with their bodies. For example, X expressed:
Since engaging with feminism … I’ve discovered to kind of like love my body, which is,
like, really nice because I’ve put my body through like a tremendous amount through the
years because I think that, like, I was angry, and I didn’t understand… I’ve dealt with my
fair share of self-harm and eating disorders because, like, I felt like I needed to kind of
look a certain way… there’s this really great rhetoric that feminism comes along with
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that, like, everybody should love their bodies no matter how they look. I’ve started to
grow out my body hair. I have, like, armpit hair and I’ve started to go to the gym and
really build muscle because that’s what I want to look like, and that’s what makes me
happy. [X]
The consequences for body image also pertained to gendered appearance management
practices more broadly, such as wearing makeup and shaving. Alexandra explained, “I
don’t need to shave my legs, and I am fully aware that that expectation is sexist and
rooted in patriarchal standards, and I am very aware of that, but I still shave my legs
regularly.” Despite the fact that Alexandra was conscious of the roots of these practices,
she still felt compelled to do them. The same was true of makeup use, as evidenced in the
following quote by Ginger:
If I feel like I’m having a day when I really need, like, an extra boost, like I’m not feeling
well or I really need a psychological pick me up, I will wear a lot more makeup because I
feel like it’s sort of like my armor. [Ginger]
For Marie, gendered appearance management was rooted in racialized, gendered
expectations for appearance, yet she queried the roots of this cultural imperative:
In the Black community, there’s a lot of pressure to like upkeep your hair. And like your
hair is like your - your crown. Like, you’re proud of it, you know? We spend a lot of
money on getting our hair done and like maintaining it… I think that speaks to, like, how
much pride Black women take in their hair, but I think that also the root of that is the
pressure of like to look feminine or like attractive. [Marie]
The same pattern of results seemed to emerge in terms of negotiated sexual agency.
When participants felt conflicted about their relation to feminism, they also seemed to
endorse lower levels of sexual agency. For example, Kim acknowledged the difficulty in
trying to negotiate being a sexual object and a sexual subject, and wrestled between her
feminist and anti-feminist attitudes:
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You’re allowed to want sex, but you’re also not supposed to be desperate for a man… So,
trying to navigate that – being and – and enjoying being a sexual person but not, like,
objectifying myself or not being, like, the desperate bitch, you know? [Kim]
150 felt much the same way, noting that she enjoyed “dressing up,” “going out,” and
engaging in self-sexualizing behaviours. She found it difficult to disentangle her own
autonomy from her desire to be the object of the male gaze, noting that she sometimes
found herself “dressing a certain way to attract male attention.”
Others, such as Zipporah, noted that, though they had previously experienced mitigated
sexual agency, their relationship with feminism had allowed them to become more
sexually empowered over time:
I certainly have become more educated about my own body, more assertive in, you know,
finding what makes me feel good, less embarrassed when I’m talking about it with my
friends and exploring new things. So, I think that my relationship with my body would be
very different if I hadn’t become more engaged with feminism. [Zipporah]
Overall, ambivalent feminist attitudes seemed to be associated with inability to translate
social attitudes into personal behaviours in the realms of body image, gendered
appearance management strategies, and sexual agency.

3.3.2.2

Ambivalent Feminism and Feminist Activism

While each of the participants in the sample identified as a feminist when asked
explicitly, for many, their feminist self-labelling was conditional. Some qualified their
statements immediately, such as Melody, who explained that she preferred the term
“humanist,” rather than feminist, and Alice, who agreed she was a feminist, but preferred
the term “libertarian.” Mrinalini explained that there were “definitely safe spaces for
calling yourself a feminist,” and she avoided the label around people if she was uncertain
if the term would be well-received. Laura put it simply when she said, “I would say ‘I’m
a feminist’ when I think about my actions, but I don’t go around telling people I’m a
feminist.” In fact, many noted that there were situations in which they would be hesitant
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to call themselves feminists (especially when they feared backlash). For example, Alicia
explained that even within her long-term romantic relationships, her feminism sometimes
came second.
I am not proud of it, but there have been times in my life where I have been dating men
… and I have denied that I was a feminist. Or not denied it but never brought it up. But
those were shameful moments for me. [Alicia]
When participants held ambivalent attitudes about feminism, or in situations where they
did not feel that feminists would be welcomed, they put their feminism “on and off like a
coat” [Alexandra].
When they were afraid of being stereotyped or experiencing backlash, or when their
feminist self-concept was not strong, several participants were passive and silent in the
face of sexist treatment, a phenomenon I call feminist bystanding. Sometimes, this
occurred in the context of interpersonal relationships. Christina, for example, explained:
There are times when I think I could stand up, but I don’t…. my ex and his family were
very almost old fashioned and, like, super nice but super traditional. They would just
make sometimes, like, these comments, and I would just let them go because I thought,
“Oh, it’s not worth it.” [Christina]
Other times, feminist bystanding occurred around friends and relatives. Melody, for
example, explained, “In high school, I was in a group of people who used to laugh,
making a joke of ‘Woman, make me a sandwich’ and I used to, like, you know… I
wouldn’t say anything.” Even when sexism was being perpetuated at them, ambivalent
feminism rendered many of the participants speechless, and they engaged in selfsilencing so as not to disrupt the status quo.
Yet, as their feminist self-concept strengthened, and when they were in situations where
they felt safe and supported to express their feminist attitudes, some participants felt a
duty to intervene. This was especially true for X, whose intersectional feminist attitudes
compelled them to speak up, and their strong feminist self-concept empowered them to
use their voice:
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It’s often difficult – sometimes it gets tiring, but I still engage with it. I still will not back
down because I know that there are people who don’t necessarily have the voice to speak
up… Black, queer folks, or Indigenous folks… I visualize like a kind of suit of armor on
myself, and in that sense, I’m shielding myself from things I know they’re gonna throw at
me, and that’s what I use to go into battle with them. I build armor around myself to have
these tough conversations, and really researching and engaging with folks about how they
engage and how they have these difficult conversations has been a really good tool for
me to go into essentially battle with people who have these really dangerous beliefs. [X]
Ambivalent feminism also seemed to serve as a barrier to collective action. Relatively
few of those sampled were actively engaged in feminist activism, and most held mixed
feelings about participating in collective action. For example, Laura explained that she
had never attended any feminist protest events around her because she maintained mixed
feelings about them about them, explaining, “I haven’t participated in the [Women’s]
March, but just like reading about it, it seems like a lot of like... yelling about pussy
power.” Laura’s reliance on negative stereotypes about feminists seemed to be a tool to
justify her inaction in the feminist movement. Many expressed that they were too busy to
participate due to school, work, and family responsibilities, or they feared that they would
be subjected to negative stereotypes for participating in activism. Mixed feelings about
feminism, regardless of feminist self-identification, appeared to serve as a barrier to full
participation in feminist collective action to challenge the gender status quo.
Those in the sample were much more apt to (try to) engage in various acts of everyday
feminism. We use the term everyday feminism to refer to low-risk interpersonal
experiences that counter sexist cultural trends and promote gender egalitarianism.
Examples of everyday feminism include posting feminist articles on social media
[Adriana, Veronica, Nicky J. Kent], talking to children about gender diversity [M, Ruth,
Nicky J. Kent], creating feminist zines [Penny], and becoming involved with feminist
communities [Veronica, Kayla]. Yet, participants’ everyday feminism was often fraught
with complexities and complications. For example, Veronica only posted feminist
articles on social media platforms where she did not fear backlash, a strategy criticized by
Phoebe as “yelling into feminist echo chambers.” Similarly, M was trying to raise her two
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sons in a feminist manner, but struggled to fully incorporate feminism into her childrearing:
I want my son to be able to wear a skirt if he wanted to, right? I’m pro-everything. But at
the same time, I don’t take him shopping in the girls’ section… I want my kids’ life to be
easy. I don’t necessarily want to encourage feminine behaviours, and then… what the
fuck did I just say?! [M]
Despite her feminist intentions, M’s ambivalence made it challenging for her to fully
enact her feminist attitudes. In sum, ambivalent feminist attitudes may act as a barrier to
political involvement in feminism, be it through conditional self-labelling, feminist
bystanding, political (in)action, or everyday feminism.

3.4 Discussion
Overall, this research highlights a novel conceptual framework for understanding modern
feminist attitudes: ambivalent feminism. Through grounded theory analysis of interviews
with 26 nonbinary people and women, six unique domains were identified that
contributed to feelings of ambivalence around feminism, even among those who selfidentified as feminists: representation and inclusion, feminist self-concept, entrenchment
of femininity, identity incongruence, evasion of stereotypes, and fear of backlash.
Endorsing these tensions was linked to negative personal outcomes, such as dysfunctional
body image attitudes, negotiated sexual agency, and gendered appearance management
strategies, as well as political outcomes, including conditional feminist labelling, feminist
bystanding, collective (in)action, and everyday feminism. As suggested by their feminist
self-labelling, each of the participants supported the basic tenets of feminism and agreed
with feminist ideologies. Yet, there were various tensions and sites of ambivalence
surrounding their feminist attitudes and behaviours, which depict a more nuanced
understanding of modern feminist attitudes, and some of the personal and political
implications of this ambivalence.
It is worth noting that there were a few participants who expressed less ambivalence and
seemed more comfortable and confident with their bodies, and they engaged in more
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political activism. These participants described previous periods of time where they had
felt ambivalent about feminism, but they had worked through the tensions and were now
more fully committed to putting their feminist attitudes into action, both personally and
politically. In this way, it is possible that ambivalent feminism may represent a liminal
phase of modern feminist identity development, in the space between passive acceptance
and active commitment to feminism that is anchored to prescriptive and proscriptive
gender role norms and expectations (Riley & Scharff, 2012) . Given that these data were
collected at a single timepoint, we hesitate to delineate a stepwise model merely on the
basis of these data alone. However, future research should explore ways that feminists
resolve these tensions over the course of their feminist identity development.

3.5 Conclusion
Over the past few years, feminism has resurfaced in the media and western cultural
consciousness. Yet, despite feminism’s recent popularity, progress toward gender
equality remains stalled, and in some cases, is being actively reversed. Ambivalent
feminism represents a conglomeration of interrelated attitudes held by self-identified
feminist women and nonbinary people, which complicate and potentially weaken
adherence to feminist principles and feminist collective action. Given that the most
effective way to bring about social change is activism by ingroup members on their own
behalf, ambivalence around being feminist and embracing feminism may serve as an
additional barrier to gender equality. This research provides a new conceptual framework
for identifying and understanding critical sites of ambivalent feminism, which can be
specifically targeted for intervention and resolution. These domains of ambivalence also
form the framework for the development of the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS),
which is outlined in Chapters 4-6.
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Chapter 4

4

Study 3: Initial Development and Validation of the
Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS)

The goal of the next set of studies was to develop and validate a novel, multidimensional
measure of feminist social identity that accounted for diverse components of modern
feminist social identity, the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS). Theorizing for the
scale was grounded in Ashmore et al.’s (2004) model of multidimensional collective
identity, as well as the qualitative results from Study 2. Ashmore et al. (2004) have
suggested that measures of social identity should capture various elements of collective
identity, such as self-categorization, public and private evaluation, and social
embeddedness of the identity (Ashmore et al., 2004, p. 83). However, measures of social
identity should be specifically tailored to capture the important elements of that particular
identity. When considering possible relevant dimensions of feminist social identity, I
consulted other multidimensional evaluations of stigmatized social identity, such as the
Lesbian and Gay Identity Scale (Mohr & Fassinger, 2000), the Lesbian, Gay, and
Bisexual Identity Scale (Mohr & Kendra, 2011), and the Multidimensional Inventory of
Black Identity (Sellers et al., 1997). I also reviewed the literature on predictors of
feminist collective action to consider which specific identity dimensions may be uniquely
important for understanding how and why people engage with feminist activism.
The first four dimensions I designed related to the basics of social identity, and some
were designed to mirror the subscales of other multidimensional assessments of social
identity. The first dimension I proposed was Beliefs. Given the various branches of
feminist thought and different positions on several political topics espoused by
individuals who hold different feminist beliefs (Henley et al., 1998; Liss et al., 2000), I
deliberately did not generate items that evaluated support for specific feminist principles.
Rather, I wrote ten items relevant to a perception that one holds the same beliefs as
feminists (e.g., “If I read a book about feminism, I would probably agree with the points
made”). People should feel more connected with a social group when they believe that
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they hold similar values to those within the group; the specific content of those beliefs is
somewhat less relevant. The second theorized dimension was Competence. The
Competence dimension was designed around the results of Study 2, as well as Conlin et
al.’s (2019) study, which found that women who perceived themselves to be less
knowledgeable about feminism were less likely to self-identify as feminists and engage in
feminist activism. Therefore, ten items were designed to evaluate a sense that one has the
competence and capacity to engage in feminist behaviours (e.g., “I know enough about
feminism to talk about it with other people”). The third dimension I designed was
Centrality, designed to assess the extent to which a feminist identity is a salient and
personally meaningful component of their identity (e.g., “When I think about who I am as
a person, “feminist” is one of the first things that comes to mind”). Despite the fact that
women report fluctuating identification and closeness with feminism across situations
and over time (Chapter 2, this dissertation; see also Crossley, 2010), to date, no scale has
specifically assessed this unique dimension of feminist identity. The fourth dimension,
Politicized, was specifically designed to evaluate the extent to which people’s feminist
social identities also maintained an activist dimension (e.g., “I am willing to fight for the
rights of women and gender diverse people”). These items tapped into behavioural
willingness and perceived importance of politics in the feminist movement.
Following the development of the first set of items, I then focused on generating items
that related to how people feel about their feminist identity, given that sense of belonging
and emotional connection to a group can positively influence social identity (Ashmore et
al., 2004). These three dimensions specifically evaluate the extent to which people feel
connected to other feminists, proud of their identities, and how well feminism “fits” into
their lives. The Acceptance dimension was generated based on the sense of exclusion
some participants reported in Study 2, and tapped into how connected people felt to other
feminists. Example items included “I enjoy being around feminists” and “I prefer to
spend my time with feminists.” The Affirmation dimension refers to a sense of pride
associated with being feminist (e.g., “If someone called me a feminist, I would consider it
a compliment”). This cluster of items was specifically designed for the FSIS because of
the potent stigma attributed to feminists; rather than try to evaluate the extent to which
people felt stigmatized, I opted for a positive approach consistent with the Affirmation
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and Belonging subscale of the Multigroup Ethnic Identity Measure (Phinney, 1992) and
the Private Self-Esteem subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen &
Crocker, 1992). Finally, the Identity Congruence dimension evaluated how well people’s
feminist identities blended with other important components of their identity, or if people
felt as though competing parts of their identities made being a feminist more challenging
for them (e.g., “Because of other aspects of my identity, I feel I cannot fully engage with
feminism”).
The next set of dimensions were largely drawn from the results of Chapter 2 and were
designed to evaluate the different forms of ambivalence that feminists may have about
their identities. Notably, the Uncertainty dimension was designed to capture doubt or
waffling regarding feminist identification, beliefs, and principles (e.g., “In some ways I
am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not”). This dimension is consistent with the
Identity Confusion subscale of the Gay and Lesbian Identity Scale (Mohr & Fassinger,
2000), which contains items such as (“I’m not totally sure that I’m a lesbian/gay”). The
Individualized subscale was designed to evaluate a sense of postfeminist identity,
comprising items that tapped into individual empowerment (e.g., “To me, being a
feminist means being confident and empowered”) and a disregard for the uncomfortable
or less socially acceptable components of the movement (“When I encounter feminist
arguments that are not consistent with my worldview, I disregard them”). Because a
postfeminist identity contains many complexities and contradictions (see Riley et al.,
2017), these items were designed to be quite broad.

4.1

Expert Review

An initial battery of 95 items was constructed for the FSIS. Items were initially reviewed
by a panel of six experts in the fields of body image, feminist identity, and feminist
research more broadly. The experts rated the items in terms of grammatical clarity,
coherence, and relevance to the construct it was intended to evaluate. Items could be
rated from “very low” to “very high” on each criterion. For each individual item, experts
could also provide any additional feedback through open-ended responses. The initial
items were quite broad and more specifically focused on the results from Study 2, rather
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than the collective identity framework proposed by Ashmore and colleagues (2004), and
the experts generally commented that the items were difficult to interpret, given that
some were double barreled or overly-complex. Given that I intended to greatly reduce the
length of the scale, I removed all items that did not score “very high” on any dimension
by two or more evaluators, and I made additional changes and revisions in response to the
evaluator’s comments, some of which suggested a clearer focus. Items were revised to
more closely reflect the collective identity framework, with the results of Study 2 more
closely guiding the identification of critical dimensions. After several items were revised
or rewritten, 90 items remained and were included in the Q-sort task.

4.2 Q-Sort Task
A Q-sort task was completed by seven members of the Stigma, Objectification, Bodies,
and Resistance lab. Q-sort tasks are useful during the preliminary stages of scale
development to help assess construct validity, maximize distinctiveness between
categories, and improve internal consistency of scale items (Nahm et al., 2002). For the
purposes of this task, an email was sent to all members of the Stigma, Objectification,
Bodies, and Resistance lab at Western University (https://calogerolab.wordpress.com),
which redirected them to a Qualtrics survey, which housed the full set of 90 items from
each of the initial nine subscales (i.e., Identity Congruence, Beliefs, Politicized, Personal,
Uncertainty, Centrality, Affirmation, Acceptance, Competence). Participants initially
read a description of each of the nine categories, and these definitions were available for
participants to refer to throughout the task. They then read the items and were asked to
sort them based on which of the nine categories they felt was most appropriate for that
particular statement. Participants also had the option to place the item into the “unclear”
category if they could not determine where the item fit.
Results for the Q-Sort are presented in Table 7. Some of the dimensions stood out as
clear and distinct, with high agreement across raters. Notably, items in the Competence
and Uncertainty subscales were clearly identifiable. Other scales, however, were less
distinct. For example, items on the Identity Congruence, Beliefs, Individualized, and
Affirmation subscales were frequently miscategorized. Given the items meant to
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comprise these dimensions were not clearly distinguishing between these dimensions, I
collapsed and revised the items comprising these dimensions to produce a Prototypicality
subscale. Prototypicality refers to the degree to which an individual feels they are
representative of the social group (Hogg, 2001) and includes the concepts of perceived
congruence and similarity with the group. This category was designed to capture a core
aspect of Social Identity Theory, but it also captures a concept that would likely be
negatively related to Individualized (i.e., a person who feels they are prototypical of the
group sees their identity as similar to that of the group) and less ambiguous than the
Identity Congruence subscale. Given that I felt this condensing resulted in a loss of
richness, and that in the initial iteration of the scale (the version that had been sent to
expert reviewers), I had included a Disavowal of Stigma dimension, I also incorporated a
Fear of Stigma dimension into the initial exploratory factor analysis. In the initial
Disavowal of Stigma subscale, I had encountered difficulty when attempting to create
questions that were not double barreled. Therefore, I decided to reverse the directionality
of the items and include statements that captured apprehension regarding disclosing one’s
feminist identity to others. The next step was to subject the items to an exploratory factor
analysis (EFA) to determine the factor structure. The final set of 90 items included in the
EFA are presented in Appendix B.
Table 7. Results of Q-Sort Task for Study 3
The problems facing feminists are similar to my own.
I have a number of qualities typical of feminists.
I have blended my identity as a feminist with other important
parts of my life.
The personality traits of feminists are much like my own.
Because of other aspects of my identity, I feel I cannot fully
engage with feminism. (Reverse scored)
Feminists and I have a lot in common.
I am subjected to the same treatment as feminists.
I have woven my identity as a feminist into my personal
identity.
What happens to feminists will affect what happens to me.
Things that are true of feminists are also true of me.
When I hear about the things feminists believe in, I usually
agree with them.
If I read a book about feminism, I would probably agree with
the points made.
The principles that I hold are similar to feminists’ principles.
I believe the same things that feminists do.
I do not agree with most feminists. (Reverse scored)

1
4
5
6

2
3
1

4
3

3

3
3
3

4
1

3
4
1

3

4

5

6

3

1

8

1

1

9

10

1
1

2

1
3
5

6
5
5

1

2
3
1

7
1
2

7

2

67

I stand for the same things that feminists stand for.
When I hear feminist arguments, I think they are correct.
My attitudes about the world are similar to the attitudes
feminists hold.
When I meet someone who is a feminist, I assume we will see
eye to eye on many things.
I see the world the same way that feminists do.
I am glad that I am a feminist.
I take pride in my feminist identity.
I would be offended if someone thought I was a feminist.
(Reverse scored)
It would not bother me if someone thought I was like a
feminist.
If someone called me a feminist, I would consider it a
compliment.
I like being a feminist.
I would be annoyed if someone called me a feminist.
I am proud to be a feminist.
I feel good about my feminist identity.
My identity as a feminist is a source of pride for me.
I see activism as a necessary part of feminism.
I think it is possible to be a feminist without being an activist.
(Reverse scored)
I see myself as a feminist activist.
I feel it is necessary to call attention to the way that women
and gender minorities are treated unfairly.
When it comes to feminism, I am very political.
Advocating for feminist principles is important to me.
It is important to me that feminism is political.
I am willing to advocate for feminist issues.
When I hear about feminist activism, I want to be involved.
I am willing to fight for the rights of women and gender
diverse people.
Being a feminist is not particularly central to who I am.
(Reverse scored)
Being a feminist is a central part of my identity.
I am who I am today because I am a feminist.
Being a feminist is an important part of my identity.
When I think about who I am as a person, “feminist” is one of
the first things that comes to mind.
Being a feminist is more important to me than many other
parts of my identity (e.g., age, ethnicity).
In order to understand who I am as a person, you must know
that I am a feminist.
I cannot imagine what my life would be like if I were not a
feminist.
My identity as a feminist is one of the impost important things
about me.
Being a feminist is an important reflection of who I am.
If I wanted to, I could debate a feminist topic with someone.
If someone asked me about feminism, I would be prepared to
talk about it.
I have the skills necessary to be an effective feminist.
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2

2
5
7
7

3

4

5

6
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8

9
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1
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5
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1
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7
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1

7
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1

6

1

6
7
7
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1
I know enough about feminism to talk about it with other
people.
I feel comfortable talking to others about feminism.
If someone had a question about feminism, they could come to
me for answers.
I am easily able to jump into any feminist conversation.
I have the ability to speak up for the feminist issues that are
important to me.
I am capable of putting feminist attitudes into practice.
I can speak competently about many feminist topics.
To me, being a feminist means doing what you want when you
want.
When it comes to feminism, I don’t usually step out of my
comfort zone.
When I encounter feminist arguments that are not consistent
with my worldview, I disregard them.
To me, being a feminist means being confident and
empowered.
To me, feminism is more of a personal attitude than a political
agenda.
I mainly concern myself with feminist issues that are relevant
to my own life.
I’m not trying to change the world with my kind of feminism.
To me, being a feminist means finding ways to empower
yourself.
I consider myself a feminist because I do things that make me
feel empowered.
I pick and choose the parts of feminism that work for me.
I cannot decide whether or not I am a feminist.
In some ways I am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not.
I feel like I am a bad feminist. (Reverse scored)
If someone asked me if I were a feminist, I’m not sure how I
would respond.
Sometimes I act like a feminist, but other times, I do not.
There are situations and circumstances when I would not call
myself a feminist.
I agree with some parts of feminism, but not others.
I am not sure whether or not I can call myself a feminist.
It is not clear to me whether or not I am a feminist.
Sometimes, I think I am a feminist, but other times, I do not.
When I am around feminists, I feel welcomed
When someone tells me they are a feminist, I immediately like
them.
I enjoy being around feminists.
I prefer to spend my time with feminists.
I would feel comfortable walking into a room full of feminists.
I enjoy meeting people who are feminists.
If I learned someone was a feminist, I would want to spend
time with that person.
I feel accepted by feminists.
I feel embraced by feminists.
I feel like I can be myself when I am in the presence of
feminists.

2

3

1

4

5

6

7

8

9
7

1

6
7
7
5

1

6
7
4

1

1

10

1
3

1

3

1

2

2

1
2

7
1

1

1
1

2

1

2

4

2
5

3

1

1
2

6
1

1

1
5
7
6
6
7

1
1
1

7
7
7
7
7
1

2
1

1
2

1

2

1

7
7
3
7
6
7
6
2
7
7
6

1
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Note. Numbers along the top of the table refer to the following categories, into which
individual items could be sorted: 1 = Identity congruence, 2 = beliefs, 3 = activist, 4 =
individualized, 5 = uncertain, 6 = centrality, 7 = affirmation, 8 = acceptance, 9 =
competence, 10 = unclear. Bolded numbers reflect the number of times the item was
placed in its intended category.

4.3

Exploratory Factor Analysis and Initial Examination

of Convergent Validity
4.3.1 Method
4.3.1.1

Participants

In total, 350 MTurk workers completed the survey. However, after removing participants
for failed attention checks, or indicating that they did not meet inclusion criteria when
asked a second time at the end of the survey, the final sample consisted of 267
participants (Mage = 31.61; SD = 4.98). Recommendations for an adequate sample size
for EFA is to include approximately 200 – 250 participants (Fabrigar & Wegener,

2012; MacCallum et al., 1999). A majority of participants identified as female (97.0%;
n = 259), with a few identifying as transgender female (1.1%, n = 3), nonbinary (1.1%; n
= 3), two-spirit (0.4%, n = 1), and gender fluid (0.4%, n = 1). They identified primarily as
White (69.0%; n = 185), African American (12.3%; n = 33), Asian/Asian American
(7.7%; n = 21), and Latin American (6.3%; n = 18;), with some identifying as multiracial
(3.4%, n = 9), Native American (0.7%, n = 2). One participant (0.4%) responded “prefer
not to disclose.”
Most participants were married (34%, n = 91) or single (32.5%; n = 87), followed by
involved in long-term relationships/partnered (24.3%, n = 67), with fewer being engaged
(3.7%, n = 10), or divorced/ separated (4.1%, n = 11). Most participants were
heterosexual (78.3%, n = 209), and some were bisexual (12.4%, n = 33), lesbian/gay
(4.1%; n = 11), asexual (2.6%, n = 7), pansexual (2.2%, n = 6), and one preferred not to
disclose (0.4%). Most had attained a Bachelor’s degree (45.3%, n = 121), with others
having completed some college (31.8%, n = 85), graduate school (10.9%, n = 29), some
graduate school (3.7%; n = 10), a high school degree (7.1%; n = 19), or less than a high
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school degree (0.7%; n = 2). One participant did not respond to this question. When
asked directly, 60.3% (n = 161) of participants categorized themselves as a “feminist,”
21.3% (n = 49) identified as “not a feminist,” and 18.4% (n = 49) were “unsure” whether
or not they were a feminist.

4.3.1.2
4.3.1.2.1

Measures
Feminist Social Identity Scale

The initial version of the FSIS contained ninety items related to nine distinct dimensions
of feminist social identity: Beliefs (10 items; e.g., “I stand for the same things feminists
stand for”), Affirmation (10 items; e.g., “Being a feminist makes me happy”), Fear of
Stigma (10 items; e.g., “I fear that I would be mocked if I told people that I am a
feminist”), Activism (10 items; e.g., “I see activism as a necessary part of feminism”),
Prototypicality (e.g., “When people think about feminists, they probably think about
someone like me”), Competence (10 items; e.g., “If someone asked me about feminism I
would feel prepared to talk about it”), Centrality (10 items; e.g., “My feminist identity is
at the core of who I am”), Acceptance (10 items; e.g., I would feel comfortable walking
into a room full of feminists”), and Uncertainty (10 items; e.g., “I cannot decide whether
or not I am a feminist”). Items were rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale anchored at
completely untrue of me (scored at 1) and completely true of me (6).

4.3.1.2.2

Involvement in Feminist Activities Scale

The Involvement in Feminist Activities Scale (IFAS; Szymanski, 2004) is a 17-item scale
that assesses participation in various activist behaviours associated with feminism (e.g.,
“I am a member of one or more feminist/women’s organizations and/or groups”). Items
are rated on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at very untrue of me (1) to very true of me
(7). Higher scores reflect more involvement in feminist activities. In the original sample,
IFAS demonstrated high internal consistency reliability (⍺ = .94) and converged
positively with measures of feminist self-identification, feminist attitudes, and feminist
identity development (Szymanski, 2004). In this sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .97.
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4.3.1.2.3

Liberal Feminist Attitude and Ideologies Scale

Liberal feminist attitudes were assessed using the short form of the Liberal Feminist
Attitude and Ideology Scale (LFAIS; Morgan, 1996). The LFAIS is an 11-item measure
of general attitudes toward liberal feminist stances (e.g., “Men should respect women
more than they currently do”). Items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale of from strongly
disagree (1) to strongly agree (7). Higher scores indicate more support for liberal
feminist principles. In the original sample, Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .81 to .84 for
the 11-item scale (Morgan, 1996). Morgan (1996) however, cautions against the use of
one item (“America should pass the Equal Rights Amendment”), so this item was omitted
in this study. In this sample, alpha was .87.

4.3.1.2.4

Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale

The Self-Identification as a Feminist scale (SIF; Szymanski, 2004) is a four-item measure
that assesses the extent to which one identifies with feminist principles and uses the label.
Example items include “I consider myself a feminist” and “I identify myself as a feminist
to other people.” Items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree
(1) to strongly agree (6). Higher scores reflect more open feminist self-labelling. In the
original sample, Cronbach’s alpha was .93 (Szymanski, 2004). In this sample,
Cronbach’s alpha was .93. For the purposes of this study, I was interested in both public
(“I identify myself as a feminist to other people”) and private (“I consider myself a
feminist”) feminist identification.

4.3.1.2.5

Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding-16

The Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding-16 (BIDR-16; Hart et al., 2015) is a
brief survey designed to capture the likelihood of socially desirable responding. It
consists of two subscales: impression management (e.g., “There have been occasions
when I have taken advantage of someone” [reverse-scored]) and self-deceptive
enhancement (e.g., “I am a completely rational person”). Items are rated on an 8-point
Likert-style scale anchored at totally disagree (1) and totally agree (8). After reverse
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scoring, higher scores indicate more desirable responding. In this sample, Cronbach’s
alpha = .87.

4.3.2 Procedure
A recruitment advertisement was posted to Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk), inviting
participants to complete a study titled, “Women and Gender Diverse People’s Social
Attitudes.” When compared with data gathered from college student samples, data
gathered from MTurk have been shown to be more diverse and nationally representative,
but just as psychometrically sound (Buhrmester et al., 2011). Only MTurk workers who
a) were located in the United States, b) had completed ≥ 10,000 Human Intelligence
Tasks (HITs), and c) had a HIT acceptance rate ≥ 95% were able to view the task. It was
explicitly stated in both the short and long form of the HIT description that, in order to be
eligible to participate, individuals must be between the ages of 18 and 40 and identify as
female or gender diverse. Three attention checks were embedded within the 90-item
FSIS, as well as a reCAPTCHA verification.
Interested MTurk workers followed a link to the survey hosted on Qualtrics. Upon
opening the survey, participants first responded to a screening questionnaire to determine
eligibility. If they responded that they were any age below 18 or over 40, and/or if they
responded that their gender was “male” or “transgender male,” they were directed out of
the survey. Participants then read the letter of information and consented to participate.
They responded to the 90-item FSIS, followed by a series of counterbalanced surveys,
and a demographics questionnaire. An online version of the debriefing form appeared on
the screen, and they received a unique 3-4 digit code to be inserted back into MTurk for
compensation. Participants were awarded $0.90 within three days after completion.

4.4

Results

4.4.1 Preliminary Analyses
Using SPSS Version 24.0, I first ran a missing data analysis using Little’s MCar test,
which suggested that the values were missing completely at random, X2 (318) = 329.56, p
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= .32. The percentage of missing values was very low (0.19%), so I did not impute
missing values (Parent, 2013).

4.4.2 Exploratory Factor Analysis
I began by conducting an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) with all 90 items using JASP
0.11.1 The results of the EFA are presented in Table 8. Anticipating correlated factors, I
used a direct oblimin rotation and maximum likelihood estimation. The number of factors
was determined by screening the eigenvalues for values greater than 1, as well as the
scree plot (Fabrigar et al., 1999). Items were retained if they loaded higher than .4 onto
any one particular factor and did not have a cross-loading higher than .3.
I first obtained an estimate for the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy
(KMO = .965) and Bartlett’s test of sphericity, x2(4005) = 28088.58, p < .001. A KMO
value close to 1 indicates that the data is likely multifactorial (Sharma, 1996), and a
significant Bartlett’s test of sphericity is required for factor analysis (Tobias & Carlson,
2010; see also Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Therefore, the data was suitable for factor
analysis.
The scree plot (See Figure 2) revealed a rapid “dip,” with two factors clearly observable,
and three additional factors located along the “elbow” of the plot. Using eigenvalues
greater than 1, a 5-factor solution was extracted. I retained an item if it had a factor
loading of at least .50 on a primary factor and cross-loading(s) less than .30 (Tabachnick
& Fidell, 2007). The first factor subsumed the Acceptance, Beliefs, and Political items,
with the highest factor loadings for the Beliefs items and accounted for 48.60% of the
total variance. The second factor comprised the Centrality items, and most of the
Prototypical items. This factor accounted for 10.21% of the total variance. The
Politicized items were split between the first two factors. The third factor was made up
exclusively of the Fear of Stigma items (4.20% of variance), the fourth comprised
exclusively the Competence items (2.73% of variance), and the fifth was exclusively the
Uncertainty items (2.72% of variance).
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Figure 2. Scree Plot for Study 3 Data
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Table 8. Exploratory Factor Analysis of 90-item FSIS for Study 3
General Centrality Stigma Competence Uncertainty
Acceptance1
Acceptance10
Acceptance2
Acceptance3
Acceptance4r
Acceptance5
Acceptance6
Acceptance7
Acceptance8
Acceptance9
Affirmation1
Affirmation10
Affirmation2
Affirmation3
Affirmation4
Affirmation5
Affirmation6
Affirmation7
Affirmation8
Affirmation9
Beliefs1
Beliefs10
Beliefs2
Beliefs3
Beliefs4
Beliefs5
Beliefs6
Beliefs7
Beliefs8r
Beliefs9
Centrality1
Centrality10
Centrality2
Centrality3R
Centrality4
Centrality5
Centrality6
Centrality7
Centrality8
Centrality9
Competence1
Competence10
Competence2
Competence3
Competence4
Competence5

.
0.687
0.527
0.585
-0.755
0.717
0.602
0.709
0.660
0.687
0.629
-0.620
0.525
0.665
0.713
.
.
0.560
0.549
0.549
0.691
0.728
0.667
0.826
0.645
0.786
0.820
0.878
-0.736
0.735
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0.543

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0.556
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0.796
0.712
0.842
-0.751
0.812
0.828
0.750
0.850
0.807
0.817
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0.569
0.816
0.818
0.831
.

Uniqueness
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

0.276
0.259
0.407
0.425
0.477
0.292
0.328
0.280
0.233
0.246
0.247
0.532
0.339
0.197
0.160
0.225
0.230
0.279
0.170
0.164
0.249
0.184
0.263
0.249
0.345
0.284
0.270
0.181
0.431
0.215
0.210
0.168
0.193
0.378
0.335
0.210
0.173
0.210
0.220
0.196
0.344
0.261
0.283
0.278
0.217
0.300
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General Centrality Stigma Competence Uncertainty
Competence6
Competence7
Competence8
Competence9
Politics1
Politics10
Politics2
Politics3
Politics4
Politics5
Politics6
Politics7
Politics8
Politics9
Prototypical1
Prototypical10
Prototypical2
Prototypical3
Prototypical4
Prototypical5
Prototypical6
Prototypical7
Prototypical8
Prototypical9
Stigma1
Stigma10
Stigma2
Stigma3
Stigma4
Stigma5
Stigma6
Stigma7
Stigma8
Stigma9
Uncertainty1
Uncertainty10
Uncertainty2
Uncertainty3
Uncertainty4
Uncertainty5
Uncertainty6
Uncertainty7
Uncertainty8
Uncertainty9

.
.
.
.
.
0.656
.
0.665
.
.
.
.
0.547
.
0.537
.
0.629
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
0.704
.
.
.
0.540
.
.
.
.
.
.
0.657
.
0.721
0.595
0.500
0.602
0.591
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

Note. Applied rotation method is oblimin.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0.670
0.757
0.767
.
0.795
0.683
0.733
0.730
0.854
0.693
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

0.814
0.666
0.519
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0.709
0.689
0.723
0.539
0.596
0.572
.
0.694
0.697
0.545

Uniqueness
0.320
0.348
0.319
0.354
0.449
0.374
0.318
0.482
0.461
0.268
0.278
0.285
0.280
0.483
0.289
0.201
0.214
0.345
0.534
0.366
0.241
0.325
0.236
0.220
0.442
0.432
0.398
0.777
0.378
0.461
0.388
0.360
0.288
0.388
0.403
0.378
0.369
0.411
0.425
0.442
0.450
0.405
0.364
0.519
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I aimed to create a practical, multidimensional tool that could be quickly administered
and incorporated in quantitative psychological research on feminist identity. Particularly
given that a limitation of past measures of feminist identity is their length (e.g., the
Feminist Perspectives Scale contains 78 items, the Liberal Feminist Attitude and
Ideologies Scale contains 60 items), creating a brief, psychometrically-sound measure
was an important goal of this research. As such, I intended to retain no more than five
items per subscale.
Given that Factors 1 and 2 were not as clearly defined as Factors 3-5, I examined which
items seemed to constitute the core of these factors. By looking at the factor loadings for
Factors 1 and 2, I detected that the highest factor loadings on Factor 1 were from the
Beliefs subscale (with one single exception, “I feel like feminists are always judging
me,” from the Acceptance subscale). Given that the beliefs items loaded very highly onto
this subscale (loadings ranged from .66 to .88), I decided to extract the five items from
the Beliefs subscale with the highest factor loadings (loadings ranged from .74 to .88).
Two items shared similar loadings on this factor (loadings = -.74 and .74); however,
given that reverse-scored items are sometimes misinterpreted by participants (see
Rodebaugh et al., 2007; van Sonderen et al., 2013), I elected to retain only the positivelykeyed item. While some have argued that reverse scoring is critical for ensuring that
participants are responding honestly to the scale items, others have suggested that
interpreting scores on reverse scored items is particularly challenging because one will
never know if the score reflects a genuine response or a misinterpretation of the item (see
Spector et al., 1997). For Factor 2, although some items from the Politicized and
Prototypical scales also loaded onto this factor, the five highest loadings came
exclusively from the Centrality subscale, and the five items with the highest factor
loadings were retained, ranging from .81 to .85 on this dimension.
The items retained comprised three dimensions that reflected alignment with a feminist
identity (Beliefs, Centrality, Competence) and two dimensions that reflected ambivalence
toward a feminist identity (Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty). Together, these dimensions
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allow for the simultaneous evaluation of alignment and ambivalence inherent in modern
feminist social identities.
I ran a second EFA with the 25 items that had the highest factor loadings on their
respective factors. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy was .913 and
Bartlett’s test of sphericity was significant, χ2 (300) = 5714.78, p < .001. All items loaded
onto their respective factors (ps < .001) with no cross-loadings above .30. Factor
loadings ranged from .61 (Uncertainty7) to .90 (Beliefs7). The uniqueness values refer to
the amount of variance attributable to that item that is not shared with other variables.
The higher the uniqueness value, the less relevant the item is to the factor model. As can
be seen in Table 8, uniqueness values ranged from .136 (Beliefs7) to .511 (Uncertainty7).
Factor 1 (Centrality) accounted for 36.33% of the total variance. Factor 2 (Fear of
Stigma) accounted for 18.23% of the total variance. Factor 3 (Beliefs) accounted for
6.09% of the total variance. Factor 4 (Competence) accounted for 5.57% of the total
variance. Factor 5 (Uncertainty) accounted for 5.09% of the total variance. Together, this
solution explained 71.30% of the variance in the factor structure. See Table 9 for the
factor loadings for the 25 items from the EFA.
Table 9. Exploratory Factor Analysis of 25 Key FSIS Items for Study 3
Centrality
Beliefs3
Beliefs5
Beliefs6
Beliefs7
Beliefs9
Centrality2
Centrality5
Centrality7
Centrality8
Centrality9
Competence2
Competence3
Competence4
Competence6
Competence7

.
.
.
.
.
0.816
0.827
0.874
0.840
0.831
.
.
.
.
.

Beliefs Competence Stigma Uncertainty Uniqueness
0.819
0.769
0.856
0.901
0.708
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0.862
0.864
0.854
0.813
0.698

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

0.238
0.281
0.222
0.136
0.227
0.221
0.187
0.172
0.172
0.165
0.238
0.242
0.209
0.323
0.352
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Stigma10
.
.
Stigma2
.
.
Stigma4
.
.
Stigma6
.
.
Stigma7
.
.
Uncertainty1
.
.
Uncertainty10
.
.
Uncertainty2
.
.
Uncertainty7
.
.
Uncertainty8
.
.
Note. Applied rotation method is oblimin.

.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.

0.794
0.691
0.798
0.714
0.676
.
.
.
.
.

.
.
.
.
.
0.806
0.682
0.787
0.609
0.735

0.382
0.446
0.372
0.391
0.382
0.340
0.389
0.323
0.511
0.344

4.4.3 Confirmatory Factor Analysis
I subjected these 25 items to a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to support the factor
structure of the FSIS, with the intention of conducting a second confirmatory factor
analysis in a new sample. This analysis was conducted not to confirm the factor structure
but rather to determine whether the fit of the previously specified EFA model would be
regarded as an adequate fit to the data if all cross-loadings were set at zero (see Showshoe
et al., 2014). I tested a five-factor model, anticipating highly correlated factors. To
determine adequacy of the fit, I examined a combination of indices to determine whether
consensus could be achieved from these values. Specifically, I examined the comparative
fit index (CFI), root mean square error of approximation (RMESA), and standardized
root-mean square residual (SRMR). Hu and Bentler (1999) have suggested that values
around .95 for CFI, .08 for SRMR, and .06 for RMSEA can be interpreted as an
acceptable fit. According to these values, the model was a generally good fit to the data,
CFI = .94, RMSEA = .071 (90% CI = .06, .08), SRMR = .051, χ2(265) = 622.324, p
<.001. All items loaded significantly on their respective factor (p <.001), and none of the
confidence intervals for these loadings included zero. The standardized factor
covariances between the subscales ranged from -.20 (Stigma with Beliefs) to .70
(Centrality with Beliefs), suggesting that each factor captured a distinct component of
feminist identity. See Figure 3 for a visual depiction of the confirmatory factor analysis
with standardized loadings and variances for each observed variable and standardized
covariances between factors.
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Figure 3. Visual Representation of Confirmatory Factor Analysis of 25-item FSIS for Study 3
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I examined the modification indices to explore the possibility of significant crossloadings or correlated residuals. The modification indices suggested that allowing the
item Beliefs9 (“I see the world the same way feminists do”) to cross-load onto the
Centrality subscale would improve the model fit. I explored this option and found that the
model fit did improve significantly, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .071 (90% CI = .06, .08),
SRMR = .051, X2(264) = 596.65, p <.001. The critical value was 3.84, suggesting that
this model was a better fit to the data compared to the original. Yet, the item still loaded
onto its original factor much more highly than onto the centrality factor, therefore the
cross-loading was removed for parsimony. In addition, the modification indices for
residual covariances suggested to allow for correlated residuals between Uncertainty10
(“In some ways, I am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not”) and Uncertainty7
(“Sometimes I think I am a feminist, but other times I do not”). Given the conceptual
similarity between Uncertainty10 and Uncertainty7, the high degree of shared variance
further supports the removal of item Uncertainty7. Because this model was still in the
exploratory phase, however, I retained this item, with the intention of exploring its fit in a
second confirmatory factor analysis in a second sample.

4.4.4 Means and Standard Deviations
I examined the means and standard deviations of the FSIS subscales, as well as their
internal consistencies and skewness and kurtosis values. Participants responded to the
FSIS items on a six-point Likert-style scale anchored at one and six, so the midpoint
would be 3.50. On average, participants scored above the midpoint on the Beliefs (M =
4.08) and Competence subscales (M = 4.16), and below the midpoint for Centrality (M =
3.05), Fear of Stigma (M = 2.82), and Uncertainty (M = 2.72). This pattern suggests that
the sample was largely feminist-oriented, which is consistent with the high mean scores
on measures of feminist beliefs and identification. Standard deviations ranged from 1.29
(Uncertainty) to 1.58 (Centrality), and Cronbach’s alpha scores ranged from .87
(Uncertainty) to .96 (Centrality). Cronbach’s alpha scores above .70 are generally
regarded as evidence of a measure’s internal consistency, so these findings support the
subscales’ internal consistency reliability. Byrne (2010) has suggested that data should be
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considered skewed if its skewness values are less than -2 or greater than 2, or if kurtosis
values are less than -7 or greater than 7. Skewness and kurtosis values did not exceed
these values, suggesting that all subscales were normally distributed.

4.4.5 Convergent and Discriminant Validity
To explore initial convergent validity for the FSIS, I analyzed the bivariate correlations
between the FSIS subscales and measures of feminist identity, attitudes, and behaviours,
as well as socially desirable responding. See Table 10 for means, standard deviations,
alphas, and bivariate correlations between subscales and key variables of interest.
Table 10. Zero-order correlations between FSIS subscales and related constructs for
Study 3
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Beliefs
Centrality
Stigma
Competence
Uncertainty
Identification
(private)
Identification
(public)
LFAIS
Activities
BIDR-16
Alpha
Mean
SD

1
.67***
-.03
.58***
-.05
.82***

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

-.10
.57**
-.16**
.73***

-.20**
.51***
-.01

-.27***
.62***

-.13*

-

.73***

.77***

-.15*

.62***

-.14*

.85**

-

.59***
.54***
.03
.94
4.08
1.35

.20**
.76***
.09
.96
3.05
1.58

-.18**
-.04
-.34***
.89
2.82
1.40

.32***
.52***
.11
.93
4.16
1.39

-.21**
-.01
-.28***
.87
2.72
1.29

.50**
.60**
.01
3.48
1.42

.41***
.67***
.08
3.19
1.48

.09
-.03
.87
4.76
0.94

.03
.97
2.99
1.67

10

.87
4.93
1.24

Note. *. Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). **. Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2tailed). *** Correlation is significant at the .001 level (2-tailed). LFAIS = Liberal Feminist Attitudes and
Ideologies Scale. BIDR-16 = Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding.

As expected, many of the FSIS subscales demonstrate significant correlations with one
another. Specifically, the Centrality, Competence, and Beliefs subscales were
significantly and positively intercorrelated. Fear of Stigma was significantly and
positively associated with Uncertainty (r = .51, p < .001), but unrelated to Beliefs and
Centrality (ps > .05) Uncertainty was unrelated to Beliefs, but significantly and
negatively linked to Centrality (r = .67, p < .001) and Competence r = -.27, p < .001).
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For feminist self-identification, private feminist identification was positively related to
the positive identity dimensions (i.e., Competence, Beliefs, and Centrality; ps < .001), but
negatively associated with Uncertainty (r = -.13, p = .01). Fear of Stigma was unrelated
to private feminist identification (r = -.01, p = .89). Public feminist identification was
positively associated with the positive identity dimensions (ps < .001), but negatively
correlated with the negative dimensions (Uncertainty, r = -.14, p < .001; Fear of Stigma,
r = -.15, p = .01). Involvement in feminist activities was positively associated with the
positive identity dimensions Centrality (ps < .001), but unrelated to Fear of Stigma (r =
.037, p = .55) and Uncertainty (r = -.01, p = .68). Liberal feminist beliefs were positively
associated with the positive identity dimensions (ps < .01) and negatively related to Fear
of Stigma and Uncertainty (ps < .01). These results support the tool’s convergent validity.
As evidence of discriminant validity, Beliefs, Competence, and Centrality were unrelated
to socially desirable responding (ps > .05). Stigma and Uncertainty were negatively
associated with socially desirable responding (r = -.34, p <.001; r = -.28, p < .001,
respectively), potentially suggesting that these subscales are associated with a more
honest response style. These findings provide support for the tool’s discriminant validity.

4.5

Discussion

As acclaimed feminist writer Jessica Valenti (2014) once wrote, “When everyone is a
feminist, is anyone?” Indeed, with more people identifying as feminists than ever before,
dated understandings and operationalizations of feminist identity are inadequate for
understanding the complexity of people’s feminist social identities in the present cultural
context (Siegel & Calogero, 2019). This study outlined the first stages of the
development and validation of the Feminist Social Identity Scale. I conducted an EFA
with direct oblimin rotation and maximum likelihood estimation in a large sample of
female-identified and gender expansive MTurk workers. The data supported a five-factor
scale with both positive identity subscales (i.e. Beliefs, Competence, Centrality) and
negative identity subscales (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty). A second EFA supported
the five-factor structure, and each scale demonstrated high internal consistency and was
normally distributed. A confirmatory factor analysis supported the five-factor structure of
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the FSIS. However, several items that had low factor loadings on the Beliefs factor
seemed to reflect a sense of solidarity with feminists, an idea which will be explored in
the next study. Initial evidence of convergent and discriminant validity was established
through positive links between the positive identity subscales and feminist beliefs, public
and private identification as a feminist, involvement in feminist activities, and a measure
of socially desirable responding, as well as negative links between the negative identity
dimensions and these measures.

4.5.1 Limitations and Future Directions
Perhaps the most serious limitation of this study is the population from which participants
were selected. Although MTurk data is typically considered to be a fast and reliable
alternative to undergraduate student samples (Buhrmester et al., 2011), a quarter of the
data collected was unusable for the purposes of this study, even when several checks and
strategies were put in place to maximize the usability of the data collection (Mason &
Suri, 2012). Further, while nonbinary and gender expansive were invited to participate in
the study, a substantial majority of participants were female-identified, and thus results
should be interpreted with caution when attempting to generalize to nonbinary and gender
expansive individuals. Given that male-identified people were unable to participate in the
study, results should not be generalized to men’s feminist identities. Finally, it may be
argued the approach taken to selecting items for Factors 1 and 2 may have homogenized
the factors without taking the unique factor loadings from the initial Political,
Prototypical, Acceptance, and Affirmation scales into account. Therefore, in my next
exploratory study, I will include items that tap into additional dimensions of feminist
identity to see if these factors emerge more clearly and discretely.
.
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Chapter 5

5

Study 4: Further Confirmation of Factor Structure of

FSIS and Links with Gender-Related Attitudes and Norms
Best practices in scale construction recommend completing a confirmatory factor analysis
in a new sample to support the underlying structure identified in the exploratory factor
analysis (Worthington & Whittaker, 2006). Therefore, the first aim of Study 4 was to
examine the factor structure of the FSIS via confirmatory factor analysis in a large
sample of women. The exploratory factor analysis in Study 3 revealed five factors; four
distinct factors and one general factor, upon which the Beliefs items all strongly loaded.
However, upon further inspection of the items that loaded onto the general factor, I
determined that many of the items with lower loadings on this scale reflected a sense of
solidarity with feminists. Therefore, in addition to the 25 items retained and confirmed in
Study 3, I generated a further 10 theoretically-relevant items that captured the essence of
solidarity, bearing in mind the feedback I received from the expert reviewers from Study
3. With the addition of these ten items, I aimed to examine the possibility that the items
that loaded onto the “general” factor of the FSIS reflected a “Solidarity” with feminists
subscale.
The second aim of Study 4 was to conduct additional tests of convergent validity for the
FSIS by examining how women’s feminist social identity relates to a wide array of
perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs that are shaped by gendered norms and attitudes.
Gender-related norms and stereotypes have the potential to shape behaviour (Fiske, 1993)
and cause harm to individuals who cannot or do not want to adhere to them (Morgenroth
& Ryan, 2020). Feminist identity does not necessarily protect people from adopting
gendered attitudes and complying with gendered norms for behaviour. Indeed, past
research has demonstrated that feminist women do not necessarily conform to feminine
norms to a lesser degree than non-feminist women (Siegel & Calogero, 2019; see also
Hurt et al., 2007), and neither feminist identification nor liberal feminist attitudes have
been found to link to less adherence to traditional gender expectations of women (Conlin
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et al., 2021a). It is possible that the aligned dimensions of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs,
Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) may be associated with weaker endorsement of
gendered attitudes and less gender-role conformity, while the ambivalent dimensions
(i.e., Uncertainty, Fear of Stigma) may be associated with stronger endorsement of
gendered attitudes, and more gender-role conformity.
To further examine convergent validity of the FSIS, I tested the associations between the
FSIS and four clusters of gender-related attitudes and norms: feminist self-identification
and sexist attitudes; feminine beauty and power beliefs; self- and body image; sexual and
relationship attitudes.
The first cluster of variables is focused on feminist self-identification, hostile sexist
attitudes, and benevolent sexist attitudes. Specifically, one would expect that individuals
with a more aligned feminist social identity would be more likely to identify as feminist
in public and private and less likely to endorse sexist attitudes. Past research supports
these ideas: People with greater endorsement of feminist principles are more likely to
label themselves as feminists (e.g., Liss et al., 2000; Reid & Purcell, 2004), and people
who identify themselves as feminists are more likely to be involved in feminist activism,
compared to those who merely hold feminist beliefs (Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010).
However, ambivalent feminist identity dimensions should predict weaker feminist
identification; the more people are afraid of experiencing feminist stigma, the less likely
they should be to label themselves as feminists. Similarly, the more uncertain people are
about whether or not they are feminists, the less likely they should be to identify as
feminists.
Ambivalent Sexism Theory (Glick & Fiske, 1996) suggests that sexist attitudes have both
blatant and subtle components. Hostile sexism refers to blatant hatred toward women,
whereas benevolent sexism may actually appear to some as subjectively positive in
valence. Benevolent sexism comprises three distinct components: complementary gender
differentiation (i.e., acceptance of stereotypes about women and men due to the essential
differences between them), heterosexual intimacy (i.e., a perception that men are entitled
to women), and protective paternalism (i.e., a feeling that women are unable to fend for
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themselves and that men should therefore protect them). Benevolent sexist attitudes are
grounded in traditional gender role norms and stereotypes about women and men, and
ultimately work to “keep women in their place” by bolstering the gender status quo. They
are subtler than hostile sexist attitudes, and women are less likely to detect and protest
against benevolent sexist treatment (Becker & Swim, 2011; Connor et al., 2015). In fact,
many women find benevolent sexist treatment to be flattering, and some women prefer to
have benevolent sexist partners (Bohner et al., 2010; Gul & Kupfer, 2018). Despite their
differences, hostile and benevolent sexism are highly correlated with one another
(Connor et al., 2015; Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001).
Feminist identity has been linked to less endorsement of hostile and benevolent sexism
(Kunst et al., 2019), so it would follow that aligned dimensions of the FSIS would be
negatively associated with both hostile and benevolent sexism. However, women who are
uncertain about their feminist identities may support those aspects of sexism that flatter
women, and those who are afraid of being stereotyped as a feminist may hold this fear
because they endorse traditional gender attitudes, such as benevolent sexism.
Therefore, I hypothesized that:
H1) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity,
Centrality) would be positively associated with (a) feminist self-identification and
negatively associated with both (b) hostile sexist attitudes, and (c) benevolent sexist
attitudes.
H2) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty)
would be negatively associated with (a) feminist self-identification and positively
associated with both (b) hostile sexist attitudes, and (c) benevolent sexist attitudes.
The second cluster of variables is focused on beliefs about feminine beauty ideals and
women’s social power. Notably, many feminist scholars have denounced the cultural
fixation on women’s beauty, and the cultural pressure for women to vigilantly manage
and monitor their appearance, weight, and shape, with some even labelling it as a
“political sedative” (Wolf, 1991, p. 187) in the way it consumes women’s cognitive,
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emotional, and economic resources, and dampens motivation to challenge the status quo.
Indeed, women who support myths about traditional feminine beauty are more likely to
hold gender system justifying attitudes and support sexist hiring practices (Ramati-Ziber
et al., 2020). Women with a stronger feminist social identity may be more likely to
recognize the harm done by trying to adhere to unrealistic cultural norms and
expectations about women’s bodies and be more accepting of a wider range of women’s
body types. They may also reject gender ideologies that suggest women can achieve
social power and mobility through their sexuality or beauty.
Therefore, I hypothesized that:
H3) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity,
Centrality) would be positively associated with (a) endorsing a broader conceptualization
of beauty and (b) acceptance of body hair on women, and negatively associated with (c) a
belief that sex is a form of power, and (d) that beauty is a form of social currency for
women.
H4) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty)
would be negatively associated with (a) endorsing a broader conceptualization of beauty,
and positively associated with (b) a belief that sex is a form of power and that (c) beauty
is a form of social currency for women, and (d) attitudes that body hair is undesirable.
The third cluster of variables is focused on women’s self-concept and body image
attitudes and behaviours. While some research suggests that feminism is linked to
positive self-body relations and body-related attitudes, some have suggested that the
benefits associated with endorsing feminist attitudes may be over-reported due to
publishing bias (Yoder et al., 2012), and the links identified between feminism and body
image are often small and inconsistent (see Murnen & Smolak, 2009). In fact, several
studies have suggested that feminist women and non-feminist women do not differ in
their levels of body satisfaction or desire for thinness (e.g., Borowsky et al., 2016; Siegel
& Calogero, 2019). One possibility for these mixed findings is that existing measures of
feminist identity and attitudes are not sufficiently nuanced to capture the multiple and
ambivalent dimensions of feminist identity, and findings may be muddied by a failure to
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attend to these dimensions. By evaluating multiple aligned and ambivalent identity
dimensions of feminist identity simultaneously, the FSIS allows for testing this
possibility.
Therefore, I hypothesized that:
H5) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Competence, Solidarity, Centrality)
would be negatively associated with (a) a perception that menstruation is bothersome, (b)
make-up use, (c) endorsement of cosmetic surgery, (d) internalized weight stigma, (e)
self-objectification, and (f) disordered eating attitudes.
H6) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty)
would be positively associated with (a) a perception that menstruation is bothersome, (b)
make-up use, (c) endorsement of cosmetic surgery, (d) internalized weight stigma, (e)
self-objectification, and (f) disordered eating attitudes.
The fourth cluster of variables is focused on women’s sexual and relationship attitudes.
Past research suggests that feminist women may hold more positive and functional sexual
attitudes, compared to non-feminist women. This may be due, in part, to the fact that
sexual relationships are situated within the wider domain of gender relations. Sexual
scripts are often grounded in traditional gender roles and norms (Eaton & Rose, 2011;
Siegel et al., 2021), even in non-heterosexual relationships (Hoppe, 2011; Pham, 2016).
However, women with stronger feminist attitudes may be less inclined to adhere to
normative expectations about romantic relationships and sexuality. There is some
research to support this idea: Feminist attitudes have been associated with more
willingness to refuse unwanted sex (Yoder et al., 2012), more erotophilia and less support
for the sexual double standard (Bay-Cheng & Zucker, 2007), more intrinsic motivations
for sexual activity (Schick et al., 2008), and refusing to fake orgasm (e.g., Lafrance et al.,
2017).
Therefore, I hypothesized that:
H7) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity,
Centrality) would be positively associated with (a) entitlement to sexual pleasure from
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one’s self, (b) entitlement to sexual pleasure from one’s partner, and negatively
associated with (c) fear of being single and (d) motivations for faking orgasm.
H8) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty)
would be negatively associated with (a) entitlement to sexual pleasure from one’s self, (b)
entitlement to sexual pleasure from one’s partner, and positively associated with (c) fear
of being single and (d) motivations for faking orgasm.
In summary, Study 4 aimed to confirm a six-factor structure for the FSIS and examined
the scale’s convergent validity by testing the links between the FSIS subscales and a wide
set of gendered norms and attitudes that are expected to be related to feminist social
identity.

5.1 Method
5.1.1

Participants

The final sample consisted of 415 female participants. Initially, 491 participants
completed the survey. Participants who failed one or more attention checks were
removed from the dataset, resulting in 416 participants. One participant indicated that we
should not use their data based on how much they were paying attention, resulting in a
final sample of 415. Kline (2011) suggests that an adequate sample size for a
confirmatory factor analysis is roughly 200 cases, or 5-10 participants per parameter; as
such, the current sample was adequate for CFA.
Four hundred and six participants (97.8%) indicated that they were cisgender, and two
(0.5%) participants indicated that they would prefer not to answer the question. Seven
participants (1.7%) did not respond to the question. Respondents ranged in age from 19 to
73 with a mean age of 33.22 and standard deviation of 9.52. The sample was primarily
European American or White (n = 347, 83.6%), with some participants identifying as
Asian (n = 21, 5.1%), African American or Black (n = 8; 1.9%), Native American (n = 2;
0.5%), Aboriginal (n = 1; 0.2%), and Maori (n = 1; 0.2%). Thirty-two participants (7.7%)
indicated that their racial group was not listed, and three participants (0.7%) indicated
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that they would prefer not to report their racial group. Additionally, 350 participants (n =
84.3%) indicated that they were non-Hispanic/Latinx, and 35 participants indicated that
they were Hispanic/Latinx (8.4%). Thirty participants (7.2%) did not respond to this
question. The majority of the sample identified as heterosexual (n = 277; 66.7%),
bisexual (n = 92, 22.2%), lesbian (n = 13; 3.1%), pansexual (n = 12; 2.9%), and asexual
(n = 9; 2.2%). Nine participants (2.2%) indicated that their sexual orientation was not
listed, and three participants (0.7%) indicated that they preferred not to report their sexual
orientation.
One hundred and twenty-eight participants (30.8%) were married, 123 (29.6%) were
single, 123 (29.6%) were involved in a long-term relationship, 19 (4.6%) were engaged, 9
(2.2%) were divorced, four (1.0%) were separated, and one (0.2%) was widowed. Eight
participants (1.9%) indicated that their relationship status was not listed. The sample was
fairly well-educated: 260 participants (62.7%) responded that they had graduate degrees,
55 (13.3%) indicated that they had completed some graduate school, 76 (18.3%)
indicated that they had a Bachelor’s degree, 21 (5.1%) had completed some college, and
3 (0.7%) responded that they had graduated from high school.

5.1.2

Materials

5.1.2.1.1

Feminist Social Identity Scale

A 35-item version of the FSIS was presented to participants. This version of the tool had
subscales to evaluate Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality, Fear of Stigma, and
Uncertainty. Items are rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale anchored at completely untrue
of me (scored at 1) and completely true of me (6). The complete FSIS, including the entire
solidarity subscale presented in this study, is presented in Appendix C.
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5.1.2.2
5.1.2.2.1

Feminist Self-Identification and Sexist Attitudes
Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale

The Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale (FSIS; Szymanski, 2004) is a unidimensional,
four-item measure that assesses the degree to which participants support feminist
principles and label themselves as feminists. Items cover both public feminist
identification (e.g., “I identify myself as a feminist to other people”) and private feminist
identification (e.g., “I consider myself a feminist”). Items are rated on a Likert-style scale
anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) to strongly agree (5). Items are averaged, and
higher scores reflect more feminist identification. The measure has shown positive links
with feminist attitudes and involvement in feminist activities in diverse samples of
women, supporting the tool’s construct validity (Siegel & Calogero, 2021; Szymanski,
2004).

5.1.2.2.2

Ambivalent Sexism Inventory

The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI; Glick & Fiske, 1996) consists of 22 items that
assess participants’ attitudes toward gender relations in society. The scale contains two
distinct subscales: hostile sexism (e.g., “When women lose to men in a fair competition,
they typically complain about being discriminated against”) and benevolent sexism
(“Women, compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility”). Items are rated
on a 6-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 0) and strongly agree
(scored at 5). After reverse scoring, items are averaged, with higher scores on each
subscale reflecting more sexist attitudes. The ASI has been used widely and has
demonstrated structural and external validity in samples of women and men around the
world (Glick & Fiske, 2001).
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5.1.2.3
5.1.2.3.1

Feminine Beauty and Power Beliefs
Broad Conceptualization of Beauty Scale

The Broad Conceptualization of Beauty Scale (BCB; Tylka & Iannantuono, 2016)
consists of nine items related to perceptions of beauty. Example items include “Even if a
physical feature is not considered attractive by others or by society, I think that it can be
beautiful” and “A woman's acceptance of herself can change my perception of her
physical beauty.” Items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree
(scored at 1) and strongly agree (7). Scores are averaged, with higher scores reflecting
more flexible and open attitudes toward women’s beauty. In a large study with four
community samples of women, the BCB demonstrated strong internal and test-retest
reliability, as well as convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity (Tylka &
Iannantuono, 2016).

5.1.2.3.2

Body Hair Attitudes Scale

The Body Hair Attitudes Scale (BHAS; Basow & Braman, 1998) is a unidimensional, 13item measure which evaluates the extent to which people hold negative attitudes toward
body hair on women. Example items include “body hair is unfeminine” and “body hair
makes a woman look like an animal.” Items are rated on a 5-point Likert scale anchored
at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (5). After reverse scoring, items are
averaged, with higher scores reflecting more negative attitudes toward body hair in
women. The scale has not been widely used, but in a sample of 195 mixed-gender
undergraduate students, the measure demonstrated strong internal consistency (⍺ = .88),
and female participants had more positive attitudes toward body hair than male
participants, providing evidence of known-groups validity for the tool.

5.1.2.3.3

Beauty as Currency Scale

The Beauty as Currency Scale (BCS; Forbes et al., 2007) consists of five items that
evaluate the extent to which respondents feel that a woman’s beauty serves as a form of
social capital. Example items include “It is more important for a woman to be pretty than
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to be smart” and “If a woman cannot do a good job of taking care of her appearance, she
probably cannot be trusted to do a good job at anything else.” Items are rated on a 7-point
Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (7). Items are
averaged, with higher scores reflecting greater agreement that beauty is an essential form
of social currency for women. Convergent validity for the measure has been
demonstrated in mixed-gender and women-only samples of college students through
positive associations with measures of thin-ideal internalization and sexist attitudes
(Calogero et al., 2017; Forbes et al., 2007).

5.1.2.3.4

Sex Is Power Scale

The Sex is Power Scale (Erchull & Liss, 2013) was employed to evaluate the extent to
which participants viewed sex as a form of social currency for women. While the full
scale consists of attitudes toward the self and women in general, we used only the 5-item
women subscale (W-SIPS). Example items include “men are easily manipulated by
beautiful women” and “women can control men through sex.” Items were rated on a 6point Likert style scale anchored at disagree strongly (scored at 1) and agree strongly (6).
Items are summed and averaged, with higher scores reflecting greater agreement that
women can control men through their sexuality. In a large sample of undergraduate
students, the W-SIPS demonstrated good internal consistency and positive associations
with hostile and benevolent sexism, supporting the scale’s convergent validity (Erchull &
Liss, 2013).

5.1.2.4
5.1.2.4.1

Self- and Body Image
Menstrual Attitudes Questionnaire

To evaluate menstrual attitudes, we employed the “menstruation as bothersome” subscale
of the Menstrual Attitudes Questionnaire (MAQ; Brooks-Gunn & Ruble, 1980). The
subscale contains six items that are rated on a 7-point Likert scale anchored at strongly
disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (7). Example items include “I hope it will be
possible someday to get a menstrual period over within a few minutes” and “Men have a
real advantage in not having the monthly interruption of a menstrual period.” After
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reverse scoring, higher scores reflect more negative attitudes toward menstruation. The
bothersome subscale of the MAQ has shown links to self-objectification (Roberts, 2000)
and a desire to suppress menstruation (Johnston-Robledo et al., 2003). In a sample of 327
women who menstruate, women with extremely negative menstrual experiences scored
more highly on this subscale than women with neutral or positive experiences
(McPherson & Korfine, 2004), supporting the tool’s known-groups validity. For the
purposes of this study, scores were reversed so that higher scores reflected more positive
menstrual attitudes.

5.1.2.4.2

Makeup Questionnaire

The Makeup Questionnaire (MQ; Smith et al., 2017) was administered to evaluate the
extent to which participants feel insecure (e.g., “If I do not have makeup on, I feel less
attractive”) and uneasy (e.g., “I do not leave the house without any makeup”) when they
are not wearing makeup. The scale consists of six items, which are rated on a 5-point
Likert-style scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (scored
at 5). In a sample of 5, 284 undergraduate women, both subscales demonstrated
significant positive correlations with body discomfort, weight and shape concerns, and
endorsement of thin-ideal stereotypes (Smith et al., 2017).

5.1.2.4.3

Attitudes Toward Cosmetic Surgery Scale

The Attitudes Toward Cosmetic Surgery Scale (ATCS; Henderson-King & HendersonKing, 2005) was used to evaluate attitudes toward receiving cosmetic surgery. The scale
contains three subscales describing intrapersonal motives for cosmetic surgery (e.g.,
“Cosmetic surgery is a good thing because it can help people feel better about
themselves”), social motives for cosmetic surgery (e.g., “I would seriously consider
having cosmetic surgery if I thought my partner would find me more attractive”), and
considering having cosmetic surgery oneself (“In the future, I could end up having some
kind of cosmetic surgery”). Items are rated on a 7-point Likert-style scale anchored at
strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (7). In a sample of 1,288 mixed-gender
participants, each of the subscales evidenced positive correlations with attitudes toward
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makeup use, and social motives for cosmetic surgery was positively linked with lower
state social, appearance, and body self-esteem in women and men (Henderson-King &
Henderson-King, 2005).

5.1.2.4.4

Weight Bias Internalization Scale

The Weight Bias Internalization Scale - Modified (WBI-M; Lillis et al., 2010; Pearl &
Puhl, 2014) was used to evaluate the extent to which participants believe that the
stereotypes attributed to individuals with larger bodies are personally true of them. Items
are rated on a Likert-style scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly
agree (7). After reverse scoring, items are averaged, with higher scores reflecting more
internalized weight stigma. Example items include “I am less attractive than most other
people because of my weight” and “I wish I could drastically change my weight.” The
WBI-M has demonstrated strong internal consistency and shown positive correlations
with dislike of fat, drive for thinness, depression, and eating disorder symptoms, and
negative correlations with self-esteem in a sample of 150 U.S. participants (Pearl & Puhl,
2014).

5.1.2.4.5

Self-Objectification Beliefs and Behaviors Scale

The Self-Objectification Beliefs and Behaviors Scale (SOBBS; Lindner & Tantleff-Dunn,
2017) was used to assess the degree to which individuals self-objectify. Participants rate
14 items that reflect on taking an observer’s perspective toward the body (e.g., “I often
think about how my body must look to others”) and treating the body as though it were
capable of representing the self (e.g., “My body is what gives me value to other people”)
using a 5-point Likert scale, anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly
agree (5). Items are averaged, with higher scores reflecting a more objectified selfperspective. In samples of college and community women, the scale has demonstrated
strong internal consistency and positive links with other measure of self-objectification,
some dimensions of femininity ideology, disordered eating attitudes, appearance anxiety,
and depressed mood (Lindner & Tantleff-Dunn, 2017; Siegel & Calogero, 2019).
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5.1.2.4.6

Eating Attitudes Test-26

The Eating Attitude Test-26 (EAT-26; Garner et al., 1982) is a measure designed to
evaluate eating disorder symptoms, specifically dieting (e.g., “I engage in dieting
behaviour”), bulimia and food preoccupation (e.g., “I have gone on eating binges where I
feel that I may not be able to stop”), and oral control (e.g., “I display self-control around
food”). Items are typically rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale anchored at never (scored
at 1) and always (6). However, for the purposes of this study, I used a 5-point scale with
the same anchors, as I was interested in all scores, not just those that were clinically
relevant. Items are summed and averaged, with higher scores reflecting more eating
disorder symptoms. The EAT-26 has been used widely in clinical, college, and
community samples. Across studies, the EAT-26 has shown strong internal consistency
for the full scale, with reliabilities ranging for the subscales (see Gleaves et al., 2014).
Convergent validity has been demonstrated through positive associations with constructs
such as self-objectification and body shame in samples of college women (Garner et al.,
1982), and drive for thinness and body dissatisfaction in athletes (Doninger et al., 2005).

5.1.2.5
5.1.2.5.1

Sexual and Relationship Attitudes
Fear of Being Single Scale

To assess participants’ felt need to be involved in a romantic relationship, we used the
Fear of Being Single Scale (FOBS; Spielmann et al., 2013). The FOBS is a
unidimensional, 6-item scale that evaluates how anxious participants feel about the idea
of being single. Items are rated on a five-point Likert-style scale anchored at not at all
true (1) and very true (5). Items are averaged, with higher scores reflecting more anxiety
about being and staying single. Example items include “I feel it is close to being too late
for me to find the love of my life” and “It scares me to think that there might not be
anyone out there for me.” The scale has shown strong internal consistency and
measurement non-invariance in samples of women and men. Convergent and
discriminant validity has been demonstrated through positive links with anxious
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attachment and neuroticism and nonsignificant associations with social approach
(Spielmann et al., 2013).

5.1.2.5.2

Reasons for Faking Orgasm Scale

The Reasons for Faking Orgasm Scale (Cooper et al., 2014) contains four subscales, but
only the altruistic deceit subscale was used for the purposes of this study. The altruistic
deceit subscale contains fifteen items related to faking orgasm out of concern for a
partner’s feelings. Participants are prompted with the question “How often do you fake
orgasm for the following reasons?” Example items from this subscale include “So your
partner doesn’t feel guilty if you don’t have a real orgasm?” and “So your partner isn’t
embarrassed if you don’t have a real orgasm?” Items are rated on a 15-item Likert-type
scale anchored at never (scored at 1) and always (5). Higher scores reflect greater
endorsement of pleasing a partner as the reason for faking orgasm. In a sample of 481
female undergraduate participants, the altruistic deceit subscale demonstrated strong
internal consistency (⍺ = .96) and was positively associated with other reasons for faking
orgasm (Cooper et al., 2014) as well as attachment avoidance and anxiety (Láng et al.,
2020).

5.1.2.5.3

Female Sexual Subjectivity Inventory

The Female Sexual Subjectivity Inventory (FSSI; Horne & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2006)
consists of 20 items with five subscales. For the purposes of this study, we employed the
entitlement to sexual pleasure from partner (e.g., “I think it is important for a sexual
partner to consider my sexual pleasure”) and self (e.g., “I believe self-masturbating can
be an exciting experience) subscales. Items were rated on a 5-point Likert scale anchored
at not at all true of me (scored at 1) and very true of me (5). Items are averaged, with
higher scores reflecting more entitlement to sexual pleasure. In a sample of 449 young
women between the ages of 16 and 20, these subscales demonstrated acceptable internal
consistency (⍺ = .78–.91), and positive links with sexual consciousness, safe sex selfefficacy, resistance to the sexual double standard, and self-esteem, and negative links
with self-silencing in intimate relationships (Horne & Zimmer-Gembeck, 2006).
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5.1.3

Procedure

Ethics approval was granted from Western University’s Non-Medical Research Ethics
Board. Participants were recruited via social media. Specifically, I posted a recruitment
advertisement to my personal Twitter account with a link to the Qualtrics survey, which
hosted the study. Interested participants clicked the link to the survey and responded to a
series of screening questions to determine eligibility. Participants who indicated that they
identified as women, were above the age of 18, and passed a reCAPTCHA verification
test were shown a Letter of Information and indicated their consent to participate by
selecting a box that read, “I understand what is being asked of me, and I consent to
participate in this research.” Participants then responded to the measures listed above,
which were presented in a counterbalanced order, followed by a standard demographics
questionnaire. Following completion of the demographics survey, participants were
shown a debriefing form and thanked for their participation. Participation was completely
voluntary.

5.2 Results
5.2.1

Preliminary Analyses

Confirmatory Factor Analysis was conducted using JASP 0.11.01. All other analyses
were conducted using SPSS 25.0. Given that less than 0.10% of the data was missing, I
did not impute missing values (Parent, 2013).

5.2.2

Confirmatory Factor Analysis

I subjected the 35 FSIS to a CFA to examine the six-factor model in this new sample.
CFA was appropriate in this case because a factor structure had been predetermined, and
a substantial portion of the factor structure had been confirmed in Study 3 (see Bandalos
& Finney, 2019; Orçan, 2018). Anticipating correlated factors, I used a direct oblimin
rotation with maximum likelihood, which allowed for the latent variables to correlate.
Similar to the criteria applied for evaluating the fit in Study 3, fit was again assessed
using Hu and Bentler’s (1999) recommendations (CFI > .95, TLI > .95, RMSEA < .06,
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SRMR < .08). In addition to reporting on the chi-square goodness of fit statistic, which is
sensitive to sample size and violations of assumptions of multivariate normality, I used
the ratio of the chi-square to the degrees of freedom as another index of fit. Hoelter
(1983) suggested that a ratio of 2.00 or less indicates a good fit for the hypothesized
model, while Marsh and Hocevar (1985) suggested that a ratio within the 2.00 to 5.00
range indicates an adequately fitting model. The GFI (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 192) is an
index of the amount of variance/covariance information that can be accounted for by the
hypothesized model. GFI values can range from .00 to 1.00, with higher values reflecting
better fitting models.
The six-factor model was a fairly good fit to the data, CFI = .91, TLI = .90, GFI = .80,
RMSEA = .07 [90% CI = .07, .08], SRMR = .06, χ2 (511) = 1615.421, p < .001, χ2/df =
3.16. All items loaded significantly on their respective factor (p <.001), and none of the
confidence intervals for these loadings included zero. The standardized factor
covariances between the subscales ranged from -.67 (Centrality with Uncertainty) to .84
(Centrality with Solidarity). Given that no covariances were greater than .9, these patterns
suggest that each factor captured a distinct component of feminist identity.
Given that the six-factor model with 35 items produced only a fairly good fit to the data,
and that five items were added to clarify the Solidarity factor, I examined the
modification indices to determine whether any of the Solidarity items had high crossloadings with items on other subscales that would warrant their removal. Removing items
was an iterative process of examining modification indices and considering the relevance
of the item. See Table 11 for the steps followed in the removal of five of the items. With
a 5-item Solidarity subscale, the six-factor model was a better fit to the data, CFI = .93,
TLI = .92, GFI = .84, RMSEA = .07, [90% CI = .06, .07], SRMR = .05,
χ2 (390) = 115.63, p < .001, χ2/df = 2.96.
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Table 11. Rationale for Deletion of Solidarity Items for Study 4
Label

Reason

X2/df

CFI

TLI

RMSEA

SRMR

3.11

.91

.90

.06

36.09

2.90

.92

.91

25.72

2.91

.92

.92

24.56

2.89

.93

.92

19.10

2.90

.93

.92

15.54

2.96

.93

.92

.07
[.07, .08]
.07
[.06, .07]
.07
[.06, .07]
.07
[06, .07]
.07
[.06, .07]
.07
[.06, .07]

Modification
index

Original
Remove
item 20
Remove
item 15
Remove
item 5
Remove
item 22
Remove
item 3

Cross-loading
with Centrality
Cross-loading
Beliefs
Cross-loading
with Beliefs
Cross-loading
with Centrality
Cross-loading
with Beliefs

.05
.05
.05
.05
.05

Given that the values for CFI and TLI were somewhat lower than would be desired, and
RMSEA was somewhat higher, I again examined the modification indices to determine if
a simple revision would improve the model fit. Notably, two items on the Fear of Stigma
subscale (Fear of Stigma Item 1 “I worry how people would react if I said I were a
feminist” and Fear of Stigma Item 2, “I fear that I would be mocked if I told people that I
am a feminist”) shared high residual variance (MI = 172.26). Given that Fear of Stigma
Item 1 also shared variance to a high degree with other items, this item was removed,
resulting in a four-item Fear of Stigma subscale. With the deletion of item 6, the sixfactor was a good fit to the data, CFI = .95, TLI = .94, GFI = .86, RMSEA = .06, [90% CI
= .06, .07], SRMR = .05, χ2 (362) = 949.725, p < .001, χ2/df = 2.62. For a visual depiction
of the 29-item FSIS, see Figure 4. The final 29-item FSIS can be found in Appendix C.
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Figure 4. Visual Depiction of Confirmatory Factor Analysis for the 29-item FSIS for Study 4
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Mean scores and standard deviations for each of the subscales can be found in Tables 11
and 12. Items on the FSIS are rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale, so a score of 3.50
represents the midpoint. Means for the aligned identity subscales were all above the
midpoint, with the highest mean value for Beliefs (M = 4.98, SD = .71), followed by
Competence (M = 4.80, SD = .97), Solidarity (M = 4.32, SD = .93), and Centrality
(M = 4.06, SD = 1.25). The means for the ambivalent identity dimensions fell below the
midpoint: Fear of Stigma had a mean of 2.72 (SD = 1.17), and Uncertainty had a mean of
2.18 (SD = .92). For Beliefs, Centrality, Fear of Stigma, and Uncertainty, mean values
ranged from 1.00 to 6.00. For competence, values ranged from 1.40 to 6.00, and for
Solidarity, scores ranged from 1.20 to 6.00. Scales are considered to demonstrate internal
consistency if their alpha values are .70 or above. In this sample, Cronbach’s alphas
ranged from .84 (Uncertainty) to .92 (Competence, Centrality), supporting each
subscale’s internal consistency reliability. Data is generally regarded as normally
distributed as long as skewness values do not exceed |2| and kurtosis values do not exceed
|7| (Byrne, 2010). Skewness and kurtosis values did not exceed these values, suggesting
that all subscales were normally distributed.

5.2.3

Bivariate Correlations

To evaluate convergent validity of the FSIS subscale scores, I examined the bivariate
correlations between the FSIS scales and the above-mentioned measures related to
gendered norms and attitudes (See Tables 12 and 13). Each of the FSIS subscales were
correlated with one another in the expected directions, with the link between Centrality
and Solidarity demonstrating the strongest association (r = .85, p < .001), and Fear of
Stigma and Beliefs demonstrating the weakest association (r = -.25, p < .001).

5.2.3.1

Feminist Self-Identification and Sexist Attitudes

See Tables 12 and 13 for means, standard deviations, alphas, and bivariate correlations
between key study variables. Providing support for Hypothesis 1a, Beliefs, Competence,
Solidarity, and Centrality were all significantly and positively associated with feminist
self-identification, suggesting that higher scores on these subscales were associated with
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a more explicit labelling of oneself as a feminist. Hostile sexism was significantly and
negatively associated with Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality, supporting
Hypothesis 1b. Benevolent sexism was significantly and negatively associated with
Beliefs, Competence, and Centrality, but not Solidarity (r = -.08, p = .11), providing
partial support for Hypothesis 1c.
Supporting Hypothesis 2a, the Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty subscales were
significantly and negatively associated with feminist identification. These subscales were
also significantly and positively associated with both hostile and benevolent sexism,
providing support for Hypotheses 2b and 2c.
To replicate and extend the patterns found in Study 2, I ran bivariate correlations between
the individual items of the Self-Identification as a Feminist Scale (Szymanski, 2004) and
the FSIS subscales to explore their associations. The patterns identified in this analysis
provide additional support for the findings in Study 2. The aligned identity subscales (i.e.,
Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) were significantly and positively associated
with importance of feminism (rs = .49–.57, ps <.001), support for feminist goals (rs =
.43–.59, ps <.001), private feminist identification (rs = .54–.59, ps <.001), and public
feminist identification (rs = .46–.68, ps <.001) . The ambivalent identity subscales (i.e.,
Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty, ps <.001) were significantly and negatively associated with
importance of feminism (rs = -.14– -.48, ps <.001), support for feminist goals (rs = - .17–
-.42), ps <.001), private feminist identification (rs = -.15–-.59, ps <.001), and public
feminist identification (rs = -.38– -.59, ps <.001).
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Table 12. Means, Standard Deviations, Alphas, and Bivariate Correlations for FSIS Subscales and Gender-Related Attitudes
for Study 4
1.

Beliefs

1
-

2

2.

Competence

.61***

-

.72***

.78***

.67

4.

Centrality

.62***
-.22

***
***

-.40

***

-.64

***

-.21

-.32***

-.54

***

***

Uncertainty

-.55

7.

Self-Identification

.66***

.61***

.64***

8.

Hostile sexism

-.54***

-.37***

-.37***

***

***

Benevolent sexism

-.20

10. Beauty as currency

-.09

11. Broad beauty

.08

12. Sex is power
13. Body hair attitudes

-.18

***

-.20

***

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

-.19

-

***

6.

9.

5

.59***

Solidarity

Fear of Stigma

4

***

3.

5.

3

.44***

-

.64***

-.27***

-.61***

-

-.40***

.16**

.47***

-.52***

**

***

***

-.64

**

-.08

-.13

-.10*

-.09

-.07

.17**

.17***

.16**

.24***

.23***

-.13**

-.15**

-.21

***

-.21

***

-.10

*

-.23

***

-.14

**

-.23

***

.13

.12

**

.23

***

.27

.23

***

.29

***

.44***

-

-.10**

.23***

.31***

-

.15**

-.18**

-.16**

-.32***

.30

***

.25

***

.35

***

.33

***

-.20

-.21

***

-.34

***

.35

***

.35

***

-.04
-.38

***

.23***

-Mean

4.98

4.80

4.32

4.06

2.72

2.18

4.53

1.49

2.09

1.89

6.19

3.96

2.10

Standard deviation

.71

.97

.93

1.25

1.17

.92

.67

.57

.76

.76

.68

1.00

.65

Cronbach’s alpha

.90

.92

.87

.92

.92

.84

.88

.82

.80

.67

.78

.87

.81

Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.
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Table 13. Means, Standard Deviations, Alphas, and Bivariate Correlations for FSIS Subscales and Body-Image and Sexuality
Attitudes for Study 4
1

2

3

1.

Beliefs

-

2.

Competence

.61*** -

3.

Solidarity

.67*** .59***
***

.72

***

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

.78***

Centrality

.62

5.

Fear of Stigma

-.22*** -.40*** -.21*** -.32*** -

6.

Uncertainty

-.55*** -.64*** -.54*** -.64*** .44***

-

7.

Menstruation

.06

.04

-.02

.005

.06

-.02

-

8.

Internalized Weight Stigma

.04

-.04

.04

.04

.15**

.06

.23***

-

9.

Makeup Use

.03

.02

.09

.07

.07

-.02

-.03

.19***

-

10. Cosmetic Surgery

-.02

.01

.04

.02

.09

.06

.05

.27**

.36**

-

11. Eating Attitudes

-.07

-.05

.001

-.001

.19**

.10*

.10*

.63**

.21**

.18**

**

*

*

-.01

-.07

-.002

-.004

.20

13. Fear of Being Single

.13**

-.21**

-.10

-.13*

.19**

.21**

14. Pleasure - Self

.11*

.12*

.15**

.17**

-.11*

-.16** -.10*

*

**

**

.12

.13

.16

-.05

-.08

-.01

.07

.05

.10

Mean

4.98

4.80

4.32

4.06

Standard deviation

.71

.97

.93

Cronbach’s alpha

.90

.92

.87

16. Faking Orgasm

Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.

14

15

16

-

12. Self-Objectification

.08

13

-

4.

15. Pleasure - Partner

12

*

.12

-.15

.12

**

-.01

-.02

.60

***

.27***

.40

***

.16**

-.14** -.08
-.10

*

**

.06
.15

.22

***

.17**

.58*** .25*** .38***

-.22** -.06
-.10

**

-

.11

*

*

-.01
.20

***

-.08
-.01
.26

***

-.16**

-

.

.15

**

***

.22

.11

*

.05

.05

-

-

.07

.06

.14

2.72

2.18

5.15

3.56

3.10

2.10

2.31

2.80

2.44

4.70

4.51

1.79

1.25

1.17

.92

1.20

1.49

.94

.65

.56

.73

1.15

.54

.64

.88

.92

.92

.84

.93

.82

.82

.81

.90

.87

.66

.82

.96

.90
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5.2.3.2

Feminine Beauty and Power Beliefs

Mixed support was found for Hypotheses 3a-d. Supporting Hypothesis 3a, Competence,
Solidarity, and Centrality were significantly and positively associated with having a
broad conceptualization of beauty; however, no link was detected between Beliefs and
broad conceptualization of beauty (r = -.08, p = .12). Hypothesis 3b was fully supported:
Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality were all significantly and positively
associated with acceptance of body hair on women. Hypothesis 3c was fully supported:
Each aligned identity subscale was significantly associated with body hair attitudes in the
expected directions. Hypothesis 3d was partially supported: Competence was
significantly and negatively related to beauty as currency beliefs (r = -.10, p = .04), but
Beliefs, Solidarity, and Centrality were not associated with this construct.
Hypotheses 4a-d were all supported: Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty were both
significantly negatively associated with endorsing a narrower conceptualization of beauty
and acceptance of body hair on women, and positively associated with perceiving beauty
as a form of social currency for women and viewing sex as a legitimate form of social
power for women.

5.2.3.3

Self- and Body-Image

Hypotheses 5a-f were not supported in this analysis. Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and
Centrality were not significantly associated with menstrual attitudes, makeup use,
endorsement of cosmetic surgery, internalized weight stigma, self-objectification, or
disordered eating. Hypotheses 6a-f received mixed support. Fear of Stigma and
Uncertainty were unrelated to menstrual attitudes, makeup use, and endorsement of
cosmetic surgery. These findings do not support Hypothesis 6a-c. Partial support was
found for Hypothesis 6d. Fear of Stigma was significantly and positively associated with
internalized weight stigma (r = .15, p = .003), but Uncertainty was unrelated to this
construct (r = .06, p = .21). Hypotheses 6e and 6f were supported: both Fear of Stigma
and Uncertainty were significantly and positively associated with self-objectification and
disordered eating attitudes.
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5.2.3.4

Sexual and Relationship Attitudes

Hypothesis 7a-d and 8 a-d were partially supported in this sample. Hypothesis 7a was
fully supported: Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality were all significantly and
positively associated with entitlement to pleasure from one’s self. Hypothesis 7b, sense of
entitlement to pleasure from one’s partner, was only partially supported. While
Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality were significantly and positively associated with
this construct, no significant association was found for Beliefs (r = .08, p = .12).
Hypothesis 7a was partially supported: Beliefs, Competence, Centrality were all
significantly and negatively associated with fear of being single. However, Solidarity
trended in the same direction (r = -.10, p = .05) but did not meet the traditional p < .05
significance level. Hypothesis 7d was not supported in this sample: Willingness to fake
orgasm was not significantly associated with Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, or
Centrality.
Hypotheses 8a-d similarly received mixed support. Hypothesis 8a was fully supported:
Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty were both significantly and negatively associated with
entitlement to pleasure from oneself. Uncertainty was significantly and negatively
associated with entitlement to pleasure from one’s partner (r = -.15, p = .003), but Fear of
Stigma was unrelated to this construct (r = -.05, p - .36), providing partial support for
Hypothesis 8b. Hypothesis 8c was fully supported: Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty were
both significantly and positively related to fear of being single. Partial support was found
for Hypothesis 8d: Fear of Stigma was positively related to faking orgasm (r = .10, p =
.04), but Uncertainty was not significantly associated with this construct (r = .07, p =
.18).

5.3 Discussion
In this study, I confirmed the six-factor structure of the 29-item Feminist Social Identity
Scale (FSIS) in a large sample of women recruited from social media. The six-factor
structure demonstrated an acceptable fit to the data, and includes the following

109

dimensions to assess modern feminist social identity: Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity,
Centrality, Fear of Stigma, and Uncertainty.
This study also provided insight into the associations between these dimensions of
feminist social identity and other gender, body, and sexuality-related variables, providing
additional evidence of convergent validity for the FSIS. The aligned identity subscale
scores (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) were negatively associated with
hostile and benevolent sexism and positively associated with feminist identification,
supporting the tool’s convergent validity. The aligned identity subscales’ negative links
to hostile sexism are unsurprising: any measure of progressive gender attitudes should
show negative associations with blatantly sexist attitudes. However, given benevolent
sexism is harder to detect (Becker & Swim, 2011; Becker et al., 2014) and that many
women – even feminist women – prefer benevolently sexist partners (Bohner et al., 2010;
Gul & Kupfer, 2018) and view benevolent sexism as flattering (Hopkins-Doyle et al.,
2019), it is noteworthy that each of these subscales also showed significant negative links
with benevolent sexism. The ambivalent identity subscale scores (i.e., Fear of Stigma,
Uncertainty) demonstrated the reverse pattern. Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty appear to
reflect the more ambivalent parts of a modern feminist social identity that are associated
with endorsement of sexist attitudes
These results also suggest that, while feminist women may be conscious of social
restrictions on women and have more open and supportive attitudes toward other women
(i.e., social-body attitudes), these attitudes may not necessarily be internalized (i.e.,
personal-body attitudes; see Rubin et al., 2004). Aligned identity subscales (Beliefs,
Competence, Centrality, and Solidarity) were – to varying degrees – significantly
associated with adopting a broader conceptualization of beauty than what is portrayed in
the media, and less agreement with the belief that women’s beauty and sexuality reflect
legitimate forms of social power. Feminist uncertainty and fear of stigma demonstrated
reverse patterns. Both subscales were significantly and positively associated with the
belief that beauty is a form of social currency and that sex is a form of power for women.
They were also significantly and negatively related to a broadened conceptualization of
women’s beauty.
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Unlike the aligned identity subscales, the ambivalent feminist subscales were
significantly and negatively linked with self-objectification and disordered eating
attitudes, and positively linked to attitudes that body hair is undesirable. Fear of Stigma
was significantly associated with internalized weight stigma. What these patterns suggest
is that the aligned components of feminist social identity may not necessarily be
associated with less personal support for traditional and restrictive societal feminine
beauty ideals, but feminist uncertainty and fear of stigma may actually be positively
associated with these constructs. Put another way, aligned dimensions of feminist identity
may not necessarily provide any additional protection above neutral attitudes; however,
ambivalent identity dimensions may restrict women’s capacity to experience full
embodiment due to the influence of gendered societal body attitudes.
I also examined associations between FSIS subscales and sexuality-related variables. In
contrast to the self- and body image variables, holding aligned identity attitudes did seem
to correspond with more positive experiences in this domain. Specifically, aligned
identity subscales were associated with less fear of being single and more entitlement to
sexual pleasure from oneself and one’s partner. Ambivalent identity subscales
demonstrated the opposite pattern, and Fear of Stigma was associated with more faking
orgasm to please a partner. Aligned identity subscales’ links to less fear of being single is
significant because it puts a positive spin on a negative stereotype about feminists,
specifically that they are “unfuckable” (see Study 2). Indeed, one stereotype about
feminists is that they are less likely to be in romantic relationships (Rudman & Phelan,
2007); however, research suggests that feminist women are no less likely to be in
romantic relationships than their non-feminist counterparts (Rudman & Phelan), and
these findings suggest that feminist women may be less likely to pursue or maintain
unhealthy relationships out of fear of being single. Greater comfort with being single has
been associated with less willingness to lower one’s standards for a partner, less
dependence on a partner, and more satisfying romantic relationships (Spielmann et al.,
2013). Feminist women’s comfort with being single may reflect a rejection of harmful,
traditionally gendered romantic and sexual scripts.
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The links between FSIS subscales and entitlement to pleasure is noteworthy because
there is an oft-cited “gap” in orgasm frequency among women and men in heterosexual
relationships (Lentz & Zaikman, 2021; Mahar et al., 2020; Mintz, 2017). Feminist
women have been found to be more sexually motivated and erotophilic, compared to their
nonfeminist and non-labeller counterparts (Bay-Cheng & Zucker, 2007; Schick et al.,
2008), and these findings support this pattern. However, fear of feminist stigma scores
were also associated with more likelihood of faking orgasm for their partners’ sake,
perhaps reflecting a general desire to present one’s self in a manner that is pleasing and
desirable to the male gaze. Uncertainty’s significant negative correlation with entitlement
to pleasure from one’s partner may reflect a sense of ambivalence about traditional
gender roles and norms and an inability to dispel sexual scripts, including the sexual
double standard. Both Uncertainty and Fear of Stigma were significantly and negatively
associated with entitlement to pleasure from one’s self, suggesting that women with
ambivalent feminist identities may still be holding onto some norms of femininity, such
as sexual fidelity – a finding that is consistent with other studies (Siegel & Calogero,
2019). Given that women who engage in solo sexual activities regularly find the
experience to be sexually empowering (Bowman, 2013), the traditionally gendered
attitudes associated with feminist ambivalence may serve as a barrier to women
embracing their sexuality and coming to enjoy their bodies.

5.3.1

Limitations and Next Steps

While this study has a number of strengths, it is not without its limitations. Despite a
broad recruitment strategy, the sample was overwhelmingly White and well-educated.
Indeed, the sample was over 80% White, and over 60% responded that they had at least a
graduate education. This is likely due to the fact that the recruitment advertisement was
initially shared on a popular academic Twitter account and then reshared on LinkedIn and
Facebook by a well-known feminist entrepreneur. Another limitation that was
acknowledged by participants was that there was no option to indicate if participants did
not menstruate at all, potentially limiting the interpretability of the findings using this
scale. Given that the Menstrual Attitudes Scale did not significantly correlate with any of
the FSIS subscales, this leaves open the possibility that menstrual attitudes may, in fact,
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show some links to feminist identity, and future research should examine feminist
identity in relation to a variety of different attitudes regarding menstruation, not merely a
sense that menstruation is bothersome.

5.3.2

Conclusion

In this chapter, I provided support for the six-factor structure of the 29-item Feminist
Social Identity Scale (FSIS). Specifically, the aligned identity subscales (i.e., Beliefs,
Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) tap into various components of feminist identity that
constitute a committed and consistent feminist orientation. The ambivalent identity
subscales (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty) tap into feelings of insecurity or lack of
confidence around being a feminist. Given that some women may hold ambivalent
feminist identities, this measure advances and updates the psychological study of modern
feminist social identity by allowing for the simultaneous evaluation of both commitment
and resistance to being a feminist.
This study also provided evidence for the FSIS subscales’ links with feminist selfidentification and sexist attitudes, feminine beauty and power beliefs, self- and body
image, and sexual and relationship attitudes. The findings from this study suggest that the
FSIS’s six-factor structure fits the data well and that the aligned identity dimensions of
the FSIS are linked to less support for traditionally gendered attitudes and behaviours for
women in general; however, these links did not always hold for women’s own body
related attitudes and behaviours. This pattern is consistent with other research suggesting
that feminist women’s awareness of these pressures does not make them any less real or
legitimate for themselves. However, the aligned identity dimensions were generally
positively associated with empowered and independent sexuality- and relationship-related
attitudes, suggesting that women’s social and interpersonal attitudes may translate into
their romantic and sexual relationships. The ambivalent identity dimensions were
generally associated with more traditionally gendered social and personal attitudes.
This pattern of results provides support for the convergent validity of the FSIS.
Specifically, these results suggest that aligned dimensions of feminist identity are
associated with more rejection of traditional feminine attitudes, norms, and expectations,
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whereas the ambivalent dimensions of feminist identity are associated with more support
for these norms – for others and for oneself. Ambivalent dimensions of feminist social
identity were also significantly and positively associated with some measures associated
with self- and body-image, such as disordered eating and self-objectification; yet the
aligned identity dimensions were unrelated to these attitudes and behaviours. This
supports feminist theorizing (see Calogero & Thompson, 2010; Engeln, 2017; Wolf,
1991) and past research (e.g., Rubin et al., 2004), suggesting that having a strong feminist
social identity does not change the day-to-day reality or impact of living in an
appearance-centric and sexually objectifying culture. Indeed, the ambivalent dimensions
of feminist social identity may have an adverse influence on women.
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Chapter 6

6

Study 5: Further Examination of External Validity of the
FSIS with Gender and Racial Behaviours

In this study, I examined convergent, incremental, criterion, and known-groups validity
for the FSIS in a sample of White women. I tested the scale’s convergent validity by
examining the correlations between the FSIS subscales and willingness to engage in both
feminist and anti-racist activism, as well as willingness to intervene in racist and sexist
situations. I then evaluated whether the FSIS subscales had incremental validity for
predicting feminist action willingness above hostile and benevolent sexism. I also
examined whether the FSIS subscales could predict willingness to intervene in racist
situations and participation in racial collective action above awareness of White privilege.
Criterion validity was evaluated by regressing the percentage of their compensation that
participants were willing to donate to a feminist organization on the FSIS subscales. To
evaluate known-groups validity, I tested whether feminist-identified women scored
differently on the FSIS subscales, compared to women who endorse feminist attitudes but
who do not use the feminist label, as well as non-feminist women.

6.1

Introduction

6.1.1 Feminist Identity and Feminist Activism: Tests of Convergent,
Incremental, and Criterion Validity
Consistent with the Social Identity Model of Collective Action (van Zomeren et al.,
2008), it is well-established that feminist self-labeling is a robust predictor of feminist
behaviours, often above other relevant dimensions of feminist attitudes including feminist
beliefs, as well as implicit and explicit attitudes about feminists (e.g., Conlin &
Heesacker, 2019; Conlin et al., 2019; Duncan, 2010; Liss et al., 2004; Nelson et al., 2008;
Redford et al., 2018; Reid & Purcell, 2004; Weis et al., 2018; Yoder et al., 2011; Zucker,
2004; see also Radke et al., 2016). Further, feminist beliefs and feminist self-
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identification have been linked to willingness to intervene in sexist situations (Weis et al.,
2018). Therefore, it is likely that the aligned identity subscales of the FSIS will positively
predict feminist activism and willingness to intervene in sexist situations.
However, ambivalence about one’s feminist identity could disrupt the link between
feminist attitudes and feminist activism (Conlin et al., 2019). A recent study explored the
effects of feminist ambivalence, or “bad feminism,” on feminist activist behaviours
(Conlin et al., 2019). In a sample of 333 MTurk workers with strong feminist beliefs,
inconsistencies in feminist beliefs, knowledge, and behaviours mediated the relation
between feminist attitudes (e.g., feminist self-labeling) and behaviours (e.g., collective
action). Therefore, it is expected that ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear
of Stigma, Uncertainty) may be negatively associated with feminist activism and
willingness to intervene in sexist situations. Given that sexist beliefs should have a
strong, negative correlation with feminist beliefs, I did not make hypotheses about
incremental validity of the Beliefs subscale beyond the variance explained by hostile and
benevolent sexism. As such, I hypothesized that:
H1) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity,
Centrality) would be negatively associated with (a) hostile and (b) benevolent sexism,
and positively associated with (c) willingness to intervene in instances of sexist situations
and (d) feminist activism.
H2) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty)
would be positively associated with (a) hostile and (b) benevolent sexism, and negatively
associated with (c) willingness to intervene in instances of sexist situations and (d)
feminist activism.
H3) Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality would predict engagement in (a) willingness
to intervene in sexist situations and (b) feminist activism above hostile and benevolent
sexism.
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H4) Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty would negatively predict engagement in (a)
willingness to intervene in sexist situations and (b) feminist activism above hostile and
benevolent sexism.
Further, tests of criterion validity are important for psychological research because
responses on self-report measures are influenced by a variety of factors such as social
desirability, demand characteristics, and perceived goals of the study (Haeffel & Howard,
2010). In the context of this study, people may overestimate their willingness to intervene
in sexist situations or exaggerate their past feminist behaviours. However, they may be
less willing to actually participate in feminist behaviours. One behaviour of particular
importance is donation to organizations doing work to support survivors of sexual and
domestic violence, such as the Rape, Abuse, and Incest, National Network (RAINN).
While people may report that they would be willing to donate to a feminist organization,
when faced with the choice to actually donate their compensation to such an organization,
they may choose not to, particularly if they are ambivalent about their feminist identities.
Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) posits that people who belong to a social
ingroup should be willing to engage in behaviours that support their social group. One
would expect, then, that the aligned dimensions of feminist identity (i.e., Beliefs,
Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) would be associated with more willingness to donate,
whereas the Uncertainty may be associated with less willingness to donate. Given that
donation is a private activity, Fear of Stigma should be unrelated to donation amount.
Therefore, I hypothesized that:
H5) The aligned FSIS subscales (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) would
be associated with donating more compensation to a feminist organization.
H6) Uncertainty, but not Fear of Stigma, would be negatively associated with donating
more compensation to a feminist organization.
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6.1.2 Feminist Identity and Anti-Racism: Tests of Convergent and
Incremental Validity
In recent years, there has been increased attention to the concept of intersectional
feminism (Crenshaw, 1991), or the recognition that women who face multiple forms of
marginalization experience sexism in a manner that is qualitatively different than women
who sit at only one axis of oppression. Understanding the links between dimensions of
feminist identity and attitudes toward racial justice is important because the feminist
movement has a long history of ignoring the needs, desires, and demands of non-White
women (See Breins, 2006). As a notable example, during the “first wave” of feminism,
when suffragettes advocated for voting rights for women, many advocated exclusively for
White women (Taylor, 1998). However, White women have been reluctant to support
causes that affect Black women for decades (Breins, 2006; Taylor, 1998), and this
remains a persistent problem today. In fact, White women’s casual racism has become
such a widespread phenomenon that at least two meme-based archetypes have
proliferated in recent years – Beckys (i.e., White women being suspicious of Black
people in public spaces) and Karens (i.e., calling the police on Black people for no
discernable reason; Williams, 2020).
White women who are keyed into social justice have the potential to be strong advocates
and allies for anti-racism. However, history suggests this is not always the case. One
potential reason why some people who identify as feminists may not explicitly advocate
for racial justice is because they are unaware of racial injustice. White privilege refers to
the “invisible package of unearned assets” (McIntosh, 1989, p, 291) that White people are
born into simply because of the colour of their skin. People who are born White benefit
from a considerable advantage in society, as they are not subjected to the same structural,
systemic, institutional, and interpersonal racism that Black people and People of Colour
face. However, White people – and all dominant groups – may not be able to recognize
the privilege they experience on the basis of the colour of their skin. In fact, group
identity is less salient for those who are privileged in society, compared to those who are
not (Pratto & Stewart, 2012), and White women – even those who hold feminist attitudes
– may not recognize the ways that racial justice and feminist justice are intertwined.
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However, it is possible that different dimensions of feminist identity may be uniquely
linked to White privilege awareness and participation in racial collective action. Feminist
beliefs are typically not a strong measure of willingness to participate in activism (see
Conlin et al., 2019). However, higher scores on the other aligned identity subscales (i.e.,
Competence, Solidarity, Centrality) may reflect an awareness of social justice issues and
a commitment to advocacy. Women who feel a sense of solidarity with other feminists
may feel closer to women of all racial backgrounds and be more likely to advocate in
support of Black women. Similarly, women who feel they are competent in engaging in
feminist behaviours may also feel competent to engage in behaviours related to racial
justice. Those who see feminism as sitting at the core of who they are as a person may be
more likely to see all social activism as personally important.
On the other hand, the ambivalent identity dimensions (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty)
may negatively predict willingness to engage in racial collective action and intervene in
racist situations. Uncertainty about one’s feminist identity (e.g., “I feel confused when I
think about whether or not I am a feminist”) may be grounded in either a lack of
knowledge about social justice or mixed feelings about gender equality, and those who
are afraid of experiencing stigma for their feminist values (e.g., “I fear that I would be
mocked if I told people that I am a feminist”) may similarly fear the potential backlash
they may elicit through participation in behaviours that support racial justice.
Therefore, I hypothesized that:
H7) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity,
Centrality) would be positively associated with (a) White privilege awareness, (b) racial
collective action, and (c) willingness to intervene in racist situations.
H8) The ambivalent identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Fear of Stigma, Uncertainty)
would be negatively associated with (a) White privilege awareness, (b) racial collective
action, and (c) willingness to intervene in racist situations.
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H9) The aligned identity subscales of the FSIS (i.e., Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity,
Centrality) would positively predict (a) willingness to intervene in racist situations and
(b) racial collective action, above White privilege awareness.
H10) The ambivalent identity dimensions (i.e., Uncertainty, Fear of Stigma) would
negatively predict (a) willingness to intervene in racist situations and (b) racial collective
action, above White privilege awareness.

6.1.3 Feminist Identity and the Importance of Labelling: Testing
Known-Groups Validity
While feminist self-identification is an important predictor of collective action, some
women are reluctant to label themselves as feminists, a phenomenon so prevalent it has
been termed the “I’m not a feminist, but…” phenomenon or the “feminist paradox” (see
Dottolo, 2011; Radke et al., 2016). Women’s reluctance to adopt a feminist identity – or
their ambivalence with the feminist label – has implications for their relationship with
feminism more broadly. For example, in a study by Duncan (2010), women who felt
uncertain about the feminist label expressed less commitment to feminism, compared to
women who confidently self-identified as feminists. In Zucker’s (2004) research, nonlabellers (i.e., women who support feminist principles but do not use the term to describe
themselves) scored significantly lower on measures of feminist activism, compared to
those who labelled themselves as feminists. In fact, this group showed levels of interest in
feminist activism similar to non-feminists (Zucker, 2004; Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010).
Zucker and Bay-Cheng (2010) have noted that it is important for future research to
determine the roots of feminist non-labellers’ ambivalence. Therefore, I hypothesized
that:
H11) Women who label themselves as feminists will score higher on (a) Beliefs, (b)
Competence, (c) Solidarity, and (d) Centrality, compared to non-labellers and nonfeminists.
H12) Women categorized as feminist non-labellers will score higher on (a) Fear of
Stigma and (b) Uncertainty, compared to feminists and non-feminists.
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6.2

Method

6.2.1 Participants and Procedure
One hundred and fifty women were initially recruited for the study via Prolific Academic.
Prolific Academic is a website where individuals can register to participate in survey
research. Prolific is different from other recruitment platforms in that equitable
remuneration is required. Unlike MTurk, participants are required to be compensated at
least $6 USD/hour. Data from Prolific is generally of higher quality than data from other
online recruitment platforms (Peer et al., 2017).
In order to be eligible, participants needed to indicate that they identified as women, were
located in the United States, were over the age of 18, and spoke fluent English. Eligible
participants were shown a recruitment advertisement, which directed them to a Qualtrics
survey. We aimed to recruit 150 participants. When participants clicked the Qualtrics
link, they confirmed that they met eligibility criteria. They were then shown the letter of
information and indicated their consent by clicking a box that said that they had read the
letter and agree to participate. Participants responded to the scales below, which were
presented in a counterbalanced order, followed by a standard demographics
questionnaire. Once all survey measures were completed, a debriefing form appeared on
the screen, along with a code that was to be entered on the Prolific platform. Participants
who entered the code received $1.20 ($6/hour for 12 minute survey) as remuneration for
their time.
Several attention checks were embedded in the survey. Six participants were excluded for
failing at least one of the three attention checks. Therefore, the final sample size was 144
White women. One hundred and twenty-six women (87.5%) identified as cisgender, two
identified as transgender (1.4%), and 11 indicated that they would prefer not to say
(7.6%). Five participants (3.5%) did not respond to this question. All participants
indicated that they were European American or White and none identified as Hispanic or
Latinx. Most of the sample (n = 97, 667.4%) identified as heterosexual or straight, and
others identified as bisexual (n = 27, 18.8%), asexual or demisexual (n = 7, 4.9%),
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lesbian or gay (n = 5, 3.5%), queer (n = 2, 1.4%), pansexual (n = 2, 1.4%), questioning (n
= 1, 0.7%), and one (0.7%) participant indicated that their sexual orientation was not
listed. Two participants (1.4%) indicated that they would prefer not to say.
A majority of participants (n = 57, 39.6%) indicated that they were married, with others
indicating that they were single (n = 38, 26.4%), in a long-term relationship (n = 25,
17.4%), engaged (n = 8, 5.6%), dating (n = 7, 4.9%), divorced (n = 6, 4.2%), and one
participant indicated that they preferred not to say (0.7%). Participants also varied in their
educational backgrounds. Fifty participants (34.7%) had completed a Bachelor’s degree,
41 (28.5%) had completed some college or university, 23 (16.0%) had completed a
graduate degree, 12 (8.3%) had a high school degree, 3 (2.1%) had completed some high
school, and 2 (1.4%) had completed some graduate school.

6.2.2 Materials
6.2.2.1

Feminist Social Identity Scale

A 35-item version of the Feminist Social Identity Scale was administered to all
participants6; however, only the 29-item final version from Study 4 was used for
analyses7. Items are rated on a 6-point Likert-style scale anchored at completely untrue of
me (scored at 1) and completely true of me (6).

6.2.2.2

Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale

The Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale (CBF; Zucker, 2004) evaluates both feminist
attitudes and feminist identification. Specifically, participants indicate whether or not
they agree with three essential feminist beliefs: “Girls and women have not been treated

6

Study 4 was conducted at the same time as Study 3, before the factor structure had been confirmed. As
such, all 35 items were administered.
7

A second confirmatory factor analysis was run using the data from this study. The fit indices supported
the structural validity of the 29-item, six-factor FSIS, CFI = .93, TLI = .92, GFI = .78, RMSEA = .08,
SRMR = .06, x2(362) = 674.24, x2/df = 1.86. While some indices are marginally lower than Hu and
Bentler’s (1999) cutoffs, the modification indices revealed no obvious modifications to improve the overall
fit of the measure.
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as well as boys and men in our society,” “women and men should be paid equally for the
same work,” and “women’s unpaid work should be more socially valued.” After
indicating their agreement with each item, participants select whether they would like to
complete the “feminist” or “non-feminist” version of the survey (a proxy for feminist
identification). Participants who agree with all three attitudinal items and select
“feminist” are labeled as feminists. Those who agree with all three attitudinal items and
select “non-feminist” are categorized as non-labellers. Participants who do not agree with
all three attitudinal items are labeled as non-feminists. In Zucker’s (2004) study with 333
women, 272 participants (81.6%) could be categorized into these three categories: 45% of
women were classified as feminists, 31% were non-labellers, and 24% were nonfeminists.

6.2.2.3

Ambivalent Sexism Inventory

The Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI; Glick & Fiske, 1996) is a 22-item measure that
evaluates two dimensions of sexist attitudes. Items are rated on a 6-point Likert scale
anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 0) and strongly agree (5). The hostile sexism
subscale contains 11 items that measure the extent to which participants hold traditionally
prejudiced attitudes toward women (e.g., Most women interpret innocent remarks or acts
as being sexist). The benevolent sexism subscale contains 11 items that assess
patronizing, condescending, and essentialist beliefs about women (e.g., Women,
compared to men, tend to have a superior moral sensibility). Around the world, in both
community and college samples of men and women, the ASI has demonstrated internal
and test-retest reliability, as well as convergent validity with other measures of prejudiced
attitudes toward women and other minoritized groups (Glick & Fiske, 1996, 2001)

6.2.2.4

Willingness to Intervene in Sexist Situations

The Willingness to Intervene in Everyday Sexism Scale (Weis et al., 2018) is a 6-item
measure that assesses how likely participants are to intervene in instances of both hostile
and benevolent sexism. An example item from the hostile sexism category is “Imagine
that you’re at a party and someone tells a joke that is degrading to women. How willing

123

would you be to speak out against this?” An example item from the benevolent category
is “Imagine that you are on a date with a male partner, and he insists on opening the car
and restaurant doors for you. How willing would you be to speak out against this?” Items
are rated on a 7-point Likert-type scale anchored at very unwilling (scored at 1) and very
willing (7). However, both subscales are averaged to create an overall behavioural
willingness score. In a sample of 428 adult U.S. women, the scale demonstrated adequate
internal consistency reliability (α = .69) and was positively associated with feminist
beliefs and identification (Weis et al., 2018).

6.2.2.5

Willingness to Intervene in Racist Situations

The Willingness to Intervene in Everyday Racism Scale was a modified version of this
scale that evaluated both modern and old-fashioned racism. An example from the modern
racism items is “Imagine that you are in a group of friends and someone states that
discrimination against Black people is no longer a problem in the United States. How
willing would you be to speak out against this?” An example of an old-fashioned racism
item is “Imagine that you are at a costume party and you notice a person in blackface.
How willing would you be to speak out against this?” This scale was designed for the
purposes of this study and used the same scoring system as the Willingness to Intervene
in Everyday Sexism scale above.

6.2.2.6

Privilege and Oppression Inventory - White Privilege
Awareness Subscale

The White Privilege Awareness subscale of the Privilege and Oppression Inventory
(Hays et al., 2007) is a unidimensional, 13-item measure that evaluates respondents’
knowledge about the myriad ways that White people are socially privileged and valued in
Western society. Example items include “The media (e.g., television, radio) favors
Whites” and “I believe that being White is an advantage in society.” Items are rated on a
6-point Likert scale anchored at strongly disagree (scored at 1) and strongly agree (6).
Across two samples of trainees in counselling programs, the subscale demonstrated
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internal consistency, two-week test-retest reliability, and positive associations with
awareness of other forms of privilege and oppression (Hays et al., 2007).

6.2.2.7

Engagement in Feminist and Racial Collective Action

Given that this study was conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic and many in-person
activist behaviours were prohibited due to social distancing, activism measures were
created for the purposes of this study. Each scale contained seven items related to modern
feminist and racial collective action: attended a protest dedicated to a feminist/racial
justice issue, signed a petition in support of a feminist cause/racial justice, donated to a
feminist/anti-racism charity, contacted a representative about a feminist/race-related
issue, shared a post on social media in support of a feminist/racial justice topic, met with
others to discuss a feminist/racial justice topic, and read feminist/anti-racist literature.
Participants are asked to indicate how frequently they have engaged in 7 different
behaviours over the past 12 months. Items are rated on a 5-point Likert-style scale
anchored at never (scored at 1) and always (5). Both scales demonstrated strong internal
consistency (see Table 14).

6.2.2.8

Donation

A one-item measure was included to evaluate the extent to which participants were
willing to donate their compensation to a well-known and reputable organization to
support survivors of gender-based violence, the Rape, Abuse, and Incest National
Network (RAINN). Specifically, participants were prompted with the instructions: “You
will have the option to donate a portion of your earnings to RAINN, the Rape, Abuse &
Incest National Network. RAINN is the largest anti-sexual violence organization in the
nation and has been supporting survivors of sexual violence since its inception in 1994.
What portion, if any, of your proceeds would you like to donate to RAINN?” Participants
indicated the portion of their $1.20 compensation they wished to donate using a sliding
scale that ranged from 0% to 100% of their compensation.
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Results

6.3

All analyses were conducted using SPSS Version 25.0. A missing values analysis
revealed that only .07% of data were missing. Given the small number of missing data
points, I did not impute missing values (Parent, 2013).

6.3.1 Tests of Hypotheses 1-6: Convergent, Criterion, and
Incremental Validity
Bivariate correlations can be found in Table 14. Supporting Hypothesis 1a-d and
consistent with Study 4, Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality subscales were
all significantly and negatively linked to hostile and benevolent sexism, as well as
willingness to intervene in sexist situations and feminist activism. Hypotheses 2a and b
were only partially supported: Uncertainty was significantly and positively linked to
hostile and benevolent sexism, but Fear of Stigma was not related to hostile (r = .06, p =
.51) or benevolent sexism (r = .05, p = .52). Hypothesis 2c was supported: both Fear of
Stigma and Uncertainty were significantly and negatively associated with willingness to
intervene in sexist situations. However, Hypothesis 2d was only partially supported
Uncertainty was significantly and negatively associated with feminist activism, but Fear
of Stigma was not significantly related to willingness to intervene in sexist situations (r =
-.06, p = .52)
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Table 14. Means, Standard Deviations, Alphas, and Bivariate Correlations for Study 5
1
1. Beliefs
2. Competence
3. Solidarity
4. Centrality
5. Stigma
6. Uncertainty
7. Hostile Sexism
8. Benevolent Sexism
9. Racial Consciousness
10. Feminist Behaviours
11. Racial Behaviours
12. Everyday Sexism
13. Everyday Racism

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

.70
.81
.76

***
***
***

.10
-.68

***

***
***

.53
.40
.60

.68

***
***

-.33

-.44
.53

.68

-.12

-.31

.62

-

-.56
-.36
.43
.61
.57

***
***
***

.43
.56
.23

***
***
***
***
***
**

.84

***

.70

***

-.31
-.54

.66
.61
.40
.49
.33

.02

-

-.41
***

-.22
.46

-

***
***
***
***
***
***

14. Donation

.28

Mean

4.23

4.23

3.70

Standard deviation

.98

1.15

Alpha

.93

.94

-.51

***
***

-.25
.47
.60
.55
.35
.40

***
***
***
***
***

***

.06

.42

.05

.38

.14

***
***

-.28

-.06

-.32

-.07
-.17

-

-.35
*

.06

-.23

***
***
***
**

-.14

.69

***

-.59
-.41
-.43

***
***
***

-.31
-.58

-.54
-.19
-.26
-.25

***

-.43

***
*
**
**
***

.39
.52
.26
.53

***
***
**
***
***

.79
.35
.37
.24

***
***
***
**

.30
.47
.37

***
***
***

.40
.21

***
*

.26

**

-.03

-.20

-.23

-.16

.27

3.07

2.86

2.69

2.18

2.56

4.54

1.86

2.05

4.85

5.54

31.86

1.25

1.36

1.29

1.30

.99

.94

1.22

.81

.85

1.08

1.32

35.34

.93

.96

.89

.93

.93

.88

.97

.70

.87

.85

.85

N/A

Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001.

.30

***

.41

-
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Although no a priori hypotheses were made regarding differences in the correlations
between FSIS scores and hostile and benevolent sexism, an examination of the table of
correlations revealed that the correlations were stronger between the FSIS scales and
hostile sexism compared to benevolent sexism. As such, I conducted exploratory Fisher’s
r to z transformations to examine the possibility that this difference was statistically
significant. This difference was significant for Beliefs (z = 3.00, p < .001), Competence (z
= 2.15, p = .016), Solidarity (z = 3.20, p < .001), and Centrality (z = 2.58, p = .005). The
difference was not significant for Fear of Stigma (z = .08, p = .466) or Uncertainty (z =
.40, p = .345).
To test Hypotheses 3a and 4a, I conducted a hierarchical linear regression to assess
whether the FSIS subscales accounted for unique variance in willingness to intervene in
sexist situations, above hostile and benevolent sexism (see Table 15). The dependent
variable was willingness to intervene in sexist situations. Hostile and benevolent sexism
were entered at Step 1, and the FSIS subscales were entered at Step 2. Only hostile
sexism explained unique variance in willingness to intervene in sexist situations.
Therefore, Hypothesis 3a and 4a were not supported: none of the FSIS subscales
explained unique variance in willingness to intervene in sexist situations.
Table 15. Incremental Validity Tests for Study 5
β

t

adj R2

∆R2

.17

.18

∆F

sr2

Criterion: Feminist activism
Step 1

15.94***

Hostile sexism

-.54

-5.10***

.150

Benevolent sexism

.19

1.78

.018

Step 2

.48

.32

14.68***

Hostile sexism

-.04

-.37

.000

Benevolent sexism

.04

.44

.000

FSIS-Beliefs

-.19

-1.49

.008

FSIS-Competence

.32

3.40***

.042

**

FSIS-Solidarity

.51

3.83

.053

FSIS-Centrality

.05

.40

.001

FSIS-Stigma

.01

.10

.005
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FSIS-Uncertainty

-.10

-1.23

.000

Criterion: Willingness to intervene in sexist situations
Step 1

.08

.10

7.53**

Hostile sexism

-.26

-2.33*

.035

Benevolent sexism

-.07

-.61

.002

Step 2

.21

.15

4.55***

Hostile sexism

.11

.82

.004

Benevolent sexism

-.15

-.13

.009

FSIS-Beliefs

.14

.92

.005

FSIS-Competence

.21

1.80

.018

FSIS-Solidarity

-.29

1.62

.015

FSIS-Centrality

-.10

-.67

.003

FSIS-Stigma

.01

.07

.000

FSIS-Uncertainty

-.17

-1.95

.021

Criterion: Racial collective action
Step 1
Privilege awareness

.27
.52

.27

52.95***

7.28***

Step 2

.27
.47

.23

19.35***

Privilege awareness

.34

4.28***

068

FSIS-Beliefs

-.25

-1.98*

.014

FSIS-Competence

.24

2.57*

.026

FSIS-Solidarity

.48

3.64***

.048

FSIS-Centrality

-.02

-.12

.000

FSIS-Stigma

-.08

-1.09

.004

FSIS-Uncertainty

-.06

-.86

.003

Criterion: Willingness to intervene in racist situations
Step 1
Privilege awareness

.28
.53

.29

56.49***

7.52***

Step 2

.28
.43

.17

7.09***

Privilege awareness

.33

3.91***

.063

FSIS-Beliefs

.16

1.22

.004

FSIS-Competence

.37

3.80***

.058

FSIS-Solidarity

.23

1.65

.020

FSIS-Centrality

-.29

-2.22*

.012

FSIS-Stigma

.07

.87

.004

FSIS-Uncertainty

.003

.04

.000
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Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001
To test Hypotheses 3b and 4b, I conducted a hierarchical linear regression to assess
whether the FSIS subscales accounted for unique variance in feminist activism, above
hostile and benevolent sexism. The dependent variable was feminist activism. Hostile and
benevolent sexism were entered at Step 1, and the FSIS subscales were entered at Step 2.
For feminist activism, Competence accounted for 4.2% of the variance in feminist
activism, and Solidarity accounted for 5.3% of the variance, above hostile and benevolent
sexism. Beliefs and Centrality did not account for any significant degree of variance in
feminist activism. Therefore, Hypothesis 3b was partially supported: two of the aligned
identity dimensions of the FSIS explained unique variance in feminist activism.
Hypothesis 4b was not supported: The ambivalent dimensions did not explain unique
variance in feminist activism.
For portion of compensation donated, responses ranged from 0% to 100%, with the mean
percent of compensation donated reflecting about one-third of the total possible
compensation, 31.86% (or $0.38). However, there was substantial variability in this
value, with the standard deviation being 35.34. While the skewness statistic did not
suggest that the data was significantly skewed (.89), an examination of the frequency
values for donation amount revealed that 28% of respondents were not willing to donate
to the organization, and 15% were willing to donate all of their compensation. Supporting
Hypothesis 5, each of the aligned identity dimensions of the FSIS was associated with
donation amount (rs ranged from .23 for Competence to .33 for Solidarity, p < .01).
Uncertainty was significantly and negatively associated with donation amount, and Fear
of Stigma was unrelated to donation amount, supporting Hypothesis 6. These findings
offer initial evidence for the criterion-related validity of the scale.

6.3.2 Tests of Hypotheses 7-10: Convergent and Incremental Validity
Supporting Hypotheses 7a-c, Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality subscales
were all significantly and negatively linked to White privilege awareness, racial
collective action, and willingness to intervene in racist situations. Hypothesis 8a was
partially supported: Uncertainty was significantly and negatively related to racial
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collective action, but Fear of Stigma was not significantly related to this construct.
Hypotheses 8a and 8b were not supported: neither Uncertainty nor Fear of Stigma was
associated with willingness to intervene in racist situations.
To test Hypotheses 9a and 10a, I conducted a hierarchical linear regression to assess
whether the FSIS subscales accounted for unique variance in willingness to intervene in
racist situations, above and beyond White privilege awareness. The dependent variable
was willingness to intervene in racist situations. White privilege awareness was entered at
Step 1, and the FSIS subscales were entered at Step 2. For willingness to intervene in
racist situations, Competence accounted for 5.8% of the variance, and Centrality
accounted for 1.2% of the variance. Interestingly, feminist Centrality was negatively
predictive of behavioural willingness. These results provide partial support for
Hypothesis 9a, but not 10a: some of the aligned FSIS subscales explained unique
variance in willingness to intervene in racist situations; none of the ambivalent subscales
did.
To test Hypotheses 9b and 10b, I conducted a hierarchical linear regression to assess
whether the FSIS subscales accounted for unique variance in racial collective action,
above and beyond White privilege awareness. The dependent variable was racial
collective action. White privilege awareness was entered at Step 1, and the FSIS
subscales were entered at Step 2. For willingness to intervene in racist situations,
Solidarity accounted for 4.8% and Competence accounted for 2.6% of the variance.
Interestingly, Beliefs accounted for 1.4% of the variance in racial collective action;
however, feminist beliefs were negatively predictive of racial collective action. These
results provide partial support for Hypothesis 9b: some of the aligned FSIS subscales
explained unique variance in racial collective action; none of the ambivalent subscales
did.

6.3.3 Tests of Hypotheses 11 and 12: Known-Groups Validity
In order to examine known-groups validity, I evaluated mean-level FSIS scores for
feminists, non-labellers, and non-feminists based on the CBF Scale (Zucker, 2004).
Using this classification, 97 participants were categorized into the “feminist” group, 22
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participants were categorized into the “non-labellers” group, and 12 participants were
categorized into the “non-feminists” group. Under this classification system, 13
participants could not be categorized. Results of a one-way ANOVA indicated significant
group differences for Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, Centrality, and Uncertainty, but
not for Fear of Stigma (See Table 16).
Table 16. Test of Known-Groups Validity for the FSIS for Study 5
Variable
Beliefs

Feminist

Non-labellers

Non-feminists

M (SD)

M (SD)

M (SD)

4.77 (.66)

3.34 (.87)

2.95 (.89)

Welch’s t

η²

F

45.06***

61.16***

.49

***

***

.28

Competence

4.57 (.92)

3.29 (1.27)

2.95 (1.19)

18.16

Solidarity

4.18 (1.02)

2.45 (.98)

2.05 (.65)

62.28***

45.66***

.42

Centrality

3.56 (1.20)

1.63 (.71)

1.70 (.78)

58.30***

37.91***

.37

Stigma

2.97 (1.28)

2.73 (1.25)

2.15 (1.01)

3.28

2.36

.04

Uncertainty

2.53 (1.28)

3.29 (1.37)

3.03 (1.23)

3.28

24.71

3.55

*

.06

Note. * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001
Revealing the unique importance of feminist self-identification, post-hoc Bonferroni tests
revealed no significant differences between non-labellers and non-feminists for any of the
FSIS subscales (see Table 16). Statistically significant differences were detected for
Beliefs scores between feminists and non-labellers (p < .001) and feminists and nonfeminists (p < .001). The same pattern was observed for Competence, Solidarity, and
Centrality scores, with feminists scoring higher on these subscales than non-labellers (ps
< .001) and non-feminists (ps < .001). A statistically significant – albeit weaker –
difference was also detected between feminists and non-labellers for the Uncertainty
subscale (p = .04); however, no significant difference was detected between feminists and
non-feminists. Overall, this pattern supports the known-groups validity of the FSIS
subscales: feminists (i.e., those who hold feminist attitudes and label themselves as
feminists) also scored higher on the aligned dimensions of feminist social identity
(Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity, and Centrality) compared to non-labellers (i.e., those
who hold feminist attitudes but do not label themselves as feminists) and non-feminists
(i.e., those who do not hold feminist attitudes or label themselves as feminists). These
results support Hypotheses 11a-d, as well as Hypothesis 12b. However, Hypothesis 12a
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was not supported. While significant differences were detected between self-identified
feminists, non-labellers, and non-feminists for Beliefs, Competence, Solidarity,
Centrality, and Uncertainty, no difference was found between these groups for Fear of
Stigma.
The CBF Scale (Zucker, 2004) allows for the examination of mean-level differences
across three groups: feminists, non-labellers, and non-feminists. However, some
participants may not be able to be categorized into one of these three categories: those
who identify as feminists but do not support all three feminists beliefs. Therefore, I ran an
exploratory ANOVA to probe for potential mean-level differences between this group
and others. Given that no past research has specifically examined this group, I did not
specify any a priori hypotheses.
The results suggested that the mean for Beliefs for this group was significantly higher
than the mean for non-labellers and non-feminists (ps < .001), but no difference was
detected between this group and feminists (p = .57). Similarly, for Competence, this
group scored similarly to feminists (p = 1.00), but higher than non-labellers (p = .001)
and non-feminists (p = .004). A similar pattern was detected for Solidarity: the mean of
this group did not significantly differ from the mean of the feminist group (p = 1.00), but
differed significantly from non-labellers (p < .001) and non-feminists (p = .001). This
group also scored similarly to feminists (p = .761) on Centrality, but higher than nonlabellers (p = .016) and non-feminists (p = .002). No significant differences were detected
between this group and the other groups for Fear of Stigma or Uncertainty. Overall, this
group scored similarly to the feminist group across both aligned and ambivalent identity
subscales.

6.4

Discussion

By examining additional convergent, criterion, incremental, and known-groups validity,
this study provided further evidence of construct validity for the FSIS. Support for the
convergent validity of the FSIS was observed through the FSIS’s associations with
relevant measures. The FSIS subscales demonstrated the expected differential
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associations with sexist attitudes, with the aligned identity subscales linked to less
endorsement of hostile and benevolent sexism, and the ambivalent identity subscales
linked to more endorsement of hostile and benevolent sexism. The one exception was for
the Fear of Stigma scale, which was not significantly associated with hostile or
benevolent sexist attitudes. Notably, the pattern of associations between the aligned
identity subscales and benevolent sexist attitudes were weaker than for hostile sexist
attitudes, consistent with the idea that benevolent sexism is more difficult to recognize as
sexist and therefore less readily rejected (see Connor et al., 2015), even among women
who report a strong feminist social identity. Moreover, the positive associations between
sexist attitudes and the Uncertainty dimension of the FSIS supports the idea that
ambivalent aspects of a feminist social identity may explain how some women are able to
hold both feminist and sexist views.
The FSIS subscales also demonstrated the expected differential associations with
measures of feminist collective action. The aligned identity subscales were linked to
more engagement in feminist collective action, whereas one of the ambivalent identity
subscales, Uncertainty, was linked to less engagement in feminist collective action.
Notably, women’s engagement in feminist collective action did not vary in relation to
their fear of stigma toward feminists. The same patterns were observed for willingness to
intervene in sexist situations, with the aligned identity subscales linked to greater
willingness to intervene in sexist situations, whereas both ambivalent identity subscales
were linked to less willingness to intervene in sexist situations.
The FSIS subscales also demonstrated the expected differential associations with
measures of racial collective action. The aligned identity subscales were linked to greater
awareness of White privilege, and one of the ambivalent identity subscales, Uncertainty,
was linked to less awareness of White privilege. Fear of Stigma was not significantly
associated with awareness of White privilege. The aligned identity subscales were
associated with more willingness to intervene in racist situations; however, the
ambivalent identity subscales were unrelated to willingness to intervene in racist
situations.
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The results for the tests of known-groups validity were consistent with theorizing on the
importance of feminist identity, above merely agreeing with feminist principles, for
predicting feminist action (Yoder et al., 2011; Zucker, 2004; Zucker & Bay-Cheng,
2010). Specifically, no significant differences were found between non-feminists and
non-labellers on any of the FSIS subscales. However, those who support feminist
principles and labelled themselves as feminists scored more highly on the aligned identity
subscales, compared to non-feminists and non-labellers. Further, as expected, nonlabellers scored more highly than feminists and non-feminists on the Uncertainty
subscale. In concert, these findings support the known-groups validity of the FSIS. In my
exploratory analyses, the group that is typically excluded from analyses (those who
identify as feminists but do not agree with the three feminist beliefs) scored similarly to
the feminist group on every subscale. Despite the fact that these participants responded
similarly to non-feminists on the beliefs items, scores were significantly different
between these groups across the other FSIS dimensions. (i.e., Competence, Solidarity,
Centrality). This pattern of findings suggests that those who identify as feminists score
more highly on the FSIS subscales, regardless of whether or not they support feminist
beliefs. Given the unique importance of identity for collective action willingness (van
Zomeren et al., 2008), as well as the complexities of feminist self-identification (see
Zucker, 2004), the tool’s value as a measure of identity may allow researchers to make
more precise predictions regarding feminist activism. This distinction also addresses a
critique of some measures of feminist “identity,” which may actually capture feminist
attitudes (Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010).
Finally, the FSIS Competence and Solidarity subscales accounted for unique variance in
feminist activism participation, above the variance accounted for by hostile and
benevolent sexism, suggesting that feeling equipped with the knowledge and skills to
enact one’s feminism and being aligned with other feminists may foster more collective
action willingness. These findings are partially consistent with the Social Identity Model
of Collective Action (van Zomeren et al., 2008), which suggests that identity and
perceived efficacy of collective action (as well as perceived injustice) may predict
collective action. Interestingly, feeling that feminism is at the core of who one is as a
person (Centrality) did not predict feminist collective action, suggesting that perhaps
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sense of community – rather than identity salience – may be important for getting people
to engage in behaviours consistent with their feminist attitudes and identities.
The same pattern was true for engagement in racial collective action, suggesting that a
sense of competence in one’s ability to address social injustice, and a sense of solidarity
with other like-minded individuals, may encourage women to think about social justice
more broadly and intersectionally. Competence also predicted wiliness to intervene in
instances of everyday racism, but not everyday sexism. While there are many potential
interpretations of this finding, one possibility is that it reflects the difficulty of
intervening in instances of everyday sexism for women. Indeed, women who take a
feminist stand against sexism, and against encounters of benevolent sexism in particular,
run the risk of experiencing backlash for violating gender norms and expectations for
women (Connor et al., 2015).

6.4.1.1

Limitations and Future Directions

It is important to note that this research is cross-sectional and correlational so no causal
claims can be made about the nature of the FSIS subscales and its ability to predict
specific behaviours. Further, the sample size for this study was somewhat smaller than
other studies in this dissertation and consisted of exclusively White women. The findings
cannot and should not be generalized to women outside of this demographic. Future
research should examine measurement invariance in the FSIS to determine whether the
subscales of this particular measure maintain the same factor structure in women across
racial and ethnic groups. Although attention checks and quality assurance measures were
embedded into the survey, there is always a possibility of low-quality data with online
surveys. Also, three of the measures used for this study (i.e., Willingness to Intervene in
Instances of Everyday Racism Scale and both measures of collective action) have not
been subjected to a full program of construct validation, and therefore any changes to
scale items in the future could change their relations to the FSIS subscales. It is also
possible that links may have been different if other items had been used to assess racial
and feminist activism. One additional limitation is that the survey was advertised as a
study of “gender attitudes and activism.” It is therefore possible that participants who
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were involved in activism or interested in this particular topic are overrepresented in this
sample.

6.4.1.2

Conclusion

This study provided additional evidence of convergent, incremental, criterion, and
known-groups validity for the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS) in a sample of White
women recruited from Prolific Academic. These findings add support for the overall
construct validity of the FSIS. This study also highlights important associations between
aligned and ambivalent dimensions of feminist social identity with awareness of White
privilege and engagement in feminist and racial collective action, which is consistent
with intersectional feminist identity. It is possible that some “White feminists’” inaction
on matters of racial justice is grounded in more than a lack of awareness of White
privilege, but also uncertainty regarding their feminist identification. In this way, it
appears that feminist ambivalence may not only serve as a barrier to feminist progress,
but also progress toward racial justice.
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Chapter 7

7

Study 6: Feminist Identity Development and Growth in
Cisgender Men

In Study 2, I developed a theoretical framework for understanding ambivalent feminism
among women and nonbinary individuals. In Studies 3-5, I developed and validated a
measure of feminist social identity that contained both positive and negative identity
subscales. However, none of these studies included men. This choice was deliberate,
given that feminist identity – and feminist identity ambivalence – likely differs between
the people who feminism primarily benefits (women and gender diverse individuals) and
those who may feel threatened by it (cisgender men). In this study, I took a bottom-up
approach to understanding how men who identify as feminists develop their identities,
and examining potential areas of ambivalence within men’s feminist identities.

7.1

Introduction

At present, feminist men are a difficult subject for empirical analysis. Virtually every
psychological theoretical model of feminist identity development is restricted to women,
and most instruments used to measure feminist identity and attitudes have been validated
with exclusively women samples, or contain items that make them irrelevant for men (see
Siegel & Calogero, 2021; also Chapter 2, this dissertation). Given that instruments and
theories of feminism have historically excluded men, it comes as no surprise that nearly
all of this research has been conducted on exclusively women samples. Understanding
men’s feminist identities, and the ambivalence inherent to them, requires special attention
and consideration. Across national surveys and psychological studies, men are less likely
than women to identify as feminists (for a review, see Siegel, 2020), and men often report
negative attitudes toward feminists (Anderson et al., 2009; Ogletree et al., 2019; Twenge
& Zucker, 1999).
However, many men support gender equality, and some identify as feminists, work to
combat sexism, and serve as feminist advocates and educators (Bojin, 2013; Drury &
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Kaiser, 2014; Edwards, 2008). Recent research has begun to examine the role of men in
the feminist movement (Iyer & Ryan, 2009; Madsen et al., 2020; Sudkämper et al., 2020;
Wiley & Dunne, 2019), but men’s feminist identity development process, remains
elusive. The current study aimed to address this gap in the literature by exploring the
dimensions of feminist identity development in men and identifying potential barriers to
men’s feminist advocacy and activism.
While feminist identification is not a necessary condition for men’s feminist activism
(Becker & Swim, 2011; Iyer & Ryan, 2009), some research has found that men’s use of
the label “feminist” (rather than “profeminist” or “antisexist”) can uniquely influence
their willingness to engage in feminist activism (White, 2006). However, many men
express reluctance about identifying as feminists, potentially due to the stigma attributed
to feminist men. The few studies that have specifically examined the stigma attributed to
men who identify as feminists have yielded inconsistent results regarding whether
feminist men are viewed more positively or negatively than their non-feminist
counterparts (Anderson, 2009; Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Rudman et al., 2013). Indeed,
stereotypes about feminist men are mixed, with male feminists regarded as more warm,
affectionate, open-minded and kind, but also weaker, less masculine, more feminine, less
attractive, and more likely to be gay compared to non-feminist men (Anderson et al.,
2009; Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Rudman et al., 2013). The negative stereotypes
attributed to male feminists may serve as a powerful deterrent to men’s feminist
identification due to the cultural mandate for men to adhere to stoic, powerful, and
hegemonic masculine norms (Connell & Messerschmidt, 2005).
Precarious Manhood Theory (Vandello et al., 2008; Vandello & Bosson, 2013) proposes
that the social title of “man” must be earned by repeated displays of traditionally
masculine behaviours, such as restricted emotionality, unrelenting competition, and
conquest over women. Men who deviate from these expectations risk being seen as less
than “real men” and may receive verbal or physical backlash for their inability or
unwillingness to follow the manhood mandate. In a culture in which rigid adherence to
restricted cultural norms of masculinity is regarded as optimal for men, aligning
themselves with a stigmatized social group, particularly one that makes them appear

139

more “feminine” to others, may be regarded as anathema to the principles of manhood.
Indeed, the more men adhere to traditionally masculine stereotypes, the less likely they
are to support feminist principles and practices (Silver et al., 2019; Toller et al., 2004;
Wade & Brittan-Powell, 2001).
Due to the lacuna of empirical research into men’s feminist identity growth and
development, I aimed to address the following four research questions: 1) What factors
promote the development of a feminist identity in men? 2) What life events precipitate
men’s feminist identity development? 3) How is masculinity negotiated within the
context of a male feminist identity? 4) How does men’s feminist identity development
compare to women’s?

7.2

Method

7.2.1 Participants and Procedure
A recruitment advertisement was posted on several social media websites (e.g., Twitter,
Facebook). Interested participants were instructed to contact the first author for a 45-60
minute interview about their attitudes and experiences as a male feminist. Upon initial
contact, the first author confirmed that the participants met inclusion criteria (i.e.,
identified as male, identified as feminist, spoke fluent English, and had access to Zoom).
Once this information was confirmed, a letter of information and consent was sent via
email, which participants signed and sent back to the first author. Once the first author
received the signed consent document, a mutually agreeable time was arranged for a
Zoom video interview. All participants selected a pseudonym to maintain their anonymity
in study records.
A video interview was chosen over an in-person interview to accommodate schedules and
diverse geographical locations. This decision was integrated into the initial design of the
study, but it proved beneficial to the project, given that interviews were conducted amid
the COVID-19 pandemic. Being in the comfort of their own homes also allowed the
research team to observe participants in their most comfortable and natural spaces. For
example, on a few occasions, interviews were interrupted by roommates, coworkers,
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partners, or internet connectivity issues. Notably, during Mitchell Oreskes’s interview,
the participant’s mother stopped the interview to deliver him banana pancakes, which he
waited to eat until after the interview had completed. One participant (Doug Fisher)
started the interview by lighting a pipe and drank two beers over the course of the 45minute chat, laughing and swearing for the duration of the discussion. When asked about
masculinity, Jordan read relevant passages and poetry from his personal diary. Moments
like these, some tender and others humorous, consistently reminded the research team to
honor and uphold our epistemological commitment to conduct research that is attentive to
our participants’ humanity.
The final sample consisted of 27 men (Mage = 33.08, SD = 8.42), all of whom were
cisgender and identified as feminist. All participants who met inclusion criteria were
interviewed until the authors felt confident that no new themes would be identified in
future interviews (i.e., theoretical saturation was reached; but see Braun & Clarke, 2019
for a critique of saturation). Sixteen of the men were residing in Canada at the time of the
interview, nine were in the United States, one was in England, and one was living in
Japan. They were mostly straight (n = 21), queer (n = 3), or gay (n = 2). One indicated
that they would prefer not to report their sexual orientation (n = 1). A majority of the
participants were in a long- or short-term relationship at the time of the interview (n = 8),
single (n = 7), and some were married (n = 6) or in common law relationships (n = 2).
One participant was engaged (n = 1), and one preferred not to say (n = 1). Two
participants indicated that they were polyamorous, but this question was not asked
explicitly in the interviews. They varied in number of children, race, level of education,
occupation, and (dis)ability status (see Table 17).
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Table 17. Demographic Information for Study 6
Pseudonym Age
Garth
Superhalk
Mitchell
Oreskes
Larry L.
Nigel

Sexual
orientation
Queer/
questioning

Race

Country

28

Caucasian

Canada

25

White/Jewish

Canada

Straight

29
34

White
White
Cherokee/
White
White/
Hispanic

Canada
Canada

Straight
Gay

USA

Straight

USA

Straight

Relationship
Highest
Children
Occupation
status
Education
In a
MA, pursuing
PhD
No
relationship
PhD
candidate
In a
No
MA
Professor
relationship
Single
No
PhD
Postdoc
Married
No
BA
Accountant
Doctoral
Single
No
MA
candidate
Long-term
No
BA
Grant writer
relationship

Clark

27

June
Donut

48

Joseph

29

White

Canada

Straight

Married

No

Bradley

26

Middle Eastern

Canada

Straight

Single

No

Patrick
John
Malden

39

White

Straight

Married

Yes

43

White

Canada
United
Kingdom

Straight

Married

Yes

Fred

49

White

Canada

Straight

In a
relationship

No

BS

27

White

Canada

Straight

Commonlaw

No

Jordan

25

White

USA

Queer

In a
relationship

No

Disability
No
No
No
No
No
No

PhD
candidate

Anxiety,
depression,
ADD

PhD student

No

Psychologist
University
PhD
lecturer
College/Trade Sales and
school
service agent
BA, pursuing
Graduate
PhD
student
BA, pursuing
Student
JD

No

MA, pursuing
PhD
BS, pursuing
PhD
PhD

No
No
No
No
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Associate
professor
Program
officer

Steven

32

White

USA

Gay

Married

No

PhD

Lee

25

White

USA

Straight

In a
relationship

No

Bachelor's

Galean

23

Asian/Indian

USA,
from
India

Prefer not to
say

Prefer not to
say

No

Bachelor's

Visiting
researcher

No

White

Canada

Queer,
polyamorous

In a
relationship
In a
relationship

No

Bachelor's

Mover

Bipolar
disorder

No

MA

University
instructor

No

No

MA, pursuing
PhD

Teacher

No

Yes

PhD

Yes

PhD

No

MA

David Pines 49
JP

31

White/British

Japan,
from UK

Straight

Wayne

35

White

USA

Straight

Kobalon

39

White/Ojibwe

Canada

Willem

38

White

Canada

Skylar

25

White

Canada

Doug

35

Charles
Cole
Andy

36
22
47

Curt

27

White/FrenchCanadian
Pilipino
White
White
Chinese/
Vietnamese/
American

Single

Straight,
Commonlaw
polyamorous
Straight
Married
In a
Straight
relationship

Canada

Straight

Engaged

No

USA
Canada
Canada

Straight
Straight
Straight

Single
Single
Married

No
No
Yes

USA

Straight

Single

No

“University
dropout”
PhD
Pursuing BS
PhD
BS, pursuing
MS

Assistant
professor
Professor
Music
educator

No
No

No
No
No

Logistics

No

Postdoc
Student
Professor

No
No
No

Student

Depression
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Interviews were semi-structured in nature, and minor revisions to the interview schedule
were made throughout the course of the project to shed light on the emergent coding
scheme (Agee, 2008). The final interview schedule can be found in Appendix C. To
create an environment in which participants felt heard and respected, no notes were taken
during the interview (see below for more information on my reflexivity process).
Interviews ranged in duration from 38 minutes to 84 minutes, depending on the length of
participants’ responses and their desire to share more or fewer experiences with me. The
average interview length was 50 minutes. In two instances, internet connectivity issues
necessitated interviewing in two separate recordings. I transcribed the interviews
verbatim, resulting in 461 single-spaced pages of data.

7.2.2 Positionality and Analytic Method
I coded the data according to the principles of reflexive thematic analysis (Braun &
Clarke, 2006, 2019, 2020a, 2020b). Thematic analysis was selected over other forms of
qualitative analysis due to its flexibility; this technique allowed me to approach the data
with a set of theoretical assumptions about feminist identity and masculinity, but also to
explore the unique and nuanced perspectives of my participants. Braun and Clarke
(2020a) define reflexive thematic analysis as an approach that “fully embraces qualitative
research values and the subjective skills the researcher brings to the process” (p. 6). With
this reflexivity in mind, I stress that this interpretation of these men’s experiences is one
of many possible interpretations, and a different research team may have extracted
alternative themes from these data. Therefore, it is important for the research team to
socially locate ourselves within the context of the study. I was responsible for advertising
the study, interviewing participants, transcribing the interviews, analyzing the data, and
writing the manuscript for this research. At the time of this study, I was a young, White,
able-bodied, cisgender woman studying feminist identity and feminist qualitative
research. I was also an American Ph.D. candidate, completing my doctoral studies in
Canada. Another coder was a young, White, able-bodied, cisgender man, holding a B.Sc.
in psychology with an honors specialization. He was responsible for identifying
exemplary quotes from the analysis to support each theme and subtheme. A third coder
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supervised the study and assisted with manuscript revisions, providing invaluable
feedback throughout the research process. She was a White, able-bodied, cisgender
woman and full professor of psychology at a Canadian university with expertise in the
psychology of gender. Each member of the research team identifies as a feminist.
I created the initial coding process. I familiarized myself with the data by conducting and
transcribing the interviews, and reading carefully through each, highlighting seeminglyimportant quotes as I read. I recorded instances where these codes could potentially form
the framework for higher-order themes. I engaged in a variety of reflexivity practices,
ranging from memoing and reflexive journaling to drawing and discussing preliminary
coding with labmates (Birks et al., 2008; Lincoln & Guba, 1985). Consistent threads of
meaning ran through several of the preliminary codes, which were grouped into higherorder themes. However, as participants shared their diverse experiences, themes and
codes were juggled and regrouped until a cogent set of themes and subthemes was agreed
upon by all coders. In order to increase the trustworthiness of the analysis (Nowell et al.,
2017), the write-up of the document was sent to each participant, who had one week to
provide feedback, suggestions, and revisions to the manuscript. Eleven (40.74%)
participants responded, all of whom indicated that the manuscript was a good fit for their
experiences and that they were grateful to be involved in this stage of the process. Some
men recommended minor revisions to the paper or asked clarifying questions, which
were addressed and incorporated into the manuscript.

7.3 Results
Rather than a clear developmental trajectory, the men described a feminist identity
development process that was cyclical and ongoing. As such, I henceforth use the term
“feminist identity growth” to describe this process. Participants often noted that no one
had ever asked about their experiences as feminists and expressed gratitude for the
opportunity to contribute to feminist research, with some stating that it was “validating”
(Skylar, Jordan). Five themes were identified that comprised men’s feminist identity
growth process: Diverse Feminist Foundations, Turning Points, Evaluation and
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(Un)Learning, Taking Action, and Feedback. See Table 18 for a list of themes,
subthemes, and exemplary quotes.
Table 18. List of Themes, Subthemes, and Exemplary Quotes for Study 6
Theme

Subtheme

Exemplary quote [Speaker]

Diverse feminist

Culture and

I grew up on the North Shore of Chicago. It was

foundations

upbringing

the 70s and 80s. Yes, I had - I think a lot, a lot of
ingrained sexist and misogynistic stereotypes from
culture, from friends, culture, movies, television
shows, books, what have you that was swiftly
beaten out of me by becoming more mature,
becoming going to college. Holy God. You know,
because I was I was a typical American child in the
sense that I played a lot of sports. I played a lot of
organized sports I played, I played Little League
Baseball. [June]

Feminist

My mom would have identified as feminist,

figures

absolutely, and still does. And so I grew up in a
household that was very much about equality. And
[I had a] sense of like, women are equal, and, you
know, people of different races, ethnicities,
language, disability status, that sort of thing are
equal, and, you know, equally valid and have should have the same rights...my mom took me and
my sister to a Gloria Steinem lecture. [Patrick]

Personal

Hmm... I mean, in, in basically every way [okay].

experiences

Um, I think that - I don't, I don't think that, that the

with

gays would have been allowed to marry without a

discrimination shit ton of groundwork that was laid by multiple
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waves of feminist thought. And I think it's wild the
extent to which, collectively we gays do not
acknowledge that fact. [Steven]
Turning points

Aha moments

I was 18, 19. I was reading a textbook. And I
could, I just realized that when like, names of
people were coming up, I was just assuming they're
all men. Like in this book, right? It was like a
scientific book. It was like nonfiction. It was names
of scientists, whatever. And I was just in my head.
They were just all men. And then I realizing that
was like, "Whoa, there's like, there's something
going on here... We gotta - We gotta dig deeper on
this.” [Mitchell]

Formal

One of my classmates in a course I took [on

education

feminism] made buttons for everyone in the class
out of rocks with the letters printed on them:
"feminist killjoy" and I have been proudly wearing
it on my backpack that I use every single day ever
since. [Wayne]

Recent social

There was a - an international "wear pants to

movements

church day"... there's nothing in the Bible that says
that women can't wear pants to church, right? And
so a bunch of women wore pants to church, and a
bunch of people got real upset about it, which was
their point.... and then also, you know,
contemporaneously, I am coming to terms with my
own sexuality, which of course, makes me question
a lot of gender roles and so forth. Because like if I
am suddenly looking at, you know, my future
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relationships being between two men then, right,
that sort of upsets the applecart in a lot of ways.
[Patrick]
Conversations And when my ex, actually, she, I think she has sort
of impacted the way I think about a lot of stuff, as
well. She's like a very sex positive person. That's
sort of - I had conversations with her about, sort of,
gender identity, sexual and sexual identity and stuff
have also been pretty influential. [Bradley]
Evaluation and

Observing

The men who have influenced my feminism in sort

unlearning

other men

of, in the "I don't want to behave like that" way
have added value. But it's - it's always bittersweet
to learn by - to learn from someone else's mistakes,
and, and to know that they don't necessarily see
them as mistakes... which is more problematic on it
and can be troubling on a philosophical level,
right? Like this person doesn't even realize how far
out to lunch they are. [Right, right.] Or what they're
teaching their kids or, you know, just through
exhibited behaviours, so it's really challenging.
[Nigel]

Distancing

Men let me down a lot.. thinking that somebody's

from sexist

kind of a good person, and then you get to know

friends

them more. And then you kind of realize like, you
realize their actions… I guess most of my friends
are women now. And then, if I ever find like, a
male friend in a lot of cases, they're like, "Oh,
yeah, he like sexually assaulting my friend like
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four years ago," and I'm like, "oh, okay, like, I
guess he's kind of out." [Cole]
Trial and

Like recently, even where, like, I end up going off

error

on a tangent and becoming like, the dominant kind
of role in something, and then I think back the next
day, I'm like, "Oh, I kind of like dominated that
whole, like conversation and spoke very, like, on
very absolute terms about everything that I was
talking about, right? [Garth]

Reimagining

My understanding of what it means to male

masculinity

identify while also being a male feminist has to do
with like a - for me, it has to with a - what's the
word I'm looking for? not a role a - responsibility
to, let's say, to challenge the kind of norms that I
was just like talking about, and, and support the,
challenge the norms that I was just talking about.
And then to also support the things that go against
those norms and normal - and normalize those, or
give those kind of safe space. [Mitchell]

Taking action

Egalitarian

I think I'd like to model as many as I try to do as

relationships

much housework and childcare as my wife does
whenever possible. And try to model the idea that
this is a two way street that there's two parents
active here and that I don't use terms like
"babysitting" to refer to the times when my wife's
out of the house and I'm the one who's taking care
of the kids. [Andy]
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Raising

You don't want to necessarily fall into this trap of

children

reinforcing what's already out there as the
background of - the background noise of
everything being gendered, right, especially when
it comes to kids. So if it's available in some color
other than making baby blue, I usually find in that
color, it's like that. [Andy]

Educating

So, when I came to back to Toronto and was

men

looking, looking at different community initiatives
to get involved in. I was specifically researching
for, for initiatives that target young men and try to
deconstruct these, these ideas of masculinity and
like promote alternative masculinities. So I was
specifically looking for that and trying to connect
with those groups because the problem that I saw
with gender equality in general, was it wasn't you
know, "we need to advocate more necessarily on
the women's side,” but I think we need to change
the mindset of the men's side. [Skylar]

Advocacy and Yep. I have absolutely signed petitions. I
activism

participated in a protest… There was somebody, an
academic, who was being invited to campus to give
a lecture series. I think he was like in kind of
Jordan Peterson-esque kind of guy, I can't
remember his name. And it became very apparent
that, you know, he was still very vocal about all of
these attitudes that really were not - quite contrary
to feminism, right, that men are superior to women
that, that ridiculous stuff. And so the protest was
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against his being welcome to the University to give
a lecture. So I participated in that protest. There
was a counter protest for the anti-abortion
movement at the university community center. I
participated in that, as well, just sat around carried
a sign, that sort of thing. [BS]
Feedback

Praise

When I'll talk to my dad about [feminism… he's
like, "Well, that's crazy. You're like a hero. Like
you're such a good guy." And I'm like, "No, no I'm
not" like, just like, I'm literally doing like, like, I'm
just learning about this like, that's it like, as I said
to you, I'm not even doing any work yet. Like, I'm I
have - I literally haven't done anything.” [Cole]

Backlash

I teeter on whether I identify as male feminist, or as
someone who's working to deconstruct patriarchy.
Like, obviously, those things are directly linked,
but sometimes I feel like - I've had conversations
with ex partners, who would tell me, like, "you
can't identify as a feminist even though you're
doing this work." And so, I haven't really worked
through whether I can take up that space that, that
label. [Kobalon]

7.3.1 Diverse Feminist Foundations
Participants often discussed how their background and upbringing set the stage for the
ways they understood gender and feminism. Notably, these men did not share all share
common experiences or understandings of the world as children. In particular, men’s
culture and upbringing, relationships with feminist figures, and personal experiences with
discrimination influenced the way they learned about and engaged with feminism.
Several men explained that they had grown up in cultures where traditionally masculine
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values of competition and violence against women were normative. Consistent with
Connell and Messerschmidt’s (2005) writing on masculinity, men’s understanding of
masculinity varied based on cultural and regional factors. Men who were raised in highly
religious (Willem, Steven) or rural communities (Garth), where traditional gender roles
were dominant, or were involved in sports where there was a high premium on
masculinity (BS, June) often spoke an unwillingness to initially engage with feminist
principles. Kobalon’s experiences growing up in a First Nation household was an
extreme example of the way men’s cultural understanding of masculinity shaped their
understanding of gender dynamics:
It was very conservative and very homophobic and very misogynistic… [I] witness[ed]
misogynistic violence… that's what we were introduced to as a form of masculinity and
therefore, really, like a very patriarchal form, a misogynistic form of masculinity.
(Kobalon)
While masculinity was sometimes embedded in cultural attitudes and practices, some
men experienced interpersonal pressure to conform to masculine roles and norms. Several
participants recalled instances when peers or parents would challenge their masculinity
(Doug Pines) or when they were mocked for not being “man enough” (Kobalon, Patrick).
Those who were raised to place a high premium on masculinity often suggested that they
initially rejected feminism as it was not in line with their understanding of the world and
their place within it.
However, despite the cultural backdrop of hegemonic masculinity, several men explained
that they had childhood encounters with feminist activism and advocacy through their
mothers or other important women in their lives. Men with feminist mothers or
godmothers (Bradley; Clark; Charles Michael Che), and those who were encouraged to
adopted inclusive masculinities as boys (Clark, Lee, Joseph, Jordan), were generally
more open to learning about feminist principles, and some actively sought out this
information. Many explained that their mothers performed non-traditional roles in their
homes and were taught to respect women from a young age. Some had mothers who were
involved in the feminist movement, such as Joseph, who recalled:
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I learned initially about feminism from my mom. She was like, really big into like, I
guess, the second wave of feminism. She wanted to go see Gloria Steinem speak and
Germaine Greer. She had all these books, and she kind of taught me about feminism.
(Joseph)
Based on the responses of Joseph and other men who had strong feminist figures in their
lives growing up, it seems that the attitudes of family members, teachers, and others that
help raise and support young men can help to counteract cultural messages about
masculinity and set the stage for men’s eventual engagement with feminism.
A few participants also suggested that they had an awareness of social issues prior to
their involvement in gender-based advocacy because they themselves were members of a
minoritized group (e.g., sexual orientation, race, class). For example, participants who
had experienced discrimination on the basis of their sexual orientation (e.g., Nigel,
Steven) felt that prejudice against the LGBTQIA+ community and prejudice against
women were intertwined. Nigel said:
Growing up gay, particularly in [redacted] in the 90s is - you live with a lot of the same
sort of oppressive things that happened to women: you're silenced, you're not allowed to
share, you're expected to behave in a certain way. (Nigel)
Steven similarly explained that he felt feminism paved the way for LGBTQIA+ rights
and his gratitude for feminists encouraged him to learn more about it, joking that “I think
it's hard for a gay [sic] to not be a feminist.” For others, awareness of class discrimination
(Clark) or being interested in racial and social justice broadly (Bradley) eventually
facilitated their interest in feminism.
In sum, men had a variety of different experiences that set the stage for their feminist
identity growth process, pointing to the potential for men from diverse backgrounds and
with different life experiences to build solidarity with women and help advance the
movement for gender equality. The heterogeneity in men’s childhood experiences
suggests that all men, regardless of their background and upbringing, have the potential
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to overcome structural and internalized sexist and misogynistic attitudes. Below, I
identify specific moments in men’s lives when they felt catalyzed to identify as feminists.

7.3.2 Turning Points
The men in the study spoke to various adult life experiences that served as direct catalysts
for their interest in feminism. Many participants recalled a variety of turning points
throughout their lives, rather than one specific incident, which prompted an “ongoing
process” of feminist identity growth (Charles Michael Che, Joseph) that strengthened,
deepened, and expanded over time. Unsurprisingly, for men who grew up with flexible
attitudes toward gender roles and strong feminist role models, the transition to adopting a
feminist identity was met with little resistance. While rare, a few participants suggested
that they had come to recognize feminist issues unexpectedly, which I have labelled aha
moments. For example, Wayne recalled an experience as an educator that he referred to
as “the bulletin board incident.” He explained:
I was trying to get my students to do a little project about someone like really, really well
known who plays their instrument, so I set up a bulletin board in my classroom with a
picture of like a household name kind of jazz performer that - for every player in my
band ... I had all the players up on the board, it looked great. And I stepped back and I
said, "Oh, sh*t, there's no women up there.” (Wayne)
For Wayne, the recognition that he had inadvertently omitted women from his project
encouraged him to critically consider his treatment of women in his own life, as well as
social attitudes toward women. For others, feminist identification was sparked by formal
education, either through reading books about feminism recommended to them by peers
(e.g., “Inferior” by Angela Saini [Galean]; “The Beauty Myth” by Naomi Wolf [Fred]) or
enrollment in a gender studies course. Clark remembered his experience in gender and
sexuality class, which opened his eyes to gender inequality:
I was actually the only man in the course… Just reading the definition of feminism, it’s
just common sense, like equal rights… that's how I adopted [a feminist label], probably
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in that college course, and ever since then, I don't think my perspective has changed, at
least too drastically. (Clark)
Clark’s experience in a women’s studies course mirrors past research on the effectiveness
of education about gender inequality for promoting feminist identification in women
students (Baird et al., 2007; Bargad & Hyde, 1991; Nelson et al., 2008). Moreover, a few
participants mentioned that they had been inspired to involve themselves with feminism
due to recent social movements. Most commonly, men spoke about large-scale social
activism, such as the #metoo movement (Mitchell), the Women’s March (Patrick), and
Gamergate (Fred), but others referred to smaller local events, such as one Mormon
church’s “Wear Pants to Church Day” (Steven).
Participants also recounted conversations with trusted and respected people in their adult
lives, including partners and friends that changed their perspectives on feminism. Most
often, these conversations were with women who shared their experiences and
perspectives with the men. For example, Skylar remembered when a conversation with
his (woman) partner encouraged him to see the world differently:
There was sort of a turning point where I was having a conversation with my, my partner,
my ex, my previous partner, and we were talking about feminism, and I didn't really
understand what it was... I think she really helped me understand like, what it actually is.
So I'd say that was the turning point for me. (Skylar)
While these conversations often focused on gender relations in general, in some cases,
this dialogue was intimate and personal, such as learning that a friend had been sexually
assaulted or that they were being paid less for doing the same work (Larry L.; Jordan;
Nigel). For the men in the study, learning about discrimination and violence happening to
those close to them galvanized them to learn more about how they could support feminist
goals and objectives. These conversations also sometimes took place with other men who
held feminist attitudes or identified as feminists (Garth).
Consistent with the “ongoing process” of feminist identity growth that many men
described, participants indicated that their feminist identities grew, changed, and
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expanded over time. Reading “tweets” (posts on Twitter) and blogs written by women, as
well as listening to podcasts about diverse women’s experiences, were all reported as
events that had sparked new rounds of the feminist identity growth cycle for participants
(Garth, Joseph, Patrick, Cole, Nigel, Bradley). Other men deliberately sought out
literature written by women, such as Patrick, who had “stopped reading books by White
men” in order to focus his attention on better-understanding women’s experiences. Some,
such as Cole and Skylar, went to public talks given by women from diverse racial
backgrounds. For many, as they learned about intersectional prejudice faced by members
of the LGBTQ+ community (e.g., “an out lesbian friend” [David]; “a trans scientist”
[Bradley]) or Black, Indigenous, and other Women of Colour (Willem).
It is important to note that, while these conversations and experiences often helped the
men learn more about why feminism was important, they were sometimes more
challenging. Charles Michael Che explained:
I've encountered a lot of people who have talked about [feminism] who are very
judgmental about it, and they make it less fun to they make it less enjoyable to try to
explore. And there are a few times where it's definitely shut me out… the instances in my
life where this has happened… they're like, Oh, you're stupid. I'm not even going to talk
to you about it. (Charles Michael Che)
As will be explored in the feedback section, negative feedback about their interest in
feminism could deter men’s willingness to participate in feminist behaviours.
Overall, men reported a variety of experiences that inspired their feminist identities,
which challenged and changed their relationship with feminism over time. Many felt as
though their understanding of feminism needed to be continually reassessed as they
reflected on new information, which reignited the cycle of feminist identity growth.

7.3.3 Evaluation and (Un)learning
Participants often spoke about periods of reflection and private, internal work prior to
engaging in public feminist actions to calibrate their involvement in the movement.
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Indeed, participants were often initially hesitant to speak about feminism or act on their
feminist intentions. Men in the study often spoke about how they had observed other men
- for better or for worse – who had influenced their desire to engage with feminism.
Participants often joked that other men served as examples of how “not to be a feminist”
(Wayne) and what they “shouldn’t be doing” (David Pines) to advance the feminist
movement. Clark explained that he and his friends distanced themselves from “toxic
masculinity”:
Together, we were always like, we're not going to be that kind of man like we made sure
to distance ourselves from what the norm was …. it was always these toxic masculinity
things that were around us growing up - the hyper competitive, the you have to push
other people down to make yourself better, like these kinds of things that we constantly
saw. (Clark)
Clark’s decision to distance himself from other men whose behaviours and attitudes he
observed as “toxic” falls in line with another commonly-endorsed strategy: reevaluating
male friendships. Several (but not all) men noted that, once they became aware of
feminist issues and topics, they distanced themselves from men in their lives who did not
hold the same beliefs as they did. This was particularly true for the younger men in the
study, such as Cole, who explained:
My experience, like, where it's like, maybe thinking that somebody's kind of a good
person, and then you get to know them more… Most of my friends are women now. And
then, if I ever find like, a male friend in a lot of cases, they're like, "Oh, yeah, he like
sexually assaulting my friend like four years ago.” (Cole)
When men learned that their male friends held sexist attitudes (Joseph) or had been
accused of sexual violence (Jordan, Cole), they felt they could no longer maintain those
relationships. By separating themselves from other men whose attitudes were not
consistent with their own burgeoning feminist identities, participants were free to
surround themselves with like-minded individuals. Notably, one participant, Larry L.,
explained that he had not altered his relationships with other men who held sexist
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attitudes, and he chose to keep his feminist identity and attitudes hidden from this crowd
out of fear of backlash.
It is worth noting, however, that several men felt a sense of solidarity with other
progressive men. For example, Willem explained, “In spite of like the lack of male allies,
I definitely feel like there's a community… there’s a group of us doing [feminist work].”
In fact, some even noted that they felt like their friend group was an “echo chamber”
[Bradley] because members of the group held such similar, progressive attitudes. This
suggests that feminist men may cluster together to enhance and deepen their
understanding of feminism. Although many men explained that other men did not
influence their feminism, Garth, Lee, Skylar, and Willem all pointed to feminist men who
had helped them understand feminism better.
Several men also referred to a process of trial and error, either through internal reflection
or due to comments made by others. For some men, the self-correcting process was
organic, arising naturally as they engaged in their day-to-day lives. For example, Garth
explained:
Like recently, even where, like, I end up going off on a tangent and becoming like, the
dominant kind of role in something, and then I think back the next day, I'm like, Oh, I
kind of like dominated that whole, like conversation and spoke very, like, on very
absolute terms about everything that I was talking about, right? (Garth)
Some men even suggested that they would sometimes overcorrect and ultimately do more
harm than good as they attempted to calibrate their feminist efforts. For these men, in
their attempts to support women, they inadvertently ended up “interrupting” them (June)
or “speaking for” women in their lives (Larry L.).
Some participants referred to reconstructing their own understanding of masculinity as a
form of feminist work within themselves. Indeed, the work of unlearning masculinity was
seen as foundational to their progress as a feminist man. Kobalon said:
It's me like basically f*cking up along the way, and then realizing … there's a number of
things that I'm unconscious of, that I participate in and do... I believe the only thing I can
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do is that, as I become conscious of these things that I have been complicit in, to
consciously unlearn them or hold them back and stop doing them. (Kobalon)
Many men referred to challenging their understanding of masculinity as a
“responsibility” (Garth, Jordan). While this process was sometimes painful and
challenging, several men described a sense of personal fulfillment from this internal
change. Joseph, for example, explained:
I could tell [feminism] had a great impact on my life. Not that that's what it's about, but
it's just like, I think it's making me a better person, continually…. I think it made me a
better partner, a better husband. It has made me a better son. I think it made me a better
brother. Or not that it has made me. It's making me, because I see it as a process. (Joseph)
Others, such as Andy, derived a sense of fulfillment from perceived involvement in
making the world a more just and equitable place. Some were happy to be more
“mindful” (Garth), and others still felt relieved to have the pressure to perform
masculinity taken off of them so they could be more authentically themselves (Joseph,
Patrick). Overall, every man was reflective in his feminist identity, synthesizing
information and working internally prior to engaging in feminist advocacy and activism
with others.

7.3.4 Taking Action
Each man in the study engaged in feminist action somewhat differently, including
nurturing egalitarian relationships, raising children, educating men, and in some cases,
engaging in advocacy and protest. Several men referred to defying conventional gender
norms within the context of their relationships to alleviate the burden of emotional and
domestic labour for their partners (Patrick, Willem, Andy, BS). Some also deliberately
sought out opportunities to reduce their female partners’ financial burdens, such as BS,
who paid for half of his partner’s birth control. He explained:
The fact that she paid for birth control by herself is complete bullsh*t because birth
control is something that couples both use… She was kind of astounded that that hadn't
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even occurred to her because no one in her life had ever even thought of that… I don't
know that I would have arrived at that without having been aware of feminist issues
through feminism beforehand. (BS)
Those involved in egalitarian partnerships often felt that their feminist relationship style
not only benefitted their partners, but also themselves. When speaking about how
feminism influenced his relationship with his wife, Patrick noted:
Flexibility as being a key factor of being a feminist in a relationship especially like
relationship-wise, masculinity-wise, of having the flexibility to do whatever without
having to worry about if it's appropriate for a guy or a woman… you just have so much
more that you can do in life and that I wouldn't want to trade that for anything. (Patrick)
Others chose to do feminism in their relationships by doing additional household chores
or spending equal time with children (“without calling it babysitting;” Patrick). Only four
participants had children at the time of the interviews, but each suggested that feminism
was an important part of their child-rearing, either because it was “always in the
background” (Andy), because their children were taken to LGBT and feminist protests
(Patrick), or because the children were encouraged to grow up in non-traditional ways
(John Malden). For example, John Malden explained that, while he allowed his girls to
explore feminine gender stereotypes, he challenged the assumptions associated with
them:
We've come up with the concept of princess scientists so that what princesses do is that
they are scientists and they invent stuff and they go out on adventures. So, so if they want
to be a princess, that's fine, they can have a nice princess dress, but then we subvert what
it means to be a princess. (John Malden)
Several participants were involved in one or more forms of advocacy and activism. Due
to their status, these men recognized that they had opportunities to champion, support,
and amplify women personally and professionally. For example, David Pines hosted a
radio show at his university and used the platform to discuss feminist issues with female
guests:
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I often have guests and, and often, you know, when I have guests, women that are
musicians or artists or, or that kind of thing, [feminism] is often a thing we talk about.
And that's often a thing that I'm interested in. And I think that - I think that - I think that
we should talk about on the radio. (David Pines)
Some men saw their role in the feminist movement not on the frontlines, but rather on the
backend by specifically creating opportunities for educating men because, as Skylar
explained, “we need to advocate more necessarily on the women's side, but I think we
need to change the mindset of the men's side.” Participants cited numerous tactics in
which they engaged to educate men, such as giving conservative friends feminist
literature for their birthdays (Bradley), mentoring young men (Curt), or even creating
more formal workshops for male peers. Cole spoke about a program he had created for
men on his college campus:
It was like sexual violence prevention on university campuses… I just did a few
presentations throughout this year, and one of them was on like, online, like online
messaging, kind of like - etiquette is the wrong word, but just like kind of dos and don'ts
of that. And it was like geared towards men. (Cole)
Others had used their status as men to speak up for women in their lives, such as Nigel,
who collected the harassment experiences of women in his workplace and presented it to
his boss. A few men noted that their social-level activism was quieter, such as by
supporting feminist media (Fred) and signing petitions (BS). Others, however, were
happy to be involved in feminist protests and rallies. Patrick recalled:
I went to the - when the - the Women's March after Trump was inaugurated, went to that
one here in [my town], and got a lot of positive responses from everyone there… As a
guy, I felt like I fit in completely. I didn't feel excluded or that people didn't want me
there or anything like that. (Patrick)
In sum, participants were involved in a variety of feminist behaviours, ranging from
personal work and interpersonal behaviours to advocacy and activism, often directly
targeting men. Unsurprisingly, men were more likely to engage in feminist behaviours if
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they received positive reactions and feedback from others, and less likely to be involved
when reactions were confrontational or unpleasant.

7.3.5 Feedback
Men reported a wide range of responses to their interest and involvement in feminism.
Some explained that their experiences as male feminists had been uniformly positive. In
fact, several men felt they had been given undue attention or had received more “praise”
(Garth) than was warranted for their feminist efforts. Patrick recalled an experience from
the Women’s March he had attended:
I felt sometimes that people were paying too much attention. Like I was - like someone
from a local newspaper, put a microphone and said, "Why are you here?" Like, Jesus,
there's like, yeah, there's like 40 women for every guy and you're finding the guy and
putting a microphone in his face? (Patrick)
However, men were aware of the stigma attributed to feminists, and male feminists in
particular. Examples of stereotypes attributed to male feminists included “not a real man”
(Skylar), “in it for dates” (Steven), “social justice warrior” (Bradley), and “p*ssy” (Larry
L.). While most men surrounded themselves with like-minded individuals, many could
recall at least one experience when they had experienced backlash for their feminist
ideals or behaviours. Some men experienced teasing, bullying, and belittling from their
male friends due to their involvement in feminism, such as Skylar, who explained:
When I'm with my guy friends, like my longtime guy friends that I made when I was a
young kid, and they're sort of teasing me about being like “PC police”… I think those
moments where I feel sort of shut down and yeah just trivialized, that, that can take a toll
on me. I only have so much tolerance for that. (Skylar)
While men generally brushed off the comments made from other men, they often
struggled to understand how best to respond to women who chastised them for their
involvement in feminism. Wayne Campbell recalled:
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I … was being clearly supportive that like some kind of measure was needed to address
some imbalance that we're talking about. I don't remember now what it was. And she
goes, "Oh, god, you're a feminist.” I said, "Yeah. Aren't you?" She says, "No, I don't think
we need feminism.” (Wayne)
Some men were even told by women that they could not call themselves feminists
because they did not have the same lived experience of gender-based prejudice that
women do. Kobalon explained:
I've had conversations with ex partners, who would tell me, like, "you can't identify as a
feminist even though you're doing this work." And so, I haven't really worked through
whether I can take up that space that, that label. (Kobalon)
As such, men were generally hesitant about using the term publicly and wary of other
men who used the feminist label. Humorously, Lee explained, “You don’t get a cookie
for being a feminist,” and Doug similarly noted:
I think that you should always be suspicious of men that just like come out and call
themselves ‘feminists’ because it's almost like they're doing it sometimes for like,
wokeness brownie points or something, you know, like, they've learned that like, this is
the new way to, you know, gain the trust of people that they're preying on. (Doug)

7.4

Discussion

This study is one of the first to examine the feminist identity growth of cisgender men
through their lived experiences of being feminist. In the current study, we identified
several steps of the “ongoing process” of feminist identity growth in a sample of 27
cisgender men with varied life experiences. Through a reflexive thematic analysis, we
identified a nonlinear, five-dimension process of male feminist identity growth: Diverse
Feminist Foundations, Turning Points, Evaluation and (Un)Learning, Taking Action, and
Feedback.
Men who had been raised in families or environments where feminist attitudes and ideas
were more normative were generally more open to the ideas and principles underlying
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feminism, while men who had grown up with a high premium on masculinity were
generally less receptive to it initially. Importantly, however, the feminist-identified men
in our sample all started with diverse feminist foundations, signaling that there is the
potential for all men to join the fight for gender equality. Men with strong feminist
figures in their childhood, including parents or godmothers, were not deterred by the
stereotypes associated with feminists, a finding that is also supported in samples of
women (Nelson et al., 2008). These findings support the idea that gender-egalitarian
attitudes can be honed and shaped during childhood in cultural attitudes and the
immediate home environment. It is worth noting that, in general, participants did not
indicate that their fathers or other male family members influenced their interest in
feminism or identification as a feminist. It is possible that feminist mothers were more
outspoken about feminist issues in egalitarian homes, and men were more easily able to
recall their mother’s activism. Alternatively, men raised in homes with feminist fathers
may have regarded their fathers’ behaviours as normative. We encourage future research
into the role of feminist fathers.
The men identified several turning points, which expand upon the types of incidents
described in Baird et al.’s (2007) findings. Some participants were receptive to simple
motivations to identify as feminists, such as taking a women’s studies course or
conversations with trusted friends and loved ones. For others, catalysts to feminist
identification came only after painful or personal experiences. Participants in this study
suggested that their support for feminism came from a wide range of experiences, such as
aha moments, formal education, conversations with others, and recent social movements.
The participants’ observations on catalysts to their feminist identification suggest that
conversations and education about gender (in)equality should start early, and that young
men should be introduced to a diverse range of role models to learn about the experiences
of people across the gender and sexuality spectrum. Further, women’s and gender studies
courses may wish to advertise to men specifically. While not all men are receptive to
formal education about feminism (Schmitz & Haltom, 2017; Thomsen et al., 1995), our
findings suggest that it is possible that men who feel inclined toward feminism may feel
inspired to deepen their involvement with the movement in response to education (see
also Harris et al., 1999). Men may wish to attend feminist lectures, read feminist
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literature, or attend programming specifically tailored toward men who wish to become
more feminist-minded.
The men discussed periods of Evaluation and (Un)learning, during which time they
reassessed their understandings of masculinity and their friendships. Reflection could be
helpful for men’s feminist identity growth as they learned and became more sensitive to
the ways their actions affected the women they sought to support. The work of “undoing
patriarchy” was seen as an effortful and painful experience for some men. While this type
of feminism may not be readily visible, men viewed their internal work as critical to their
feminist activism, as it shifted and shaped the way they engaged with the women in their
lives. While, of course, the objective of feminist activism is not to comfort or placate
cisgender men, female and nonbinary feminists may wish to be tactical in the ways that
they approach correcting men for their inadvertent errors as they calibrate their feminist
identities. Rather than “calling out,” we encourage men to be “called in” to these
conversations so they can continue to listen, learn, and reflect on these experiences.
Many men also were engaged in some form of feminist advocacy or activism. In the
“doing” feminism phase, participants reported involvement in several types of feminist
advocacy and activism. Several men sought to level the power dynamics in their romantic
relationships by striving toward gender-egalitarian relationships. Research suggests that
partners in more gender-egalitarian relationships have higher sexual empowerment and
enhanced communication, compared to those in more traditionally-gendered relationships
(Carlson & Soller, 2019), so it is likely that men’s feminist behaviours in their
relationships contributed to their increased relationship satisfaction. Interestingly, though
two participants had sons, conversations about child-rearing tended to focus on
daughters, making men’s feminist parenting a topic ripe for empirical examination.
Further, the men expressed feeling welcomed and accepted when they attended feminist
protests. Men should consider engaging in feminist collective action, particularly in ways
that can help alleviate the burden for female and nonbinary attendees.
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7.4.1 Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research
While these findings shed novel light on the process underlying feminist identification in
men, this research is not without its limitations. Most notably, each participant was
cisgender, and the feminist identity growth process in transgender men still requires
specific exploration. Moreover, while the sample was diverse in terms of sexuality and
life experiences, most participants were at least partially White, and a majority resided in
the United States and Canada. Given that attitudes toward gender equality may vary by
geographical location and ethnic background (Ipsos, 2019; Robnett & Anderson, 2017), it
will be important for future researchers to examine how men from countries outside of
the United States and men from different ethnic backgrounds become involved with
feminism.
While there is some research to suggest that Black men and women are both interested in
feminism (White, 2006), future research should explore the unique complications of
feminist identification for men of diverse racial backgrounds. It is important to note that,
due to the general racial homogeneity of this sample, it is possible that racial
discrimination would have come up as a precipitating factor for non-White men, and I
encourage future research to explore feminist identity in more diverse samples to explore
whether experiences of racism can predict feminist identification. Kobalon noted that he
witnessed misogynistic violence in his First Nations tribe, suggesting that feminism in the
Ojibwa tribe may be another promising avenue for empirical examination.
Further, the sample was fairly well-educated, with 22 of the 27 men having obtained a
bachelor’s degree at the time of the interview. This is somewhat unsurprising, given that
men often cited formal education as a turning point for their feminist identity growth, and
attending university introduced them to different people, ideas, and perspectives than
they had been exposed to prior to university. It is also possible that the recruitment
advertisement reached a narrower audience than would be representative of the
population. I encourage continued examination of feminist identity growth and
development in men from diverse backgrounds. Finally, this study did not disentangle
“male feminist allies” from “male feminists” from “profeminist men.” Future research
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may wish to dive more deeply into the attitudinal and personal differences between these
categories, particularly as feminist identification has a uniquely powerful impact, even
above other gender equality identifiers (White, 2006).
Importantly, this research provides insight into the experiences of men who currently
label themselves as feminists. Future research should also examine the experiences of
men who are feminist-minded yet eschew the feminist label. While one study suggests
that negative stereotypes contribute to men’s distancing from the feminist label (see
Wiley et al., 2013), there are likely other factors that discourage men from selfidentifying as feminists. These other factors should be explored to understand more fully
the barriers to men’s engagement in feminist advocacy and activism. Future research is
also needed to examine how and when men choose to disclose their feminist identities to
others. Given that men may sometimes face backlash for identifying themselves to others
as feminists, it would be useful to know what factors motivate or hinder men’s feminist
self-labelling. Others may wish to explore how men who identify as feminists are
perceived as potential romantic partners. It is possible that feminist men are perceived as
more desirable partners to individuals with social justice values but may be perceived as
less desirable partners to those who support traditional gender roles and norms.

7.5

Conclusion

Men who identify as feminists can serve as “comrades in the struggle” (hooks, 2000) and
can meaningfully contribute to gender-based social change. These findings add to the
limited research on the experiences of outgroup allies and highlight the experiences that
may catalyze or hinder the development of a feminist identity in cisgender men. This
research suggests that feminist identity growth in men is an “ongoing process,”
comprising several stages, through which men cycle and recalibrate as they encounter
new information and receive feedback on their attitudes and actions. Given the
importance of allies for social change, these data indicate that conversations about race,
gender, social class, and other social issues should begin early in life and happen often.
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These findings also suggest that the FSIS subscales of Fear of Stigma and Uncertainty
may be relevant for cisgender men, as well. In many ways, the uncertainty and
ambivalence noted by women and nonbinary individuals overlaps and intersects with the
uncertainty and ambivalence expressed by men in this study. Much like femininity serves
as an anchor, keeping women tied to restrictive gender-based norms and customs, men’s
understanding of masculinity must be reexamined and reimagined in order to embrace a
feminist identity. Men’s fear of stigma does not appear to be rooted in the same fear of
potential physical harm and occupational backlash as women’s – in fact, several men
specifically noted that they knew that they likely would not experience harm or serious
penalties for defending feminist principles. Rather, these men feared social ostracism
among friends and with potential romantic partners, and some men felt uncertain about
their place and voice in the feminist movement.
When developing tools to evaluate feminist social identity in men, the insights gleaned
from this study should be taken into account. Notably, researchers assessing feminist
social identity in may also wish to examine a subscale about adherence to traditionally
masculine norms, given that most men in this study seemed to denounce some negative
elements of masculinity, while holding onto some positive elements, as their feminist
identities developed. Another potentially useful subscale may be the extent to which men
spend time with other men who are feminists, given that some men expressed a sense of
solidarity with other like-minded men. While the Solidarity subscale may capture some
of this, researchers may wish to specifically tailor the items to other feminist men.
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Chapter 8

8

Conclusion
8.1

Review of Studies

Although feminism has become a cornerstone of the cultural zeitgeist, modern
identification as a feminist is characterized by a notable ambivalence that has heretofore
not undergone systematic examination. In this dissertation, I present six studies that shed
light on the phenomenon of modern feminist identity in the hopes of elucidating the
complex ways in which feminism and antifeminism are intricately intertwined in modern
feminists’ presentation and embodiment of feminist identity. Specifically, this
dissertation provides initial evidence that normative components of feminist identity,
such as identity ambivalence and conditional disclosure of feminist identity – while
beneficial for making the movement palatable to those who oppose gender-based social
change – may actually dilute women’s feminist consciousness and prevent them from
reaping the benefits of advanced levels of feminist identity development. Similarly,
uncertainty about their “place” in the feminist movement can prevent men, even those
who feel comfortable adopting a feminist label, from serving as the powerful allies they
have the potential to be in the workplace and beyond.
In Study 1, I provided a critical review of 10 popular measures of feminist attitudes and
identity, and their long and short forms. This review revealed a number of conceptual and
psychometric limitations of the extant measures designed to evaluate people’s support for
and alignment with feminism. This analysis also revealed a need for an updated measure
of feminist identity grounded in the experiences of those who identify as feminists
themselves.
In Study 2, I conducted a grounded theory analysis of interviews with women and
nonbinary individuals who identify as feminists, and I proposed a theory of ambivalent
feminism that is grounded in seven inherent tensions: (lack of) representation and
inclusion, feminist self-consciousness, entrenchment of femininity, identity
(in)congruence, evasion of stereotypes, and fear of backlash. As suggested by the
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participants, these tensions give rise to both personal outcomes (e.g., body image
disturbances, negotiated sexual agency), as well as political outcomes (e.g., political
[in]action, conditional feminist self-labelling). The results of this study laid the
theoretical foundation for the dimensions of the Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS),
specifically the uncertainty and fear of stigma subscales.
In Study 3, I outlined the initial development of the FSIS, beginning with item
generation, expert review, item refinement, and a Q-sort task. In a large sample of women
recruited from MTurk, the initial nine dimensions were condensed to five as per the
results of an exploratory factor analysis. The initial analysis revealed three dimensions
that represent an alignment with a feminist identity (i.e., feminist beliefs, centrality of
feminist identity, feminist competence) and two dimensions that represent an
ambivalence toward a feminist identity (i.e., fear of stigma, identity uncertainty). The
aligned subscales were significantly and positively linked to liberal feminist attitudes,
public and private feminist identification, and involvement in feminist activities (e.g.,
protest, letter-writing). The ambivalent identity subscales evidenced significant and
negative links with these constructs. This study provided initial evidence of structural and
external validity for the FSIS (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; Flake et al., 2017).
In Study 4, I subjected the FSIS to a confirmatory factor analysis; however, I also
included one additional subscale that seemed to capture the essence of the four additional
subscales that fell out of the exploratory factor analysis. Therefore, the 25-item FSIS and
10 additional solidarity items were analyzed via confirmatory factor analysis, and results
suggested that the six-factor, 35-item version of the scale showed acceptable fit to the
data using data collected from a large sample of women recruited via social media. An
abbreviated, 30-item version with only five items in the solidarity subscale evidenced a
better fit to the data.
Aside from structural validity, this study also provided additional evidence of external
validity for the FSIS, as well. Linking the FSIS to gender-related attitudes, the aligned
identity subscales demonstrated significant and negative associations with hostile and
benevolent sexism and significant and positive associations with feminist identification,
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whereas the ambivalent identity subscales evidenced an opposite pattern. Linking the
FSIS to attitudes toward women’s bodies, ambivalent identity subscales were
significantly and positively associated with a sense that beauty is a form of social
currency and sex is a source of power for women, and these subscales were significantly
and negatively linked to a broad sense of women’s beauty. The aligned identity subscales
showed significant negative links to the idea that sex is a form of power and significant
and positive links to a broad sense of beauty for women. The aligned FSIS subscales
were also positively linked to relationship- and sexuality-related variables, such as a
higher sense of entitlement to pleasure from one’s self and one’s partner, and less fear of
being single. The ambivalent identity subscales were negatively associated with
entitlement to pleasure, and positively associated with fear of being single and likelihood
of faking orgasm for a partner’s sake. Links were not as strong between the FSIS
subscales and own-body attitudes. None of the scales was significantly linked to attitudes
toward menstruation, attitudes toward cosmetic surgery, or makeup use. However, fear of
stigma was positively associated with internalized weight stigma, and all subscales were
associated with attitudes toward body hair in the expected directions. This study provided
initial evidence that the FSIS can be used to evaluate women’s attitudes toward gender
relations, sexuality, and other women’s bodies; however, the scale is not an excellent
predictor of attitudes toward one’s own body.
In Study 5, I provide further external validity for the FSIS by examining additional
convergent, incremental, known-groups, and ecological validity in a sample of White
women. Specifically, I examined the FSIS subscales’ relations to dimensions of sexism,
awareness of White privilege, willingness to intervene in instances of everyday racism
and sexism, participation in feminist and anti-racist activism, and willingness to donate to
a feminist charity (RAINN). The aligned identity subscales were positively associated
with willingness to intervene in feminist and anti-racist activism, participation in feminist
and anti-racist behaviours, and willingness to donate to a feminist organization. The
ambivalent identity subscales showed the opposite pattern. The competence and
solidarity subscales accounted for unique variance in feminist behaviours above and
beyond hostile and benevolent sexism, and these subscales accounted for unique variance
in anti-racist behaviours above and beyond awareness of White privilege in this sample
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of White women. I also evaluated known-groups validity using the grouping from
Zucker’s (2004) Cardinal Beliefs of Feminists Scale. Women who identified as feminists
and endorsed feminist attitudes scored significantly more highly than “non-labellers” and
nonfeminists on each of the aligned identity subscales. “Non-labellers” scored
significantly more highly than feminists and nonfeminists on the uncertainty subscale.
These findings help to distinguish the FSIS from other measures of feminist identity and
attitudes because they tap into the unique importance of identity.
Given that patriarchy largely benefits men, cisgender men’s relationship to feminism
warrants special attention. As such, rather than evaluating men’s scores on the FSIS, I
conducted a thematic analysis in Study 6 to understand the ways that men’s feminist
social identities develop over time, and the factors that facilitate and hinder this process.
My analysis resulted in the development of a new model of feminist identity growth in
cisgender men. Rather than a static linear process suggested by other models of feminist
identity development in women, the feminist identity growth model suggests that men
may enter into the growth process at any time, and that feminist identity may shift and
change over time in response to feedback from others. While feminist men evidenced
similar discomfort in their feminist identities to feminist women and nonbinary
individuals, this discomfort took a different form. While individuals both groups felt
excluded from the movement due to lack of representation, feminist men faced the
additional discomfort of backlash from women and men who made them feel as though
their contributions were unwelcome. When men experienced this stigma, they were less
likely to continue wanting to engage with the movement and learn more about how to
leverage their privilege to best support women. These findings suggest that men may
score similarly on the uncertainty and fear of stigma subscales of the FSIS, and future
research should evaluate measurement invariance between women and men on this scale.

8.2

Implications and Future Directions

This research suggests that modern feminist identity contains complexities that are not
captured in previous measures of feminist identity. The development and implementation
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of the FSIS addresses many of the limitations identified in past measures in Chapter 2,
and will allow scholars to evaluate multiple dimensions of feminist social identity
simultaneously, in order to develop a broader picture of modern feminist identity.
While the FSIS has a number of strengths, it is not without its limitations. One key
limitation of this program of research is the overwhelmingly White, Western samples.
There are a number of reasons why White women may have been more drawn to studies
on feminism, compared to Women of Colour. For example, Black women may prefer to
label their alignment with the principles of gender equality “Womanism” or may
generally be averse to mainstream feminism (Kendall, 2020). However, given that this is
a common limitation of measures of feminist identity, it will be critical moving forward
that tests of measurement invariance are conducted to compare the factor structure of the
FSIS in White women and women from other racial and ethnic groups. Further, the FSIS
has not yet been tested in men. The results from Study 6 suggest that men’s experiences
of uncertainty may be greater, but their fear of stigma may be weaker, than women’s.
Finally, tests of measurement invariance could also potentially shine light on potential
differences between sexual minority women and heterosexual women. Given that lesbian
women consistently score more highly on measures of feminist identification and
activism (see Moore & Stathi, 2019; Szymanski, 2004), potentially due to comfort
adopting stigmatized labels (Duncan, 1999), one would expect that lesbian women would
score more highly than heterosexual women on the aligned subscales, and less highly
than heterosexual women on the ambivalent sexism. The measure should also be
validated cross-culturally, to determine whether these dimensions of feminist identity are
appropriate for individuals in Eastern cultures.
Another promising avenue for future exploration is the development of feminist profiles
using Latent Profile Analysis (LPA). It is possible that different combinations of scores
on the FSIS subscales may be linked to different patterns of feminist attitudes. This is
consistent with past research which has used conglomerated measures of feminist
attitudes and identity to determine different feminist “types” (Yoder et al., 2012; Zucker,
2004). For example, in a 2012 study by Yoder and colleagues, canonical correlation
analysis revealed three distinct types of feminist attitudes: established feminism, woman-
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identified traditionalism (i.e., nonfeminism), and a third category of “awakening
feminism,” which was characterized by supporting feminist principles and scoring highly
on revelation subscale of the Feminist Identity Composite (Fischer et al., 2000); this
subscale was negatively related to well-being. Zucker (2004) has also evaluated a third
dimension of feminist identity beyond feminists and nonfeminists, with a special
emphasis on the unique role of feminist identity. The “in-between” category of nonlabellers has been associated with less support for feminist principles and practices
(Zucker & Bay-Cheng, 2010). It is possible that further examination of the FSIS via
canonical correlation or LPA may reveal additional feminist identities that help
encapsulate the tangled set of attitudes different feminists may experience.
An additional area that is ripe for examination is tracing the development of feminist
social identity over time. While interview-based qualitative research provides the
opportunity to glean rich data from participants, tracing people’s historical experiences
relies on recall, which is notably faulty. A longitudinal qualitative approach, such as the
approach taken by Dr. Niva Piran in her Developmental Theory of Embodiment (2017)
may allow for scholars to understand how and when feminist identities take on an
ambivalent nature, and in response to which triggers, as well as the moments that help to
reduce this uncertainty.
Further, both women and men in these studies were less likely to be involved in feminist
activism and more inclined to participate in less “extreme” forms of everyday feminism.
Given the popularity of social media activism, it is possible that the shift away from inperson collective action and toward the deliberate integration of feminist principles into
one’s daily life and social media presence may be the way of the future for social
activism. Social psychologists and sociologists studying social identity and social
movements should consider examining the efficacy of everyday feminism, as well as
motivations for participating in certain types of activism over others.
Finally, Studies 2, 4, and 6 of this dissertation highlighted the ways that traditional
gender role norms and expectations can serve as barriers to feminist identity, and
conforming to these norms may restrict people from reaping the benefits that feminist
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identity brings (for a discussion about the limitations of the gender binary, see
Morgenroth & Ryan, 2020). Both women and men in these studies indicated that
developing a feminist identity meant renouncing some aspects of their gender role.
However, most participants still felt aligned with their assigned gender. Future research
should specifically examine how feminist identity is negotiated and navigated for
individuals who are transgender and nonbinary. While Study 2 included some
participants who were transgender and nonbinary, due to the unique role gender seems to
play in feminist ambivalence, individualized attention should be paid to these
populations.

8.3

Conclusion

Overall, this package of research sheds light on the ambivalence inherent in many
modern feminists’ identities. Through a critical review, two qualitative studies, and the
development and validation of a novel psychological instrument to evaluate the
multidimensionality of contemporary feminist identity, this dissertation deepens the
field’s understanding of social identity, the psychology of feminism and postfeminism,
and the psychology of gender and allyship. Developing and maintaining a fully aligned
feminist identity may be nearly impossible in a patriarchal and heterosexist culture.
However, this research suggests that overcoming feminist ambivalence may be a
necessary step toward gender equality.
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Appendices
Appendix A. Final Interview Schedule for Study 2
1. What does feminism mean to you?
2. Where did you learn this definition?
3. How has your identity as a feminist developed?
4. Was there a defining moment when you knew you were a feminist?
5. What do you think people think about when they think of male feminists?
6. How does your understanding of what it means to be a feminist intersect with
what it means to be a man?
7. What or who have been some of your feminist influences or role models?
8. Have your behaviors changed since becoming a feminist? If so, how?
9. What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of being a feminist?
10. How do people react when you tell them you are a feminist?
11. Have you ever experienced backlash for calling yourself a feminist or identifying
as a feminist?
12. Is there any person or people around whom you avoid using the word “feminist”?
Why?
13. Are you involved with any feminist activism? In person? Online?
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Appendix B. Initial Battery of Items Presented to Participants in Study 3
IA = Identity Affirmation, S = Stigma, P = Political, A = Acceptance, Pro =
Prototypicality, U = Uncertainty, Comp = Competence, Cent = Centrality, B = Beliefs
1.

I am glad that I am a feminist. (IA)

2.

I take pride in my feminist identity. (IA)

3.

I feel good about my feminist identity. (IA)

4.

I like being a feminist. (IA)

5.

My identity as a feminist is a source of pride for me. (IA)

6.

I am overjoyed to be a feminist. (IA)

7.

If someone called me a “feminist,” I would consider it a compliment. (IA)

8.

Being a feminist makes me happy. (IA)

9.

I am proud to be a feminist. (IA)

10. My life would be a lot better if I were not a feminist. (IA)
11. I am selective about who I tell that I am a feminist because I am afraid of others'
reactions. (S)
12. I worry how people would react if I said I were a feminist. (S)
13. I do not want people to think I am an “angry feminist.” (S)
14. I fear that I would be mocked if I told people that I am a feminist. (S)
15. I'm worried that if I tell people I am a feminist, they will think I hate men. (S)
16. I do not tell certain people that I am a feminist. (S)
17. I worry about people’s perceptions of me as a feminist. (S)
18. I do not admit that I am a feminist when I cannot tell how others will respond. (S)
19. I only call myself a feminist when I know it will not cause problems. (S)
20. In some situations, I think it is better not to tell people I am a feminist. (S)
21. It is important to me that feminism is political. (P)
22. I see myself as a feminist activist. (P)
23. I feel it is necessary to call attention to the way that women and gender minorities
are treated unfairly. (P)
24. When it comes to feminism, I am very political. (P)
25. Advocating for feminist principles is important to me. (P)
26. When I hear about feminist activism, I want to be involved. (P)
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27. I am very interested in feminist politics. (P)
28. I am willing to advocate for feminist issues. (P)
29. I see activism as a necessary part of feminism. (P)
30. I am willing to fight for the rights of women and gender diverse people. (P)
31. I see myself as similar to most feminists. (Pro)
32. I have a lot in common with a typical feminist. (Pro)
33. If someone painted a portrait of a feminist, it would look a lot like me. (Pro)
34. When people think about feminists, I’m probably not the kind of person that comes
to mind. (Pro)
35. When people think about feminists, they probably think about someone like me.
(Pro)
36. I am a good example of what a feminist is like. (Pro)
37. When I think about what a feminist is like, I think of myself. (Pro)
38. I am a good example of a feminist. (Pro)
39. I am just like a feminist. (Pro)
40. When people talk about feminists, they are talking about people like me. (Pro)
41. I have the skills necessary to be an effective feminist. (Comp)
42. I know enough about feminism to talk about it with other people. (Comp)
43. If someone asked me about feminism, I would be prepared to talk about it. (Comp)
44. I can speak competently about many feminist topics. (Comp)
45. I am capable of putting feminist attitudes into practice. (Comp)
46. If I wanted to, I could debate a feminist topic with someone. (Comp)
47. I feel comfortable talking to others about feminism. (Comp)
48. If someone had a question about feminism, they could come to me for answers.
(Comp)
49. I am easily able to jump into any feminist conversation. (Comp)
50. I have the ability to speak up for the feminist issues that are important to me. (Comp)
51. In order to understand who I am as a person, you must know that I am a feminist.
(Cent)
52. My identity as a feminist is one of the most important things about me. (Cent)
53. Being a feminist is not particularly central to who I am. (Cent)
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54. Being a feminist is more important to me than many other parts of my identity, such
as my age or ethnicity. (Cent)
55. My feminist identity is at the core of who I am. (Cent)
56. Being a feminist is an important reflection of who I am. (Cent)
57. Being a feminist is critical to the person I am. (Cent)
58. Being a feminist is a central part of my identity. (Cent)
59. When I think about who I am as a person, “feminist” is one of the first things that
comes to mind. (Cent)
60. Being a feminist is an important part of my identity. (Cent)
61. I prefer to spend my time with feminists. (A)
62. I would feel comfortable walking into a room full of feminists. (A)
63. When someone tells me they are a feminist, I assume we will get along. (A)
64. I feel like feminists are always judging me. (A)
65. I feel accepted by feminists. (A)
66. I feel embraced by feminists. (A)
67. When I am around feminists, I feel welcomed. (A)
68. I enjoy meeting people who are feminists. (A)
69. I enjoy being around feminists. (A)
70. I feel like I can be myself when I am in the presence of feminists. (A)
71. I cannot decide whether or not I am a feminist. (U)
72. It is not clear to me whether or not I am a feminist. (U)
73. If someone asked me if I were a feminist, I am not sure how I would respond. (U)
74. I am not sure if I can call myself a feminist. (U)
75. Sometimes I act like a feminist, but other times I do not. (U)
76. There are situations and circumstances when I would not call myself a feminist. (U)
77. In some ways, I am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not. (U)
78. I feel confused when I think about whether or not I am a feminist. (U)
79. I agree with some parts of feminism, but not others. (U)
80. Sometimes I think I am a feminist, but other times I do not. (U)
81. When I hear about the things feminists believe in, I usually agree with them. (B)
82. I see the world the same way that feminists do. (B)
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83. When I meet someone who is a feminist, I assume we will see eye to eye on many
things. (B)
84. I believe the same things that feminists do. (B)
85. My attitudes about the world are similar to the attitudes feminists hold. (B)
86. The principles that I hold are similar to feminists’ principles. (B)
87. I do not agree with most feminists. (reverse, B)
88. I stand for the same things that feminists stand for. (B)
89. If I read a book about feminism, I would probably agree with the points made. (B)
90. When I hear feminist arguments, I think they are correct. (B)
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Appendix C. Feminist Social Identity Scale (FSIS)
Instructions: Regardless of whether people see themselves as feminists or not, people
have a variety of different attitudes about feminism and feminists. Regardless of whether
people see themselves as feminists or not, people have a variety of different attitudes
about feminism and feminists. Please read the following questions and answer them
based on how true they are of you.

Scale: Completely untrue of me (1) to completely true of me (6)

Beliefs
1. I stand for the same things that feminists stand for.
2. When I hear feminist arguments, I think they are correct.
3. I believe the same things that feminists do.
4. When I hear about the things feminists believe in, I usually agree with them.
5. I see the world the same way that feminists do.
Competence
1. I feel comfortable talking to others about feminism.
2. I can speak competently about many feminist topics.
3. If I wanted to, I could debate a feminist topic with someone.
4. If someone asked me about feminism, I would be prepared to talk about it.
5. I know enough about feminism to talk about it with other people.
Solidarity
1. When someone speaks negatively about feminists, it feels like a personal insult.*
2. If someone tells me they are a feminist, I feel like I can trust them.*
3. I experience a deep sense of connection with other feminists.
4. When I learn that someone is a feminist, I want to support them.
5. I feel as though I am a part of a community of feminists.*
6. I feel connected to the feminist movement.
7. I feel a sense of closeness with feminists.*
8. When I talk with feminists, it feels like we are speaking the same language.*
9. Being a feminist makes me feel like I am a part of something bigger than myself.
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10. I feel I have a commitment to feminists.
Centrality
1. When I think about who I am as a person, “feminist” is one of the first things that
comes to mind.
2. My feminist identity is at the core of who I am.
3. Being a feminist is a central part of my identity.
4. Being a feminist is critical to the person I am.
5. My identity as a feminist is one of the most important things about me.
Fear of Stigma
1. I worry how people would react if I said I were a feminist.*
2. I fear that I would be mocked if I told people that I am a feminist.
3. I do not tell certain people that I am a feminist.
4. I do not admit that I am a feminist when I cannot tell how others will respond.
5. In some situations, I think it is better not to tell people I am a feminist.
Uncertainty
1. I feel confused when I think about whether or not I am a feminist.
2. In some ways, I am a feminist, but in other ways, I am not.
3. It is not clear to me whether or not I am a feminist.
4. Sometimes I think I am a feminist, but other times I do not.
5. I cannot decide whether or not I am a feminist.

Note. *Item was not retained in the final version of the FSIS.
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Appendix D. Final Interview Schedule for Study 6
1. What does feminism mean to you?
2. Where did you learn this definition?
3. How has your identity as a feminist developed?
4. Was there a defining moment when you knew you were a feminist?
5. What do you think people think about when they think of male feminists?
6. How does your understanding of what it means to be a feminist intersect with
what it means to be a man?
7. What or who have been some of your feminist influences or role models?
8. Have your behaviors changed since becoming a feminist? If so, how?
9. What are some of the advantages and disadvantages of being a feminist?
10. How do people react when you tell them you are a feminist?
11. Have you ever experienced backlash for calling yourself a feminist or identifying
as a feminist?
12. Is there any person or people around whom you avoid using the word “feminist”?
Why?
13. Are you involved with any feminist activism? In person? Online?
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